Marco Bodellini is Lecturer in Banking and Financial Law at the University of Bergamo, Italy, and Research Scientist in Sustainable Finance Law at the House of Sustainable Governance & Markets, University of Luxembourg.

This book presents a timely analysis of bank crisis management measures at various stages. It is a must-read for those who wish to grasp a full picture of what tools could be applied in a banking crisis.

• 1. International Bank Crisis Management: Framing the Key Definitions and Drawing the Perimeter of the Analysis I. Introduction II. Bank Crisis Management: Framing the Key Definitions III. Other Relevant DefinitionsIV. Jurisdiction-Specific Definitions V. The Perimeter of the Analysis 2. The Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture in the EU, UK and US I. Introduction II. The European Banking Union III. The UK Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture IV. The US Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture 3. The First Lines of Defence: Bank Capital and Early Intervention Measures I. Introduction II. The Concept of Capital and the Rationale behind Minimum Bank Capital Requirements III. Capital Requirements and the Role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision IV. The Adoption of Basel I V. The Adoption of Basel II VI. The Adoption of Basel III VII. The Adoption of Basel IV VIII. Early Intervention Measures IX. The Effectiveness of Capital and Early Intervention Measures as First Lines of Defence 4. The Crisis of Non-Systemic Institutions: Bank Insolvency Regimes I. Introduction II. The New EU Regime and its Weaknesses III. Towards the Establishment of a New EU Harmonised Bank Insolvency Regime Inspired by the Italian, UK andUS Frameworks and Experiences IV. The Italian Legal Framework V. Compulsory Administrative Liquidation under Italian Law VI. Bank Liquidation and the EU State Aid Framework: The So-called Liquidation Aid VII. The UK Regime VIII. The US Regime IX. Receivership X. The FDIC Strategies XI. Concluding Remarks 5. The Crisis of Systemic Institutions: Resolution and Orderly Liquidation Authority I. Introduction II. Resolution in the EU III. The Resolution Tools IV. Bail-in V. Resolution Funds VI. The Provision of Public Funds in the Context of Resolution and the Interaction between the Resolution Regime and the State Aid FrameworkVII. Impediments to Resolvability VIII. Resolution within the Banking Union IX. The UK Regime X. The US Regime: The Orderly Liquidation Authority XI. Concluding Remarks 6. Deposit Guarantee Schemes I. Introduction II. The Functions Performed by Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Bank Crises III. The Interplay between the Legislation on DGSs and the State Aid Regime IV. The Key Contributions of DGSs in Handling Bank Crises V. The General Court of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgmentsin the Banca Tercas Case VI. The Current Legal Constraints to DGSs’ Optional Interventions in Bank Crises VII. Deposit Insurance in the US VIII. A Limited-Scope Reform Proposal to Allow DGSs to Play a Leading Role in Bank Crises 7. The Legacy of the COVID-19 Crisis: The Non-Performing Loan Problem I. Introduction II. Non-Performing Loans III. How to Tackle the Non-Performing Loan Problem: Asset Management Companies IV. Types of NPLs to Transfer V. Transfer Price VI. Capital and Funding Structure and Governance Arrangements VII. Concluding Remarks 8. Conclusions

Marco Bodellini is Lecturer in Banking and Financial Law at the University of Bergamo, Italy, and Research Scientist in Sustainable Finance Law at the House of Sustainable Governance & Markets, University of Luxembourg.

This book presents a timely analysis of bank crisis management measures at various stages. It is a must-read for those who wish to grasp a full picture of what tools could be applied in a banking crisis.

