Chennat Gopalakrishnan is Professor (Emeritus) of Natural Resource Economics at the University of Hawaii, USA. He has published seven books and approximately 115 journal articles and technical papers on current and emerging issues in natural resource economics and policy. He is the Editor-In-Chief of the Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research.

'This book does great service by giving scholars a unique opportunity to read classic papers in natural resource economics side-by-side with extensive expert commentary contributing original insights on why the papers are classics, and how the papers set the agenda for future work. There is no better, or more enjoyable way, to come up to speed on the intellectual development of natural resource economics than reading this book.' - Ray Huffaker, University of Florida, USA'Seven papers, originally published between 1960 and 2000, that address key issues in resource production, pricing, consumption, planning, management, and policy, are used as the inspiration for forty-eight additional papers that examine why these seven papers have become classics and how they have impacted and shaped the intellectual content of the field of natural-resource economics. Papers are grouped into the five core areas of naturalresource economics—the intertemporal problem; externalities and market failure; property rights, institutions, and public choice; the economics of exhaustible resources; and the economics of renewable resources. Gopalakrishnan is Professor (Emeritus) of Natural Resource Economics at the University of Hawaii. Index'. - December 2016 issue of the Journal of Economic Literature (Volume 54, no. 4) and the American Economic Association's electronic publications: e-JEL, JEL on CD, and EconLit.'Dr. Gopalakrishnan has provided a valuable service by linking these foundational papers by pioneers in natural resource and environmental economics with a series of commentaries by contemporary authors. The range of topics is as timely today as when the papers were originally written: forest policy, exhaustible resources, externalities, market failures and tragedy of the commons. The value added of the book is the commentaries on these classic articles by leading thinkers who assess the strengths as well as the limitations of the Classic Papers. Collectively these authors provide their own insights, rebuttals to, refinements of, and extensions to the original path- breaking papers and challenges facing natural resource economists in the 21st Century.' - Dr John Loomis, Colorado State University, USA'This book is a jewel. It contains classic works in natural resource economics and policy. Three cheers to Dr. Chennat Gopalakrishnan (Gopal) for his original and exhaustive treatment of five foundation areas of the discipline that will engage a large and growing body of readers worldwide. The five foundations are:1. The Intertemporal Problem2. The Problem of Social Cost3. Property Rights, Institutions and Public Choice4. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources.5. Renewable ResourcesI like his treatment of those important five themes for several reasons:The book is a first rate source for an upper division undergraduate or graduate seminar in natural resource economics as a standalone source for much or all source material for such a seminar.Each of the five areas centers on a classic work, while being complemented by a number of supporting works. The supporting works are nice for scholars who want to see what makes for a great paper or who need background reading before entering the classic.It makes a fine source for PhD students starting on a dissertation or scholars working on a literature review who wish to access foundations.It reaches out beyond economics. For example, Elinor Ostrom's Economics Nobel Prize winning career is as much about natural resource institutions as neoclassical economics.The chapters contain so much breadth and depth to make it a treasured addition to my library.' -Frank A. Ward, New Mexico State University, USA

