Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control

Ali Co?kun Tunçer is Lecturer in Modern Economic History at the Department of History, University College London (UCL). Previously he taught and conducted research in economic history at the London School of Economics and the European University Institute, Italy. His research focuses on the economic and financial history of the late Ottoman Empire, long-term economic change in the Middle East and Southeast Europe, the history of financial markets from the early modern era to the present, and long-term market integration in Europe and the Mediterranean.

"This book will certainly become a go-to reference for historians interested in the region and economists seeking better understanding of the mechanisms of default. ... this is an admirable work of nuanced historical interpretation that questions received generalizations and raises many questions for future research. Economists and economic historians interested in sovereign default, state capacity and even the debt crisis in the Eurozone will do well to read it." (Rui Esteves, EH.Net, March, 2016) "Ali Coskun Tuncer's work fills a historiographical gap concerning the establishment and the role of international financial control committees in Egypt ... . Ali Coskun Tuncer's work is essential reading, both for experts in the field and for all those interested in deep ening their understanding of the role of international financial committees in the Mediterranean in the nineteenth century." (Giampaolo Conte, The Journal of European Economic History, Issue 3, January, 2015)

• 1 Introduction2 Governing Sovereign Debt: Defaults And Enforcement, 1870-1914 2.1 Origins Of Defaults: Financial And Monetary Constraints 2.2 Costs Of Defaults: Enforcement And Conditionality 2.2.1 Direct Sanctions And Preventing Access To Future Credit 2.2.2 Protective Clauses And Bondholder Committees 2.2.3 Assignment And Control Of Future Revenues 2.3 Summary And Conclusions 3 From Financial Control To Colonisation: Egypt, 1862-19143.1 Khedives As Borrowers: Crisis, Default And Punishment 3.2 The Loss Of Political Sovereignty And Imperial Rivalry 3.3 Summary And Conclusions4 From ''Financial Barbarism'' To Cooperation: The Ottoman Empire, 1854-19144.1 Lending To The Sick Man Of Bond Markets4.2 The Loss Of Fiscal Sovereignty And Cooperation4.3 Summary And Conclusions5 From Fiscal Control To Financial Supervision: Serbia, 1878-19145.1 A Newborn State Surrounded By Foreign Creditors5.2 Financial Control In A ''LandOf Monopolies''5.3 Summary And Conclusions6 From Financial Supervision To Political Resistance: Greece, 1879-19146.1 Financial Isolation And Settlement: A History Of Defaults6.2 Refining The Control And ''Mistrust'' To Creditors6.3 Summary And Conclusions7 International Financial Control And Sovereign Risk7.1 Determinants Of Sovereign Risk Before 1914: A Critical Review7.2 Measuring Sovereign Risk: Sources And Methodology7.3 Structural Breaks In Spread: The Bai-Perron Test7.4 Summary And Conclusions8 Debt, Default And Resistance: Political Economy Of Ifcs8.1 Fiscal Capacity, Political Regimes And Tax Systems: A Review8.1.1 Taxation Vs Representation8.1.2 Direct Vs Indirect Taxes8.1.3 Political Regime Type And Public Debt8.1.4 Foreign Rule: Resistance Vs Cooperation8.1.5 Conclusion8.2 Varying Degrees Of Success And The Extent Of Control8.3 Political Institutions And Tax Systems In The Middle East And The Balkans8.4 Summary And Conclusions9 Conclusion Bibliography Data Appendix