Philosophy of Language

Alexander Miller is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He is author of Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction (Polity Press, second edition, 2013), co-editor of Rule-Following and Meaning (Acumen, 2002) and co-editor of A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (second edition, Wiley-Blackwell, 2017).

"This book has been on my reading list for philosophy of language since the first edition; I’m delighted to see this new edition, with additions, such as study questions, and updated suggestions for further reading that will enhance its value for students."Michael Beaney, Humboldt University, Germany, and King’s College London, UK"The third edition of Philosophy of Language provides an exceptionally lucid and accessible overview of both the history of the subject and contemporary debates. Miller covers the topics that are likely to appear on any undergraduate syllabus but he does so with a refreshing twist, emphasising the meta-semantic question, 'what constitutes meaning?’. Miller delves into fundamental questions concerning the connections between language, mind and reality, and conveys the centrality of the study of language to philosophy. The book will be an invaluable resource for introducing undergraduates to the subject." Anandi Hattiangadi, Stockholm University, Sweden

• Preface to the first editionPreface to second edition Preface to the third edition Acknowledgements, first edition Acknowledgements, second editionAcknowledgements, third editionIntroduction1 Frege: Semantic value and reference 1.1 Frege’s logical language 1.2 Syntax 1.3 Semantics and truth 1.4 Sentences and proper names 1.5 Function and object 1.6 Predicates, connectives and quantifiers 1.7 A semantic theory for a simple language Chapter summaryStudy questionsFurther Reading 2 Frege and Russell: Sense and definite descriptions 2.1 The introduction of sense 2.2 The nature of sense 2.3 The objectivity of sense: Frege’s critique of Locke 2.4 Four problems with Frege’s notion of sense 2.5 Kripke on naming and necessity 2.6 A theory of sense? 2.7 Force and tone 2.8 Russell on names and descriptions 2.9 Scope distinctions 2.10 Russell’s attack on sense 2.11 Russell on communication 2.12 Strawson and Donnellan on referring and definite descriptions 2.13 Kripke’s causal-historical theory of reference 2.14 Appendix: Frege’s theses on sense and semantic value Chapter summaryStudy questionsFurther reading3 Sense and verificationism: Logical positivism 3.1 From the Tractatus to the verification principle 3.2 The formulation of the verification principle 3.3 Foster on the nature of the verification principle 3.4 The a priori and the linguistic theory of necessity3.5 Carnap on internal and external questions 3.6 Logical positivism and ethical language 3.7 Moderate holismChapter summaryStudy questionsFurther reading 4 Scepticism about sense (I): Quine on analyticity and translation 4.1 Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction: Introduction 4.2 The argument of "Two Dogmas" (part I) 4.3 Criticism of "Two Dogmas" (part I)4.4 The argument of "Two Dogmas" (part II) 4.5 Criticism of "Two Dogmas" (part II) 4.6 Quine on the indeterminacy of translation: Introduction4.7 The argument from below 4.8 Evans and Hookway on the argument from below 4.9 The argument from above 4.10 Conclusion Chapter summaryStudy questionsFurther Reading5 Scepticism about sense (II):Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the skeptical paradox5.1 The sceptical paradox 5.2 The sceptical solution and the argument against solitary language 5.3 Boghossian’s argument against the sceptical solution 5.4 Wright’s objections to the sceptical solution 5.5 Zalabardo’s objection to the sceptical solution 5.6 The normativity of meaning? 5.7 "Factualist" interpretations of Kripke’s Wittgenstein Chapter summaryStudy questionsFurther reading6 Saving sense: Responses to the sceptical paradox 6.1 Linguistic meaning and mental content 6.2 Sophisticated dispositionalism 6.3 Lewis-style reductionism and ultra-sophisticated dispositionalism 6.4 Fodor's "asymmetric dependency" account of meaning6.5 McGinn on normativity and the ability conception of understanding 6.6 Wright’s judgement-dependent conception of meaning 6.7 Pettit’s "ethocentric" account6.8 Wittgenstein’s dissolution of the sceptical paradox? 6.9 Ginsborg’s "partial reductionism" Chapter summaryStudy questionsFurther Reading7 Sense, intention and speech acts: Grice’s programme 7.1 Homeric struggles: Two approaches to sense 7.2 Grice on speaker’s-meaning and sentence-meaning 7.3 Searle’s modifications: Illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions 7.4 Objections to Gricean analyses 7.5 Response to Blackburn 7.6 Strawson on referring revisited Chapter summaryStudy questionsFurther Reading8 Sense and Truth: Tarski and Davidson 8.1 Davidson and Frege8.2 Davidson’s adequacy conditions for theories of meaning8.3 Intensional and extensional theories of meaning8.4 Extensional adequacy and Tarski’s Convention (T)8.5 Tarskian truth-theories8.6 Truth and translation: Two problems for Davidson8.7 Radical interpretation and the principle of charity8.8 Holism and T-theorems8.9 Conclusion: Theories of meaning and natural languageChapter summaryStudy questionsFurther Reading9 Sense, world and metaphysics 9.1 Realism 9.2 Non-cognitivism and the Frege-Geach problem 9.3 Realism and verification-transcendent truth 9.4 Acquisition, manifestation and rule-following: the arguments against verification-transcendent truth 9.5 Twin-Earth, meaning, mind, and world 9.6 Grades of objectivity: Wright on anti-realism 9.7 Two threats of quietism Chapter summaryStudy questionsFurther readingBibliography Index