Complexity and Institutions: Markets, Norms and Corporations

MASAHIKO AOKI, Stanford University, USA. KENNETH BINMORE, University of London, UK.  SIMON DEAKIN, Cambridge University, UK. HERBERT GINTIS, Santa Fe Institute USA and Central European University, Hungary.

• PART I: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL REALITY Theory and Reality in Economics: Insights from Three Allegories; M.Kandori PART II: COMPLEX ECONOMIC DYNAMICS: AGENT-BASED AND ANALYTICAL MODELS The Dynamics of Pure Market Exchange; H.Gintis Towards an Analytical Solution for Agent Based Models; an Application to a Credit Network Economy; C.Guilmi , M.Gallegati , S.Landini & J.Stiglitz The EURACE Macroeconomic Model and Simulator; S.Cincotti, M.Roberto & A.Teglio PART III: SOCIAL NORMS Aspects of Naturalising the Social Contract; B.Skyrms The Role of Salience in the Emergence and Reproduction of Norms; R.Sugden Fairness as an Equilibrium Selection Device; K.Binmore PART IV: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ORGANISATION Shapley-Value Parables of Corporations as Evolutive Systems of Associational Cognition; M.Aoki An End to Consensus? The Selective Impact of Corporate Law Reform on Financial Development; S.Deakin , P.Sarkar & A.Singh On the Plasticity of the Corporate Form; K.Pistor Government Banks and Growth: Theory and Evidence; S.Andianova , P.Demetriades & A.Shortland