Edited by Thomas J. Miceli, Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut, US and Matthew J. Baker, Associate Professor of Economics, Hunter College, City University of New York, US

‘The extent of the research and co-ordination required to produce a scholarly compilation like this is astounding. There is little doubt that this book will make life just a touch easier for students and academics in economics and law, as well as, yes, modellers.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. BakerPART I GENERAL 1. Robert Cooter (1985), ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’2. Donald Wittman (1981), ‘Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law’PART IITORTS 3. A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson (1983), ‘Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power’4. Steven Shavell (1984), ‘A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation’5. Keith N. Hylton (1990), ‘The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence’6. Kathryn E. Spier (2011), ‘Product Safety, Buybacks, and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn’PART III CONTRACTS 7. Russell Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (1985), ‘Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard’8. Steven Shavell (1994), ‘Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale’9. Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung (1999), ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’PART IV PROPERTY 10. Dean Lueck (1995), ‘The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law’11. Mathew J. Baker (2003), ‘An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies’12. Matthew Baker and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), ‘Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis’13. Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro (1984), ‘The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?’14. Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson (1994), ‘Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?’15. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1989), ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’16. Paul Klemperer (1990), ‘How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?’PART V CRIME 17. Gary Becker (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’18. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’19. William J. Furlong (1987), ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Crime Commission and Prevention’PART VI LEGAL PROCESS20. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1988), ‘Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion’21. Barry Nalebluff (1987), ‘Credible Pretrial Negotiation’22. Avery Katz (1990), ‘The Effect of Frivolous Litigation on the Settlement of Legal Disputes’

Edited by Thomas J. Miceli, Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut, US and Matthew J. Baker, Associate Professor of Economics, Hunter College, City University of New York, US

‘The extent of the research and co-ordination required to produce a scholarly compilation like this is astounding. There is little doubt that this book will make life just a touch easier for students and academics in economics and law, as well as, yes, modellers.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. BakerPART I GENERAL 1. Robert Cooter (1985), ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’2. Donald Wittman (1981), ‘Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law’PART IITORTS 3. A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson (1983), ‘Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power’4. Steven Shavell (1984), ‘A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation’5. Keith N. Hylton (1990), ‘The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence’6. Kathryn E. Spier (2011), ‘Product Safety, Buybacks, and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn’PART III CONTRACTS 7. Russell Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (1985), ‘Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard’8. Steven Shavell (1994), ‘Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale’9. Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung (1999), ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’PART IV PROPERTY 10. Dean Lueck (1995), ‘The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law’11. Mathew J. Baker (2003), ‘An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies’12. Matthew Baker and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), ‘Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis’13. Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro (1984), ‘The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?’14. Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson (1994), ‘Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?’15. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1989), ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’16. Paul Klemperer (1990), ‘How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?’PART V CRIME 17. Gary Becker (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’18. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’19. William J. Furlong (1987), ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Crime Commission and Prevention’PART VI LEGAL PROCESS20. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1988), ‘Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion’21. Barry Nalebluff (1987), ‘Credible Pretrial Negotiation’22. Avery Katz (1990), ‘The Effect of Frivolous Litigation on the Settlement of Legal Disputes’

Edited by Thomas J. Miceli, Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut, US and Matthew J. Baker, Associate Professor of Economics, Hunter College, City University of New York, US

‘The extent of the research and co-ordination required to produce a scholarly compilation like this is astounding. There is little doubt that this book will make life just a touch easier for students and academics in economics and law, as well as, yes, modellers.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. BakerPART I GENERAL 1. Robert Cooter (1985), ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’2. Donald Wittman (1981), ‘Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law’PART IITORTS 3. A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson (1983), ‘Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power’4. Steven Shavell (1984), ‘A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation’5. Keith N. Hylton (1990), ‘The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence’6. Kathryn E. Spier (2011), ‘Product Safety, Buybacks, and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn’PART III CONTRACTS 7. Russell Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (1985), ‘Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard’8. Steven Shavell (1994), ‘Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale’9. Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung (1999), ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’PART IV PROPERTY 10. Dean Lueck (1995), ‘The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law’11. Mathew J. Baker (2003), ‘An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies’12. Matthew Baker and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), ‘Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis’13. Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro (1984), ‘The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?’14. Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson (1994), ‘Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?’15. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1989), ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’16. Paul Klemperer (1990), ‘How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?’PART V CRIME 17. Gary Becker (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’18. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’19. William J. Furlong (1987), ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Crime Commission and Prevention’PART VI LEGAL PROCESS20. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1988), ‘Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion’21. Barry Nalebluff (1987), ‘Credible Pretrial Negotiation’22. Avery Katz (1990), ‘The Effect of Frivolous Litigation on the Settlement of Legal Disputes’