Dongfeng (Phoenix) Fang, PhD, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering at the California Polytechnical State University, San Luis Obispo, USA. Yi Qian, PhD, is a Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Nebraska‐Lincoln, USA. Rose Qingyang Hu, PhD, is a Professor in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department and the Associate Dean for Research of the College of Engineering, Utah State University, USA.

• About the Authors ixPreface xiAcknowledgments xiiiIntroduction xv1 Introduction to 5G Wireless Systems 11.1 Motivations and Objectives of 5G Wireless Networks 11.2 Security Drives and Requirements 21.3 5GWireless Network Architecture 41.3.1 Overview of the 5G Wireless Network Architecture 41.3.2 Comparison Between the Legacy Cellular Network and the 5GWireless Network 51.4 Conclusion 62 Security from Legacy Wireless Systems to 5G Networks 72.1 Network Security for Legacy Systems 72.2 Security Attacks and Security Services in 5G Wireless Networks 92.2.1 Security Attacks 92.2.2 Security Services 112.2.2.1 Authentication 122.2.2.2 Confidentiality 122.2.2.3 Availability 132.2.2.4 Integrity 142.3 The Evolution of Wireless Security Architectures from 3G to 5G 142.3.1 3G Security Architecture 142.3.2 4G Security Architecture 152.3.3 5GWireless Security Architecture 162.3.3.1 Overview of the Proposed 5G Wireless Security Architecture 162.3.3.2 Security Domains 172.4 Summary 183 Security Services and Mechanisms in 5G Wireless Systems 193.1 Cryptographic Approaches and Physical Layer Security 193.2 Authentication 223.3 Availability 273.4 Data Confidentiality 293.5 Key Management 333.6 Privacy 353.7 Conclusion 364 An Efficient Security Solution Based on Physical Layer Security in 5G Wireless Networks 374.1 Enhancing 5G Security Through Artificial Noise and Interference Utilization 374.2 A HetNet System Model and Security Analysis 384.2.1 System Model and Threat Model 384.2.2 Security Analysis 404.3 Problem Formulation and Analysis 424.3.1 Maximum Secrecy Rate 434.3.2 The Proposed Algorithm 434.4 Numerical and Simulation Results 464.5 Conclusion 495 Flexible and Efficient Security Schemes for IoT Applications in 5G Wireless Systems 515.1 IoT Application Models and Current Security Challenges 515.2 A General System Model for IoT Applications Over 5G 525.2.1 System Architecture 525.2.2 Trust Models 545.2.3 Threat Models and Design Objectives 555.3 The 5G Authentication and Secure Data Transmission Scheme 565.3.1 Overview of the 5G Authentication and Secure Data Transmission Scheme 565.3.2 The Detailed Scheme 575.3.2.1 Phase 1 -- System Initialization 575.3.2.2 Phase 2 -- Authentication and Initial Session Key Agreement 585.3.2.3 Phase 3 -- Data Transmission 585.3.2.4 Phase 4 -- Data Receiving 595.3.2.5 Phase 5 -- T2 IoT Devices Authentication and Initial Session Key Agreement 595.4 Security Analysis 605.4.1 Protocol Verification 615.4.2 Security Objectives 615.4.2.1 Mutual Authentication 615.4.2.2 Initial Session Key Agreement 625.4.2.3 Data Confidentiality and Integrity 625.4.2.4 Contextual Privacy 625.4.2.5 Forward Security 625.4.2.6 End-to-End Security 635.4.2.7 Key Escrow Resilience 635.5 Performance Evaluation 635.5.1 Security Services 635.5.2 Computational Overhead 635.5.3 Communication Overhead 665.6 Conclusion 676 Secure and Efficient Mobility Management in 5G Wireless Networks 716.1 Handover Issues and Requirements Over 5G Wireless Networks 716.2 A 5G CN Model and HetNet System Model 726.3 5G Handover Scenarios and Procedures 756.3.1 Handover Scenarios 756.3.2 Handover Procedures 766.4 A New Authentication Protocol for 5G Networks 796.4.1 Assumptions 806.4.2 Pre-Authentication 806.4.3 Full Authentication 816.4.4 Fast Authentication 836.4.4.1 Handover Between APs 836.4.4.2 Handover Between BSs 846.5 Security Analysis of the New 5G Authentication Protocols 846.6 Performance Evaluations 856.6.1 Communication Overhead 866.6.2 Computation Overhead 866.7 Conclusion 877 Open Issues and Future Research Directions for Security and Privacy in 5G Networks 897.1 New Trust Models 897.2 New Security Attack Models 907.3 Privacy Protection 907.4 Unified Security Management 91References 93Index 103

Dongfeng (Phoenix) Fang, PhD, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering at the California Polytechnical State University, San Luis Obispo, USA. Yi Qian, PhD, is a Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Nebraska‐Lincoln, USA. Rose Qingyang Hu, PhD, is a Professor in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department and the Associate Dean for Research of the College of Engineering, Utah State University, USA.

