Michael Luntley is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. His previous publications include Language, Logic and Experience (1988), Reason, Truth and Self (1995) and Contemporary Philosophy of Thought (Blackwell, 1999).

"The largely moribund state of current Wittgenstein scholarship ought to be radically changed for the better by this conspicuously interesting and insightful book." Alan Thomas, Philosophical Books"Michael Luntley offers a striking interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, one aimed at displaying and defending Wittgenstein's positive contribution in the later work. The result is a theory of the conditions for the possibility of intentionality, a theory that identifies the subject as agent in the world with that condition. Powerfully argued, this interesting and original treatment of Wittgenstein's later philosophy raises a challenge for all of us who find a social dimension in Wittgenstein's account of intentionality and normativity." Meredith Williams, The Johns Hopkins University "Luntley provides an intriguing discussion of Wittgenstein's early work, arbitrating judiciously between realist readings that emphasise the place of reference in its account of language, and non-realist readings that emphasise inference." Daniel Whiting, University of Reading, Philosophical Investigations 28/4, October 2005

• Preface viiAbbreviations ix1 Wittgenstein’s Master Argument 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Animating Signs 21.3 The Platonist Source of Grammar 91.4 The Cartesian Source of Grammar 111.5 The Community Source of Grammar 151.6 The Negative and Positive Phases – First Statement 162 Realism, Language and Self 212.1 Introduction 212.2 Logic Takes Care of Itself 222.3 The Need for Grammar 272.4 The Metaphysical Options 342.5 The Self 423 This is How We Play the Game 483.1 Introduction 483.2 Two Kinds of ‘Hidden’ 503.3 Meaning and Use 583.4 Use and Self 643.5 Use and Augustine’s Mistake 673.6 Is ‘Slab!’ a Shortening of ‘Bring Me a Slab!’or is the Latter a Lengthening of the Former? 713.7 This and Similar Things are called ‘Games’ 773.8 Spontaneity in Particular Circumstances 834 Rules and Other People 934.1 Introduction 934.2 The Structure of an Argument 944.3 The Bipartite Account of Meaning 1004.4 Practice 1054.5 What You See/Hear is not Normless 1154.6 Seeing the Similarity in Particular Cases 1195 Putting Your Self in the Picture 1245.1 Introduction 1245.2 The Standard Treatments 1245.3 What’s Special about Sensations? 1285.4 The Need for Calibration 1335.5 Calibration in Subjectivity 1375.6 Agreement in Forms of Life 1425.7 ‘Inner’ Life Out There 1465.8 Now I Understand 1486 Seeing Things Aright 1526.1 Introduction 1526.2 Two Uses of the Word ‘See’ 1556.3 See What I Mean 1656.4 Paying Attention 1686.5 The Place of Judgement 1706.6 What Comes Natural 173Bibliography 177Index 182