Edited by Antonio Cucinotta, Universita di Messina, Roberto Pardolesi, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy and Roger J. Van den Bergh, Professor of Law and Economics, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands

• Contents: 1. The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust Herbert Hovenkamp2. The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law Roger Van den Bergh3. Apreface to Post-Chicago Antitrust Jonathan B. Baker4. Post-Chicago, Post-Seattle and the Dilemma of Globalization Eleanor M. Fox5. The Bounds Approach to Antitrust Patrick Van Cayseele6. Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy Rudolph J.R. Peritz7. ‘Obvious’ Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts John E. Lopatka and William H. Page8. Second Order Oligopoly Problems with International Dimensions: Sequential Mergers, Maverick Firms and Buyer PowerMichael S. Jacobs9. Rule Fixing: An Overlooked but General Category of CollusionRobert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel10. Raising Consumers’ Costs as an Antitrust Problem: A Sketch of the Argument from Kodak to Microsoft (the European Proceedings)Francesco Denozza11. How Safe is the King’s Throne? Network Externalities on TrialRoberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda12. The Vertical Price Fixing ControversyAntonio Cucinotta13. The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent Seeking 280Peter C. Carstensen14. Cooperation, Competition and Collusion Among Firms at Successive StagesRobert L. SteinerIndex

Edited by Antonio Cucinotta, Universita di Messina, Roberto Pardolesi, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy and Roger J. Van den Bergh, Professor of Law and Economics, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands

• Contents: 1. The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust Herbert Hovenkamp2. The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law Roger Van den Bergh3. Apreface to Post-Chicago Antitrust Jonathan B. Baker4. Post-Chicago, Post-Seattle and the Dilemma of Globalization Eleanor M. Fox5. The Bounds Approach to Antitrust Patrick Van Cayseele6. Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy Rudolph J.R. Peritz7. ‘Obvious’ Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts John E. Lopatka and William H. Page8. Second Order Oligopoly Problems with International Dimensions: Sequential Mergers, Maverick Firms and Buyer PowerMichael S. Jacobs9. Rule Fixing: An Overlooked but General Category of CollusionRobert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel10. Raising Consumers’ Costs as an Antitrust Problem: A Sketch of the Argument from Kodak to Microsoft (the European Proceedings)Francesco Denozza11. How Safe is the King’s Throne? Network Externalities on TrialRoberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda12. The Vertical Price Fixing ControversyAntonio Cucinotta13. The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent Seeking 280Peter C. Carstensen14. Cooperation, Competition and Collusion Among Firms at Successive StagesRobert L. SteinerIndex