Cyber-physical Resilience of Inverter-interfaced Power Grids

Jiazuo Hou, Associate Professor, State Key Laboratory of Autonomous Intelligent Unmanned Systems, Shanghai Institute of Intelligent Science and Technology, Tongji University, China. Shunbo Lei, Assistant Professor, School of Science and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen), Guangdong, China. Wei Sun, Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Central Florida, FL, USA. Francis Y. Hou, Associate Professor, The Bradley Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, VA, USA.

• About the Authors xiiiPreface xvAcknowledgments xixAbout the Companion Website xxi1 Introduction 11.1 Renewable-intensive Power Grids 11.2 Cyber and Physical Resilience 31.3 Focus of This Book 101.4 Summary 11Part I Attack Situation Awareness 152 Attack-induced Butterfly Effect: Infinitesimal-attack-high-impact Phenomena in Power Delivery Systems 172.1 Small-perturbation-high-impact Phenomena 172.2 Hierarchical Control of Power Delivery Systems 192.3 Heterogeneous Equilibrium Points Under Attacks 232.4 Attack-induced Butterfly Effect 312.5 Case Studies 342.6 Summary and Conclusions 393 Multi-objective Attacker: Power Grid Stability and Efficiency Under Stealthy Cyberattacks 433.1 Power Grid Influenced by Stealthy Cyberattacks 433.2 Cyber Threat Modeling 453.3 Stealthy Attacks on Two-area Power Grids 483.4 Stealthy Attacks on General Power Grids 543.5 Case Studies 603.6 Summary and Conclusions 67Part II Defense Source Allocation 734 Event-triggered Defender: Cybersecurity Evaluation and Enhancement for Multi-infeed Direct-current Power Grids 754.1 Enhancing Cybersecurity for Multi-infeed Direct-current Power Grids 754.2 Cyber-physical Property of Multi-infeed Direct-current Power Grids 774.3 Cross-timescale Cybersecurity Evaluation Model 824.4 Event-triggered Cybersecurity Enhancement Against Unfolding Attacks 854.5 Case Studies 894.6 Summary and Conclusions 945 Cross-regional Defender: Innate Cyber-immunity and Acquired Cyber-immunity for Power Subnetworks 1015.1 Biological Immunity and Cyber-physical Immunity 1015.2 Cyberdefense in Power Engineering and Organism-defense in Biological Science 1035.3 Innate Cyber-immunity Characterization 1055.4 Acquired Cyber-immunity Establishment 1085.5 Bioinspired Cyber-immune Framework 1165.6 Case Studies 1195.7 Summary and Conclusions 1246 Cost-effective Defender: Cybersecurity Cost-benefit Trade-off for Alternating-current/Direct-current Power Grids 1316.1 Cost and Benefit of Power Grid Cybersecurity 1316.2 Cyber-physical Property of AC/DC Power Grids 1336.3 Spatial-temporal Dual Cyberattack Evaluation Model 1356.4 Cost-effective Cyberdefense Strategy with Conflicting Interests 1386.5 Case Studies 1446.6 Summary and Conclusions 150Part III Operation Region Characterization 1557 Cyber Insecurity Region: Minimizing Attack-induced Region and Maximizing Cybersecurity Margin 1577.1 Preventive and Corrective Cybersecurity 1577.2 Preventive Cyberdefense to Minimize Attack-induced Region 1597.3 Corrective Cyberdefense to Maximize Cybersecurity Margin 1687.4 Case Studies 1717.5 Summary and Conclusions 1768 Physical Security Region: Existence, Expansion, and Application of Inverter-interfaced Power Grids 1838.1 Security of Legacy and Modern Power Grids 1838.2 Security Region and Solvability Region 1868.3 Existence of Security Region 1898.4 Expansion of Security Region 1948.5 Inverter-security-constrained Optimal Power Flow 2028.6 Case Studies 2058.7 Summary and Conclusions 2109 Cybersecurity Paradigm Shift: From Synchronous Machine-based Power Grids to Power Electronics-dominated Power Grids 2179.1 Cyber Resilience of Grid-tied Converters 2179.2 Cyber Resilience of Power Generation 2199.3 Cyber Resilience of Power Transmission 2229.4 Cyber Resilience of Power Prosumption 2259.5 Cyber Resilience of ESSs 2309.6 Summary and Conclusions 232References 233Index 245