• 1. International Bank Crisis Management: Framing the Key Definitions and Drawing the Perimeter of the Analysis I. Introduction II. Bank Crisis Management: Framing the Key Definitions III. Other Relevant DefinitionsIV. Jurisdiction-Specific Definitions V. The Perimeter of the Analysis 2. The Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture in the EU, UK and US I. Introduction II. The European Banking Union III. The UK Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture IV. The US Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture 3. The First Lines of Defence: Bank Capital and Early Intervention Measures I. Introduction II. The Concept of Capital and the Rationale behind Minimum Bank Capital Requirements III. Capital Requirements and the Role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision IV. The Adoption of Basel I V. The Adoption of Basel II VI. The Adoption of Basel III VII. The Adoption of Basel IV VIII. Early Intervention Measures IX. The Effectiveness of Capital and Early Intervention Measures as First Lines of Defence 4. The Crisis of Non-Systemic Institutions: Bank Insolvency Regimes I. Introduction II. The New EU Regime and its Weaknesses III. Towards the Establishment of a New EU Harmonised Bank Insolvency Regime Inspired by the Italian, UK andUS Frameworks and Experiences IV. The Italian Legal Framework V. Compulsory Administrative Liquidation under Italian Law VI. Bank Liquidation and the EU State Aid Framework: The So-called Liquidation Aid VII. The UK Regime VIII. The US Regime IX. Receivership X. The FDIC Strategies XI. Concluding Remarks 5. The Crisis of Systemic Institutions: Resolution and Orderly Liquidation Authority I. Introduction II. Resolution in the EU III. The Resolution Tools IV. Bail-in V. Resolution Funds VI. The Provision of Public Funds in the Context of Resolution and the Interaction between the Resolution Regime and the State Aid FrameworkVII. Impediments to Resolvability VIII. Resolution within the Banking Union IX. The UK Regime X. The US Regime: The Orderly Liquidation Authority XI. Concluding Remarks 6. Deposit Guarantee Schemes I. Introduction II. The Functions Performed by Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Bank Crises III. The Interplay between the Legislation on DGSs and the State Aid Regime IV. The Key Contributions of DGSs in Handling Bank Crises V. The General Court of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgmentsin the Banca Tercas Case VI. The Current Legal Constraints to DGSs’ Optional Interventions in Bank Crises VII. Deposit Insurance in the US VIII. A Limited-Scope Reform Proposal to Allow DGSs to Play a Leading Role in Bank Crises 7. The Legacy of the COVID-19 Crisis: The Non-Performing Loan Problem I. Introduction II. Non-Performing Loans III. How to Tackle the Non-Performing Loan Problem: Asset Management Companies IV. Types of NPLs to Transfer V. Transfer Price VI. Capital and Funding Structure and Governance Arrangements VII. Concluding Remarks 8. Conclusions

Marco Bodellini is Lecturer in Banking and Financial Law at the University of Bergamo, Italy, and Research Scientist in Sustainable Finance Law at the House of Sustainable Governance & Markets, University of Luxembourg.

This book presents a timely analysis of bank crisis management measures at various stages. It is a must-read for those who wish to grasp a full picture of what tools could be applied in a banking crisis.

• 1. International Bank Crisis Management: Framing the Key Definitions and Drawing the Perimeter of the Analysis I. Introduction II. Bank Crisis Management: Framing the Key Definitions III. Other Relevant DefinitionsIV. Jurisdiction-Specific Definitions V. The Perimeter of the Analysis 2. The Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture in the EU, UK and US I. Introduction II. The European Banking Union III. The UK Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture IV. The US Bank Supervisory and Crisis Management Architecture 3. The First Lines of Defence: Bank Capital and Early Intervention Measures I. Introduction II. The Concept of Capital and the Rationale behind Minimum Bank Capital Requirements III. Capital Requirements and the Role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision IV. The Adoption of Basel I V. The Adoption of Basel II VI. The Adoption of Basel III VII. The Adoption of Basel IV VIII. Early Intervention Measures IX. The Effectiveness of Capital and Early Intervention Measures as First Lines of Defence 4. The Crisis of Non-Systemic Institutions: Bank Insolvency Regimes I. Introduction II. The New EU Regime and its Weaknesses III. Towards the Establishment of a New EU Harmonised Bank Insolvency Regime Inspired by the Italian, UK andUS Frameworks and Experiences IV. The Italian Legal Framework V. Compulsory Administrative Liquidation under Italian Law VI. Bank Liquidation and the EU State Aid Framework: The So-called Liquidation Aid VII. The UK Regime VIII. The US Regime IX. Receivership X. The FDIC Strategies XI. Concluding Remarks 5. The Crisis of Systemic Institutions: Resolution and Orderly Liquidation Authority I. Introduction II. Resolution in the EU III. The Resolution Tools IV. Bail-in V. Resolution Funds VI. The Provision of Public Funds in the Context of Resolution and the Interaction between the Resolution Regime and the State Aid FrameworkVII. Impediments to Resolvability VIII. Resolution within the Banking Union IX. The UK Regime X. The US Regime: The Orderly Liquidation Authority XI. Concluding Remarks 6. Deposit Guarantee Schemes I. Introduction II. The Functions Performed by Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Bank Crises III. The Interplay between the Legislation on DGSs and the State Aid Regime IV. The Key Contributions of DGSs in Handling Bank Crises V. The General Court of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgmentsin the Banca Tercas Case VI. The Current Legal Constraints to DGSs’ Optional Interventions in Bank Crises VII. Deposit Insurance in the US VIII. A Limited-Scope Reform Proposal to Allow DGSs to Play a Leading Role in Bank Crises 7. The Legacy of the COVID-19 Crisis: The Non-Performing Loan Problem I. Introduction II. Non-Performing Loans III. How to Tackle the Non-Performing Loan Problem: Asset Management Companies IV. Types of NPLs to Transfer V. Transfer Price VI. Capital and Funding Structure and Governance Arrangements VII. Concluding Remarks 8. Conclusions