Peter C. Carstensen, Fred W & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School, Senior Fellow, American Antitrust Institute, US

'In a lucid and thorough exploration of buyer power, Peter Carstensen persuasively illustrates the welfare effects and societal costs. He offers a detailed review of buyer power exploitation and the means to tackle it using ex-ante and ex-post intervention. This excellent contribution to the legal and policy debate highlights the prevalence of buyer power in many industries and markets, its potential abuse, and the likely costs of limited antitrust enforcement.'--Ariel Ezrachi, The University of Oxford, UK'Which is more harmful to the competitive process-abuse of buyer power or seller power? Which is more difficult for enforcers to control? Are monopsonies the ''mirror image'' of monopolies? Professor Carstensen tackles these important questions in this much needed addition to an under-researched topic. A cogent, compelling analysis of why buyer power requires much more attention from competition authorities and policymakers generally than it has received.'--Maurice E. Stucke, The University of Tennessee; of counsel, The Konkurrenz Group, US'In this excellent book Peter Carstensen gives buyer power the attention it deserves. Long relegated to a secondary role in antitrust analysis, buyer power is an important source of inefficiency, harm to competition, and exploitation. This book is an exceptionally comprehensive, incisive, and thoughtful treatment of the issue. And it could not be more timely.'--John B. Kirkwood, Seattle University, School of Law, US

• Contents: Acknowledgements 1. Buyer Power: a Pervasive Challenge to Competition Policy 2. The Goals of Competition Policy 3. Buyer Power: Its Definition and Measurement 4. The Potential Competitive Harms from the Existence and Abuse of Buyer Power 5. Competition Policy for Unilateral Conduct by Buyers 6. Market Regulation and Other Strategies to Remedy Abuse of Buyer Power 7. Competition Policy for Buying Cartels, Buying Groups and Other Contractual Restraints Involving Buyer Power 8. Controlling the Creation of Buyer Power through Merger Policy 9. Conclusion: The Centrality of Market Structure and the Limits of National Authority Index

Peter C. Carstensen, Fred W & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School, Senior Fellow, American Antitrust Institute, US

'In a lucid and thorough exploration of buyer power, Peter Carstensen persuasively illustrates the welfare effects and societal costs. He offers a detailed review of buyer power exploitation and the means to tackle it using ex-ante and ex-post intervention. This excellent contribution to the legal and policy debate highlights the prevalence of buyer power in many industries and markets, its potential abuse, and the likely costs of limited antitrust enforcement.'--Ariel Ezrachi, The University of Oxford, UK'Which is more harmful to the competitive process-abuse of buyer power or seller power? Which is more difficult for enforcers to control? Are monopsonies the ''mirror image'' of monopolies? Professor Carstensen tackles these important questions in this much needed addition to an under-researched topic. A cogent, compelling analysis of why buyer power requires much more attention from competition authorities and policymakers generally than it has received.'--Maurice E. Stucke, The University of Tennessee; of counsel, The Konkurrenz Group, US'In this excellent book Peter Carstensen gives buyer power the attention it deserves. Long relegated to a secondary role in antitrust analysis, buyer power is an important source of inefficiency, harm to competition, and exploitation. This book is an exceptionally comprehensive, incisive, and thoughtful treatment of the issue. And it could not be more timely.'--John B. Kirkwood, Seattle University, School of Law, US

• Contents: Acknowledgements 1. Buyer Power: a Pervasive Challenge to Competition Policy 2. The Goals of Competition Policy 3. Buyer Power: Its Definition and Measurement 4. The Potential Competitive Harms from the Existence and Abuse of Buyer Power 5. Competition Policy for Unilateral Conduct by Buyers 6. Market Regulation and Other Strategies to Remedy Abuse of Buyer Power 7. Competition Policy for Buying Cartels, Buying Groups and Other Contractual Restraints Involving Buyer Power 8. Controlling the Creation of Buyer Power through Merger Policy 9. Conclusion: The Centrality of Market Structure and the Limits of National Authority Index