• Introduction Section I: The Intertemporal Problem 1. Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions 2. The relevance and the limits of the Arrow-Lind Theorem 3. A reconsideration of Arrow-Lind: risk aversion, risk sharing, and agent choice 4. Evaluating uncertain public projects with rival and non-rival benefits 5. Probing the limits of risk-neutral government 6. Are we in this together? Risk bearing and collective action 7. Evaluation of public investments and individual discounting 8. Rebutting Arrow and Lind: why governments should use market rates for discounting 9. Revisiting Arrow-Lind: Managing Sovereign Disaster Risk 10. Size matters: capital market size and risk-return profiles 11. Microeconomic foundations of bailouts Section II: Externalities and Market Failure – Ronald H. Coase 12. The Problem of Social Cost 13. Battles lost and wars won: reflections on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 14. The importance of being misunderstood: the Coase theorem and the legacy of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 15. Infringement as nuisance: intellectual property rights and The Problem of Social Cost 16. About some distortions in the interpretation of ‘the problem of social cost’ 17. The successes and failures of Professor Coase Section III: Property Rights, Institutions and Public Choice – Garrett J. Hardin and Elinor Ostrom 18. The Tragedy of the Commons 19. The Core Challenges of Moving Beyond Garrett Hardin 20. Revising the Commons Paradigm 21. Hardin’s Brilliant Tragedy and a Non-Sequitur Response 22. Free Parking at Christmas Is Not a Tragedy of the Commons 23. Guarding the Guardians: Enforcement in the Commons 24. From ‘Tragedy’ to Commons: How Hardin’s Mistake Might Save the World 25. Collective action and the evolution of social norms 26. The collective action theory path to contextual analysis 27. Contextualizing the influence of social norms, collective action on social-ecological systems 28. Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms: the principled optimism of Elinor Ostrom 29. Crossing disciplinary boundaries 30. Elinor Ostrom’s challenge for laboratory experiments 31. The evolution of social norms in conflict resolution 32. The evolution of elite and societal norms pertaining to the emergence of federal-tribal co-management of natural resources Section IV: The Economics of Exhaustible Resources – Robert Solow and William Nordhaus 33. The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics 34. Reflections on Solow’s The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics 35. What Does the Empirical Work Inspired by Solow’s The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics Tell Us? 36. What Would Solow Say? 37. Reflections on Solow’s 1974 Richard T. Ely Address 38. The Economics of Resources and the Economics of Climate 39. Celebrating Solow: Lessons from Natural Resource Economics for Environmental Policy 40. The Allocation of Energy Resources 41. Modeling long term energy futures after Nordhaus (1973) 42. The allocation of energy resources in the very long run 43. The world before climate change 44. Energy modeling post 1973 45. The allocation of energy conservation 46. A retrospective on The Allocation of Energy Resource 47. Backstop technology: model keystone or energy systems transition guide essay 48. Caveats for climate policy from Nordhaus’s The Allocation of Energy Resources Section V: Renewable Resources - Paul A. Samuelson 49. Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society 50. Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society: Still an Important and Relevant Article Thirty Six Years Later 51. Reflections on Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society 52. Samuelson and 21st Century Tropical Forest Economics 53. Putting Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society into Context: The Limits of Forest Economics in Policy Debates 54. Samuelson on Forest Economics: An Inadvertent Tribute to Faustmann, and a Few Others 55. Thoughts on Paul Samuelson’s Classic, Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society

Chennat Gopalakrishnan is Professor (Emeritus) of Natural Resource Economics at the University of Hawaii, USA. He has published seven books and approximately 115 journal articles and technical papers on current and emerging issues in natural resource economics and policy. He is the Editor-In-Chief of the Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research.