• About the Authors ixPreface xiAcknowledgments xiiiIntroduction xv1 Introduction to 5G Wireless Systems 11.1 Motivations and Objectives of 5G Wireless Networks 11.2 Security Drives and Requirements 21.3 5GWireless Network Architecture 41.3.1 Overview of the 5G Wireless Network Architecture 41.3.2 Comparison Between the Legacy Cellular Network and the 5GWireless Network 51.4 Conclusion 62 Security from Legacy Wireless Systems to 5G Networks 72.1 Network Security for Legacy Systems 72.2 Security Attacks and Security Services in 5G Wireless Networks 92.2.1 Security Attacks 92.2.2 Security Services 112.2.2.1 Authentication 122.2.2.2 Confidentiality 122.2.2.3 Availability 132.2.2.4 Integrity 142.3 The Evolution of Wireless Security Architectures from 3G to 5G 142.3.1 3G Security Architecture 142.3.2 4G Security Architecture 152.3.3 5GWireless Security Architecture 162.3.3.1 Overview of the Proposed 5G Wireless Security Architecture 162.3.3.2 Security Domains 172.4 Summary 183 Security Services and Mechanisms in 5G Wireless Systems 193.1 Cryptographic Approaches and Physical Layer Security 193.2 Authentication 223.3 Availability 273.4 Data Confidentiality 293.5 Key Management 333.6 Privacy 353.7 Conclusion 364 An Efficient Security Solution Based on Physical Layer Security in 5G Wireless Networks 374.1 Enhancing 5G Security Through Artificial Noise and Interference Utilization 374.2 A HetNet System Model and Security Analysis 384.2.1 System Model and Threat Model 384.2.2 Security Analysis 404.3 Problem Formulation and Analysis 424.3.1 Maximum Secrecy Rate 434.3.2 The Proposed Algorithm 434.4 Numerical and Simulation Results 464.5 Conclusion 495 Flexible and Efficient Security Schemes for IoT Applications in 5G Wireless Systems 515.1 IoT Application Models and Current Security Challenges 515.2 A General System Model for IoT Applications Over 5G 525.2.1 System Architecture 525.2.2 Trust Models 545.2.3 Threat Models and Design Objectives 555.3 The 5G Authentication and Secure Data Transmission Scheme 565.3.1 Overview of the 5G Authentication and Secure Data Transmission Scheme 565.3.2 The Detailed Scheme 575.3.2.1 Phase 1 -- System Initialization 575.3.2.2 Phase 2 -- Authentication and Initial Session Key Agreement 585.3.2.3 Phase 3 -- Data Transmission 585.3.2.4 Phase 4 -- Data Receiving 595.3.2.5 Phase 5 -- T2 IoT Devices Authentication and Initial Session Key Agreement 595.4 Security Analysis 605.4.1 Protocol Verification 615.4.2 Security Objectives 615.4.2.1 Mutual Authentication 615.4.2.2 Initial Session Key Agreement 625.4.2.3 Data Confidentiality and Integrity 625.4.2.4 Contextual Privacy 625.4.2.5 Forward Security 625.4.2.6 End-to-End Security 635.4.2.7 Key Escrow Resilience 635.5 Performance Evaluation 635.5.1 Security Services 635.5.2 Computational Overhead 635.5.3 Communication Overhead 665.6 Conclusion 676 Secure and Efficient Mobility Management in 5G Wireless Networks 716.1 Handover Issues and Requirements Over 5G Wireless Networks 716.2 A 5G CN Model and HetNet System Model 726.3 5G Handover Scenarios and Procedures 756.3.1 Handover Scenarios 756.3.2 Handover Procedures 766.4 A New Authentication Protocol for 5G Networks 796.4.1 Assumptions 806.4.2 Pre-Authentication 806.4.3 Full Authentication 816.4.4 Fast Authentication 836.4.4.1 Handover Between APs 836.4.4.2 Handover Between BSs 846.5 Security Analysis of the New 5G Authentication Protocols 846.6 Performance Evaluations 856.6.1 Communication Overhead 866.6.2 Computation Overhead 866.7 Conclusion 877 Open Issues and Future Research Directions for Security and Privacy in 5G Networks 897.1 New Trust Models 897.2 New Security Attack Models 907.3 Privacy Protection 907.4 Unified Security Management 91References 93Index 103