Economics of Financial Law

Inbunden, Engelska, 2016

Del 48 i serien Economic Approaches to Law series

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Beskrivning

Covering the most important areas of the subject, such as financial crises, the nature of the banking firm and issues in bank regulation, Economics of Financial Law is a comprehensive collection of the papers that have shaped the field of financial law. This original research review by editor Professor Geoffrey Miller provides a thorough and authoritative examination of the material and will prove to be an invaluable resource for academics and practitioners alike.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2016-02-26
Mått:169 x 244 x undefined mm
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Economic Approaches to Law series
Förlag:Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
ISBN:9781783471829

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Edited by Geoffrey P. Miller, Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law, New York University, School of Law, US

Innehållsförteckning

Contents:IntroductionGeoffrey P. MillerPART ITHE NATURE OF THE BANKING FIRM 1. George J. Benston (2004), ‘What’s Special About Banks?’, Financial Review, 39 (1), February, 13–332. Martin Hellwig (1998), ‘Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (1), March, 328–453. Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan and Jeremy C. Stein (2002), ‘Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking’, Journal of Finance, 57 (1), February, 33–734. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2001), ‘Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking’, Journal of Political Economy, 109 (2), April, 287–327PART IISHADOW BANKS 5. Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick (2010), ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 41 (2), Fall, 261–3126. Morgan Ricks (2012), ‘A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 65 (5), October, 1289–360PART IIILIQUIDITY 7. Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn (1991), ‘The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements’, American Economic Review, 81 (3), June, 497–5138. Gary Gorton and George Pennacchi (1990), ‘Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation’, Journal of Finance, 45 (1), March, 49–71PART IVLENDING 9. Gary Gorton and James Kahn (2000), ‘The Design of Bank Loan Contracts’, Review of Financial Studies, 13 (2), April, 331–6410. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner (1979), ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants’, Journal of Financial Economics, 7 (2), June, 117–6111. Douglas W. Diamond (1984), ‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’, Review of Economic Studies, 51 (3), July, 393–41412. Franklin Allen and Anthony M. Santomero (1997), ‘The Theory of Financial Intermediation’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21 (11–12), December, 1461–85PART VCAPITAL 13. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2000), ‘A Theory of Bank Capital’, Journal of Finance, 55 (6), December, 2431–6514. Berry K. Wilson and Edward J. Kane (1996), ‘The Demise of Double Liability as an Optimal Contract for Large-Bank Stockholders’, NBER Working Paper No. 5848, December, i, 2–24, notes15. Benjamin C. Esty (1998), ‘The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking’, Journal of Financial Economics, 47 (2), February, 189–21816. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2011), ‘Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight’, Columbia Law Review, 111 (4), May, 795–84717. Patrick Bolton and Frédéric Samama (2012), ‘Capital Access Bonds: Contingent Capital with an Option to Convert’, Economic Policy, 27 (70), April, 277–31718. Charles W. Calomiris and Richard J. Herring (2013), ‘How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 25 (2), Spring, 39–62PART VIBANK RUNS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 19. Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig (1983), ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’, Journal of Political Economy, 91 (3), June, 401–1920. Charles W. Calomiris (1990), ‘Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Economic History, 50 (2), June, 283–95IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsAn introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I PART IFINANCIAL CRISES 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933), ‘First Fireside Chat, Delivered on 12th March 1933’, [accessed at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14540, 09.07.2015], re-set2. Viral V. Acharya (2009), ‘A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation’, Journal of Financial Stability, 5 (3), September, 224–553. Steven L. Schwarcz (2008), ‘Systemic Risk’, Georgetown Law Journal, 97 (1), 193–2494. Ben S. Bernanke (1983), ‘Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression’, American Economic Review, 73 (3), June, 257–765. Erik F. Gerding (2009), ‘Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis’, Washington Law Review, 84 (2), 127–986. Geoffrey P. Miller and Gerald Rosenfeld (2010), ‘Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008’, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 33 (2), March, 807–407. Martin F. Hellwig (2009), ‘Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis’, De Economist, 157 (2), June, 129–207PART IIISSUES IN BANK REGULATION 8. Kenneth E. Scott (1977), ‘The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation’, Stanford Law Review, 30 (1), November, 1–509. Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey (1988), ‘The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System’, Cornell Law Review, 73 (4), May, 677–71810. Roberta Romano (2014), ‘For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture’, Yale Journal on Regulation, 31 (1), Winter, 1–7611. Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz (2011), ‘Regulatory Contrarians’, North Carolina Law Review, 89 (5), 1629–7912. James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Levine (2004), ‘Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13 (2), April, 205–4813. Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl (2013), ‘Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation’, American Economic Review, 103 (3), May, 1–5PART IIIGOVERNANCE 14. KJ Hopt (2013), ‘Corporate Governance of Banks and Other Financial Institutions After the Financial Crisis’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 13 (2), October, 219–5315. Lucian A. Bebchuk (2010), ‘How to Fix Bankers’ Pay’, Daedalus, 139 (4), Fall, 52–60PART IVCENTRAL BANKS 16. C A E Goodhart (2010), ‘The Changing Role of Central Banks’, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Working Papers, 326, vii, ix, 1–2317. Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler (2001), ‘Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 91 (2), May, 253–718. Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers (1993), ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25 (2), May, 151–62PART VCONSUMER BANKING 19. Oren Bar-Gill (2009), ‘The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts’, Cornell Law Review, 94, 1073–15120. Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren (2008), ‘Making Credit Safer’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 157 (1), November, 1–10121. Michael S. Barr (2004), ‘Microfinance and Financial Development’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 26 (27), Fall, 271–96Index