Comparative Competition Policy

Edited by Susan Beth Farmer, Professor of Law, Affiliate Professor at School of International Affairs and McQuaide Blasko Faculty Scholar, Penn State Law, Pennsylvania State University, Pennsylvania, US

‘This collection of articles edited by Professor Susan Beth Farmer offers a wide range of specialist comparative studies of EU competition law and US antitrust law. In a world increasingly influenced by the two legal models, this access to an in depth analysis of specific components of almost the entire field of competition policy is a valuable and exceptional addition to the literature.’

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgements viiiIntroduction: Comparative Competition Policy – an Anthology of Recent ArticlesSusan Beth Farmer xiPART I COMPETITION THEORY1. Inara Scott (2016), ‘Antitrust and Socially ResponsibleCollaboration: A Chilling Combination?’, American Business LawJournal, 53 (1), Spring, 97–144 22. D. Daniel Sokol (2015), ‘Tensions between Antitrust and IndustrialPolicy’, George Mason Law Review, 22 (5), 1247–68 503. Harry First and Eleanor M. Fox (2015), ‘Philadelphia NationalBank, Globalization, and the Public Interest’, Antitrust Law Journal,80 (2), 307–51 724. Mel Marquis (2015), ‘Idea Merchants and Paradigm Peddlers inGlobal Antitrust’, Pacific McGeorge Global Business andDevelopment Law Journal, 28, 155–208 1175. John Temple Lang (2014), ‘After Fifty Years – What is Needed fora Unified European Competition Policy?’, 21st St. GallenInternational Competition Law Forum ICF, May, 1–54 1716. Paul Nihoul (2012), ‘Freedom of Choice: The Emergence of aPowerful Concept in European Competition Law’, ConcurrencesReview, 3, 55–70 2257. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. (2009), ‘Managing Antitrust Compliancethrough the Continuing Surge in Global Enforcement’, AntitrustLaw Journal, 75 (3), 965–95 2418. Susan Beth Farmer (2007), ‘Global Competition Implications forEnforcement’, in Larry Catá Baker (ed.), Harmonizing Law in anEra of Globalization: Convergence, Divergence, and Resistance,Chapter 9, Durham, NC, USA: Carolina Academic Press, 185–216 2729. Oliver Budzinski (2008), ‘Monoculture versus Diversity inCompetition Economics’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 32 (2),March, 295–324 30410. Spencer Weber Waller (1994), ‘Neo-Realism and the InternationalHarmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust’, Kansas LawReview, 42 (3), Spring, 557–604 334PART II ABUSE OF DOMINANCE/MONOPOLIZATION11. Niklas Horstmann, Jan Krämer and Daniel Schnurr (2018),‘Number Effects and Tacit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies’,Journal of Industrial Economics, 66 (3), September, 650–700 38312. Christian Bergqvist (2017), ‘Where Do We Stand on Discounts? – ADanish Perspective’, in Where Do We Stand on Discounts? ANordic Perspective, Chapter 2, Copenhagen, Denmark: Ex TutoPublishing, 53–113 43413. Yong Huang, Elizabeth Xiao-Ru Wang and Roger Xin Zhang(2015), ‘Essential Facilities Doctrine and Its Application inIntellectual Property Space under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’,George Mason Law Review, 22 (5), 1103–26 49514. Eleanor M. Fox (2014), ‘Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance:Why Europe is Different’, Antitrust Bulletin, 59 (1), Spring, 129–52 51915. Michal S. Gal (2013), ‘Abuse of Dominance – ExploitativeAbuses’, in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (eds), Handbookon European Competition Law: Substantive Aspects, Chapter 9,Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward ElgarPublishing, 385–422 54316. David J. Gerber (2010), ‘Convergence in the Treatment ofDominant Firm Conduct: The United States, the European Union,and the Institutional Embeddedness of Economics’, Antitrust LawJournal, 76 (3), 951–73 58117. Michal S. Gal and A. Jorge Padilla (2010), ‘The FollowerPhenomenon: Implications for the Design of Monopolization Rulesin a Global Economy’, Antitrust Law Journal, 76 (3), 899–928 60418. Avishalom Tor (2010), ‘Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions ofDominance or Monopoly Power’, Antitrust Law Journal, 76 (3),847–72 63419. Ariel Ezrachi and David Gilo (2008), ‘Are Excessive Prices ReallySelf-Correcting?’