'This book does great service by giving scholars a unique opportunity to read classic papers in natural resource economics side-by-side with extensive expert commentary contributing original insights on why the papers are classics, and how the papers set the agenda for future work. There is no better, or more enjoyable way, to come up to speed on the intellectual development of natural resource economics than reading this book.' - Ray Huffaker, University of Florida, USA'Seven papers, originally published between 1960 and 2000, that address key issues in resource production, pricing, consumption, planning, management, and policy, are used as the inspiration for forty-eight additional papers that examine why these seven papers have become classics and how they have impacted and shaped the intellectual content of the field of natural-resource economics. Papers are grouped into the five core areas of naturalresource economics—the intertemporal problem; externalities and market failure; property rights, institutions, and public choice; the economics of exhaustible resources; and the economics of renewable resources. Gopalakrishnan is Professor (Emeritus) of Natural Resource Economics at the University of Hawaii. Index'. - December 2016 issue of the Journal of Economic Literature (Volume 54, no. 4) and the American Economic Association's electronic publications: e-JEL, JEL on CD, and EconLit.'Dr. Gopalakrishnan has provided a valuable service by linking these foundational papers by pioneers in natural resource and environmental economics with a series of commentaries by contemporary authors. The range of topics is as timely today as when the papers were originally written: forest policy, exhaustible resources, externalities, market failures and tragedy of the commons. The value added of the book is the commentaries on these classic articles by leading thinkers who assess the strengths as well as the limitations of the Classic Papers. Collectively these authors provide their own insights, rebuttals to, refinements of, and extensions to the original path- breaking papers and challenges facing natural resource economists in the 21st Century.' - Dr John Loomis, Colorado State University, USA'This book is a jewel. It contains classic works in natural resource economics and policy. Three cheers to Dr. Chennat Gopalakrishnan (Gopal) for his original and exhaustive treatment of five foundation areas of the discipline that will engage a large and growing body of readers worldwide. The five foundations are:1. The Intertemporal Problem2. The Problem of Social Cost3. Property Rights, Institutions and Public Choice4. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources.5. Renewable ResourcesI like his treatment of those important five themes for several reasons:The book is a first rate source for an upper division undergraduate or graduate seminar in natural resource economics as a standalone source for much or all source material for such a seminar.Each of the five areas centers on a classic work, while being complemented by a number of supporting works. The supporting works are nice for scholars who want to see what makes for a great paper or who need background reading before entering the classic.It makes a fine source for PhD students starting on a dissertation or scholars working on a literature review who wish to access foundations.It reaches out beyond economics. For example, Elinor Ostrom's Economics Nobel Prize winning career is as much about natural resource institutions as neoclassical economics.The chapters contain so much breadth and depth to make it a treasured addition to my library.' -Frank A. Ward, New Mexico State University, USA

• Introduction Section I: The Intertemporal Problem 1. Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions 2. The relevance and the limits of the Arrow-Lind Theorem 3. A reconsideration of Arrow-Lind: risk aversion, risk sharing, and agent choice 4. Evaluating uncertain public projects with rival and non-rival benefits 5. Probing the limits of risk-neutral government 6. Are we in this together? Risk bearing and collective action 7. Evaluation of public investments and individual discounting 8. Rebutting Arrow and Lind: why governments should use market rates for discounting 9. Revisiting Arrow-Lind: Managing Sovereign Disaster Risk 10. Size matters: capital market size and risk-return profiles 11. Microeconomic foundations of bailouts Section II: Externalities and Market Failure – Ronald H. Coase 12. The Problem of Social Cost 13. Battles lost and wars won: reflections on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 14. The importance of being misunderstood: the Coase theorem and the legacy of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 15. Infringement as nuisance: intellectual property rights and The Problem of Social Cost 16. About some distortions in the interpretation of ‘the problem of social cost’ 17. The successes and failures of Professor Coase Section III: Property Rights, Institutions and Public Choice – Garrett J. Hardin and Elinor Ostrom 18. The Tragedy of the Commons 19. The Core Challenges of Moving Beyond Garrett Hardin 20. Revising the Commons Paradigm 21. Hardin’s Brilliant Tragedy and a Non-Sequitur Response 22. Free Parking at Christmas Is Not a Tragedy of the Commons 23. Guarding the Guardians: Enforcement in the Commons 24. From ‘Tragedy’ to Commons: How Hardin’s Mistake Might Save the World 25. Collective action and the evolution of social norms 26. The collective action theory path to contextual analysis 27. Contextualizing the influence of social norms, collective action on social-ecological systems 28. Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms: the principled optimism of Elinor Ostrom 29. Crossing disciplinary boundaries 30. Elinor Ostrom’s challenge for laboratory experiments 31. The evolution of social norms in conflict resolution 32. The evolution of elite and societal norms pertaining to the emergence of federal-tribal co-management of natural resources Section IV: The Economics of Exhaustible Resources – Robert Solow and William Nordhaus 33. The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics 34. Reflections on Solow’s The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics 35. What Does the Empirical Work Inspired by Solow’s The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics Tell Us? 36. What Would Solow Say? 37. Reflections on Solow’s 1974 Richard T. Ely Address 38. The Economics of Resources and the Economics of Climate 39. Celebrating Solow: Lessons from Natural Resource Economics for Environmental Policy 40. The Allocation of Energy Resources 41. Modeling long term energy futures after Nordhaus (1973) 42. The allocation of energy resources in the very long run 43. The world before climate change 44. Energy modeling post 1973 45. The allocation of energy conservation 46. A retrospective on The Allocation of Energy Resource 47. Backstop technology: model keystone or energy systems transition guide essay 48. Caveats for climate policy from Nordhaus’s The Allocation of Energy Resources Section V: Renewable Resources - Paul A. Samuelson 49. Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society 50. Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society: Still an Important and Relevant Article Thirty Six Years Later 51. Reflections on Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society 52. Samuelson and 21st Century Tropical Forest Economics 53. Putting Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society into Context: The Limits of Forest Economics in Policy Debates 54. Samuelson on Forest Economics: An Inadvertent Tribute to Faustmann, and a Few Others 55. Thoughts on Paul Samuelson’s Classic, Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society

Chennat Gopalakrishnan is Professor (Emeritus) of Natural Resource Economics at the University of Hawaii, USA. He has published seven books and approximately 115 journal articles and technical papers on current and emerging issues in natural resource economics and policy. He is the Editor-In-Chief of the Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research.

'This book does great service by giving scholars a unique opportunity to read classic papers in natural resource economics side-by-side with extensive expert commentary contributing original insights on why the papers are classics, and how the papers set the agenda for future work. There is no better, or more enjoyable way, to come up to speed on the intellectual development of natural resource economics than reading this book.' - Ray Huffaker, University of Florida, USA'Seven papers, originally published between 1960 and 2000, that address key issues in resource production, pricing, consumption, planning, management, and policy, are used as the inspiration for forty-eight additional papers that examine why these seven papers have become classics and how they have impacted and shaped the intellectual content of the field of natural-resource economics. Papers are grouped into the five core areas of naturalresource economics—the intertemporal problem; externalities and market failure; property rights, institutions, and public choice; the economics of exhaustible resources; and the economics of renewable resources. Gopalakrishnan is Professor (Emeritus) of Natural Resource Economics at the University of Hawaii. Index'. - December 2016 issue of the Journal of Economic Literature (Volume 54, no. 4) and the American Economic Association's electronic publications: e-JEL, JEL on CD, and EconLit.'Dr. Gopalakrishnan has provided a valuable service by linking these foundational papers by pioneers in natural resource and environmental economics with a series of commentaries by contemporary authors. The range of topics is as timely today as when the papers were originally written: forest policy, exhaustible resources, externalities, market failures and tragedy of the commons. The value added of the book is the commentaries on these classic articles by leading thinkers who assess the strengths as well as the limitations of the Classic Papers. Collectively these authors provide their own insights, rebuttals to, refinements of, and extensions to the original path- breaking papers and challenges facing natural resource economists in the 21st Century.' - Dr John Loomis, Colorado State University, USA'This book is a jewel. It contains classic works in natural resource economics and policy. Three cheers to Dr. Chennat Gopalakrishnan (Gopal) for his original and exhaustive treatment of five foundation areas of the discipline that will engage a large and growing body of readers worldwide. The five foundations are:1. The Intertemporal Problem2. The Problem of Social Cost3. Property Rights, Institutions and Public Choice4. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources.5. Renewable ResourcesI like his treatment of those important five themes for several reasons:The book is a first rate source for an upper division undergraduate or graduate seminar in natural resource economics as a standalone source for much or all source material for such a seminar.Each of the five areas centers on a classic work, while being complemented by a number of supporting works. The supporting works are nice for scholars who want to see what makes for a great paper or who need background reading before entering the classic.It makes a fine source for PhD students starting on a dissertation or scholars working on a literature review who wish to access foundations.It reaches out beyond economics. For example, Elinor Ostrom's Economics Nobel Prize winning career is as much about natural resource institutions as neoclassical economics.The chapters contain so much breadth and depth to make it a treasured addition to my library.' -Frank A. Ward, New Mexico State University, USA

• Introduction Section I: The Intertemporal Problem 1. Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions 2. The relevance and the limits of the Arrow-Lind Theorem 3. A reconsideration of Arrow-Lind: risk aversion, risk sharing, and agent choice 4. Evaluating uncertain public projects with rival and non-rival benefits 5. Probing the limits of risk-neutral government 6. Are we in this together? Risk bearing and collective action 7. Evaluation of public investments and individual discounting 8. Rebutting Arrow and Lind: why governments should use market rates for discounting 9. Revisiting Arrow-Lind: Managing Sovereign Disaster Risk 10. Size matters: capital market size and risk-return profiles 11. Microeconomic foundations of bailouts Section II: Externalities and Market Failure – Ronald H. Coase 12. The Problem of Social Cost 13. Battles lost and wars won: reflections on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 14. The importance of being misunderstood: the Coase theorem and the legacy of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 15. Infringement as nuisance: intellectual property rights and The Problem of Social Cost 16. About some distortions in the interpretation of ‘the problem of social cost’ 17. The successes and failures of Professor Coase Section III: Property Rights, Institutions and Public Choice – Garrett J. Hardin and Elinor Ostrom 18. The Tragedy of the Commons 19. The Core Challenges of Moving Beyond Garrett Hardin 20. Revising the Commons Paradigm 21. Hardin’s Brilliant Tragedy and a Non-Sequitur Response 22. Free Parking at Christmas Is Not a Tragedy of the Commons 23. Guarding the Guardians: Enforcement in the Commons 24. From ‘Tragedy’ to Commons: How Hardin’s Mistake Might Save the World 25. Collective action and the evolution of social norms 26. The collective action theory path to contextual analysis 27. Contextualizing the influence of social norms, collective action on social-ecological systems 28. Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms: the principled optimism of Elinor Ostrom 29. Crossing disciplinary boundaries 30. Elinor Ostrom’s challenge for laboratory experiments 31. The evolution of social norms in conflict resolution 32. The evolution of elite and societal norms pertaining to the emergence of federal-tribal co-management of natural resources Section IV: The Economics of Exhaustible Resources – Robert Solow and William Nordhaus 33. The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics 34. Reflections on Solow’s The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics 35. What Does the Empirical Work Inspired by Solow’s The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics Tell Us? 36. What Would Solow Say? 37. Reflections on Solow’s 1974 Richard T. Ely Address 38. The Economics of Resources and the Economics of Climate 39. Celebrating Solow: Lessons from Natural Resource Economics for Environmental Policy 40. The Allocation of Energy Resources 41. Modeling long term energy futures after Nordhaus (1973) 42. The allocation of energy resources in the very long run 43. The world before climate change 44. Energy modeling post 1973 45. The allocation of energy conservation 46. A retrospective on The Allocation of Energy Resource 47. Backstop technology: model keystone or energy systems transition guide essay 48. Caveats for climate policy from Nordhaus’s The Allocation of Energy Resources Section V: Renewable Resources - Paul A. Samuelson 49. Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society 50. Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society: Still an Important and Relevant Article Thirty Six Years Later 51. Reflections on Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society 52. Samuelson and 21st Century Tropical Forest Economics 53. Putting Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society into Context: The Limits of Forest Economics in Policy Debates 54. Samuelson on Forest Economics: An Inadvertent Tribute to Faustmann, and a Few Others 55. Thoughts on Paul Samuelson’s Classic, Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society