Paul D. Miller is a professor in the practice of international affairs at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is also a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He previously held the position of Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the National Security Council from 2007 to 2009, worked as an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, and served as a military intelligence analyst with the US Army in Afghanistan. He is the author of Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898–2012.

A tour de force on American grand strategy. . . . Miller is highly attentive to the costs and benefits of various policies.

• IntroductionPart I: A Framework for Thinking about US Grand Strategy1. In Search of a Twenty-First-Century Grand Strategy2. Power and Liberty in US Diplomatic History3. The New World DisorderPart II: Strategic Courses of Action4. The Balance of Power and the Democratic Peace5. Barbarians, Failed States, and Stability OperationsPart III: Regional Application6. The Frontline: Europe and East Asia7. The Opportunity: South Asia8. The Quagmire: The Middle East9. The Periphery: Latin America and AfricaPart IV: The National Security Toolkit10. Homeland Defense11. Diplomacy and Development12. Military, Intelligence, and National Security Decision Making13. ConclusionBibliographyIndexAbout the Author

Paul D. Miller is a professor in the practice of international affairs at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is also a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He previously held the position of Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the National Security Council from 2007 to 2009, worked as an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, and served as a military intelligence analyst with the US Army in Afghanistan. He is the author of Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898–2012.

A tour de force on American grand strategy. . . . Miller is highly attentive to the costs and benefits of various policies.

• IntroductionPart I: A Framework for Thinking about US Grand Strategy1. In Search of a Twenty-First-Century Grand Strategy2. Power and Liberty in US Diplomatic History3. The New World DisorderPart II: Strategic Courses of Action4. The Balance of Power and the Democratic Peace5. Barbarians, Failed States, and Stability OperationsPart III: Regional Application6. The Frontline: Europe and East Asia7. The Opportunity: South Asia8. The Quagmire: The Middle East9. The Periphery: Latin America and AfricaPart IV: The National Security Toolkit10. Homeland Defense11. Diplomacy and Development12. Military, Intelligence, and National Security Decision Making13. ConclusionBibliographyIndexAbout the Author

Paul D. Miller is a professor in the practice of international affairs at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is also a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He previously held the position of Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the National Security Council from 2007 to 2009, worked as an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, and served as a military intelligence analyst with the US Army in Afghanistan. He is the author of Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898–2012.

A tour de force on American grand strategy. . . . Miller is highly attentive to the costs and benefits of various policies.

• IntroductionPart I: A Framework for Thinking about US Grand Strategy1. In Search of a Twenty-First-Century Grand Strategy2. Power and Liberty in US Diplomatic History3. The New World DisorderPart II: Strategic Courses of Action4. The Balance of Power and the Democratic Peace5. Barbarians, Failed States, and Stability OperationsPart III: Regional Application6. The Frontline: Europe and East Asia7. The Opportunity: South Asia8. The Quagmire: The Middle East9. The Periphery: Latin America and AfricaPart IV: The National Security Toolkit10. Homeland Defense11. Diplomacy and Development12. Military, Intelligence, and National Security Decision Making13. ConclusionBibliographyIndexAbout the Author