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 5(2), 249–68 66020. A. Neil Campbell and J. William Rowley (2008), ‘TheInternationalization of Unilateral Conduct Laws – Conflict, Comity,Cooperation and/or Convergence?’, Antitrust Law Journal, 75 (2),267–351 68021. Michal S. Gal (2007), ‘The “Cut and Paste” of Article 82 of the EUTreaty in Israel: Conditions for a Successful Transplant’, EuropeanJournal of Law Reform, 9 (3), 467–84 765PART III VERTICAL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE22. Wouter P. J. Wils (2014), ‘The Judgment of the EU General Court inIntel and the So-Called More Economic Approach to Abuse ofDominance’, World Competition, 37 (4), 405–34 78423. Damien Geradin (2015), ‘Loyalty Rebates after Intel: Time for theEuropean Court of Justice to Overrule Hoffman-La Roche’, Journalof Competition Law and Economics, 11 (3), September, 579–615 81424. Damien Geradin and Caio Mario da Silva Pereira Neto (2013), ‘Fora Rigorous “Effects-Based” Analysis of Vertical Restraints Adoptedby Dominant Firms: A Comparison of EU and BrazilianCompetition Law’, Competition Policy International, 9 (1), Spring,1–16 85125. Vincent Verouden (2003), ‘Vertical Agreements and Article 81 (1)EC: The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis’, Antitrust LawJournal, 71 (2), 525–75 867IndexVolume IIAcknowledgements viiiIntroduction An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume IPART I CARTELS1. Wouter P. J. Wils (2016), ‘The Use of Leniency in EU CartelEnforcement: An Assessment after Twenty Years’, WorldCompetition, 39 (3), 327–88 22. John M. Connor (2015), ‘The Rise of ROW Anti-CartelEnforcement’, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 1, September, 1–11 643. Joseph E. Harrington Jr., Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger andFlorian Smuda (2015), ‘The Discontent Cartel Member and CartelCollapse: The Case of the German Cement Cartel’, InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization, 42, September, 106–19 754. Wouter P. J. Wils (2012), ‘Recidivism in EU Antitrust Enforcement:A Legal and Economic Analysis’, World Competition, 35 (1), 5–26 895. Amedeo Arena (2011), ‘Game Theory as a Yardstick for AntitrustLeniency Policy: The US, EU, and Italian Experiences in aComparative Perspective’, Global Jurist, 11 (1), March, 1–13 1116. Michal S. Gal (2010), ‘Free Movement of Judgments: IncreasingDeterrence of International Cartels through Jurisdictional Reliance’,Virginia Journal of International Law, 51 (1), 57–94 1267. Julian M. Joshua, Peter D. Camesasca and Youngjin Jung (2008),‘Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: CartelEnforcement’s Global Reach’, Antitrust Law Journal, 75 (2),353–97 1648. Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2004), ‘ContemporaryInternational Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effectsand Implications for Competition Policy’, Antitrust Law Journal, 71(3), 801–52 2099. Barbara J. Alexander (2003), ‘The Impact of Exchange Rate Levelsand Changes on International Cartels: Implications for Liability andOvercharges’, Antitrust Law Journal, 70 (3), 819–46 26110. William E. Kovacic (2000), ‘Lessons of Competition Policy Reformin Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy’, St. John’s LawReview, 74 (2), Spring, 361–405 289PART II HORIZONTAL NON-CARTEL AGREEMENTS11. Thomas K. Cheng (2017), ‘The Meaning of Restriction ofCompetition under the Monopolistic Agreements Provisions of thePRC Anti-Monopoly Law’, World Competition, 40 (2), 323–54 33512. Björn Lundqvist (2015), ‘Competition Law as the Limit toStandard-Setting’, in Josef Drexl and Fabiana di Porto (eds),Competition Law as Regulation, Chapter 13, Cheltenham, UK andNorthampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 365–95 367PART III MERGERS13. Joseph A. Clougherty, Tomaso Duso, Miyu Lee and Jo Seldeslachts(2016), ‘Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger PolicyGenerate Deterrence?’, Economic Inquiry, 54 (4), October,1884–903 39914. David Reader (2016), ‘Accommodating Public InterestConsiderations in Domestic Merger Control: Empirical Insights’,Working Paper, 1–80 41915. Fei Deng and Su Sun (2015), ‘The Role of Economics in ChineseMerger Appraisal’, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 3 (1), 92–107 50016. Anca D. Chirita (2016), ‘Procedural Rights in EU AdministrativeCompetition Proceedings: Ex Ante Mergers’, in Caroline Cauffmanand Qian Hao (eds), Procedural Rights in Competition Law in theEU and China, Berlin and Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag,59–99 51617. Antonio Capobianco, John Davies and Sean F. Ennis (2016),‘Implications of Globalisation for Competition Policy: The Needfor International Cooperation in Merger and Cartel Enforcement’,E15 Expert Group on Competition Policy and the Trade System:Think Piece, Geneva, Switzerland: International Centre for Tradeand Sustainable Development and Cologny and Geneva,Switzerland: World Economic Forum, January, i–v, 1–20 55718. William E. Kovacic, Petros C. Mavroidis and Damien J. Neven(2014), ‘Merger Control Procedures and Institutions: A Comparisonof the EU and US Practice’, European University Institute, RobertSchuman Centre for Advanced Studies: Global GovernanceProgramme – 84, Working Paper No. 2014/20, 1–30 58319. Alison Jones and John Davies (2014), ‘Merger Control and thePublic Interest: Balancing EU and National Law in the ProtectionistDebate’, European Competition Journal, 10 (3), December, 453–97 61420. D. Daniel Sokol (2013), ‘Merger Control under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’, New York University Journal of Law and Business,10 (1), Fall, 1–36 65921. Michal S. Gal (2012), ‘Merger Policy for Small and MicroJurisdictions’, in Konkurrensverket: Swedish Competition Authority(eds), More Pros and Cons of Merger Control, Chapter 3,Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Competition Authority, 61–124 69522. Ariel Ezrachi (2006), ‘Merger Control and Cross-BorderTransactions: A Pragmatic View on Cooperation, Convergence andWhat is in between’, in Philip Marsden (ed.), Handbook of Researchin Trans-Atlantic Antitrust, Chapter 24, Cheltenham, UK andNorthampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 622–40 75923. Eleanor M. Fox (2002), ‘U.S. and European Merger Policy – FaultLines and Bridges: Mergers that Create Incentives for ExclusionaryPractices’, George Mason Law Review, 10 (3), 471–88 77824. Eleanor M. Fox (2002), ‘Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywelland the Future of Merger Control’, University of PennsylvaniaJournal of International Economic Law, 23 (3), Fall, 457–68 796PART IV COMPETITION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES25. Michal S. Gal and Thomas K. Cheng (2016), ‘AggregateConcentration: A Study of Competition Law Solutions’, Journal ofAntitrust Enforcement, 4 (2), October, 282–322 80926. Alison Jones (2016), ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law:A Comparison with, and Lessons from, the US’, in MariaBergström, Marios Iacovides and Magnus Strand (eds),Harmonising EU Competition Litigation: The New Directive andBeyond, Part I, Chapter 2, Oxford, UK and Portland, OR, USA:Hart Publishing, 15–41 85027. Anca D. Chirita (2015), ‘The Judicial Review of the EuropeanUnion Industrial Cartels’, Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien,18 (4), 407–41 87728. Edward D. Cavanagh (2010), ‘The Private Antitrust Remedy:Lessons from the American Experience’, Loyola UniversityChicago Law Journal, 41 (3), Spring, 629–49 91229. Bruce Wardhaugh (2014), ‘Bogeymen, Lunatics and Fanatics:Collective Actions and the Private Enforcement of EuropeanCompetition Law’, Legal Studies, 34 (1), 1–23 933Index