WTO’s Core Rules and Disciplines

Edited by Kym Anderson, Professor of Economics, University of Adelaide, Australia and Australian National University and Bernard Hoekman, European University Institute, Italy

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroduction Kym Anderson and Bernard HoekmanPART IAN OVERVIEW 1. Bernard Hoekman (2002), ‘The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles’PART IITHE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL TRADE RULES AND DISCIPLINES 2. Jacob Viner (1924), ‘The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in American Commercial Treaties’3. James Meade ([1942] 1987), ‘A Proposal for an International Commercial Union’4. W. Max Corden (1987), ‘On Making Rules for the International Trading System’5. John A.C. Conybeare (1988), ‘Managing International Trade Conflicts: Explanations and Prescription’6. Charles P. Kindleberger (1989), ‘Commercial Policy between the Wars’7. Brian R. Copeland (1990), ‘Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Trade Barriers’8. Douglas A. Irwin (1993), ‘Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: An Historical Perspective’9. Paul Krugman (1997), ‘What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?’10. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1999), ‘Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?’11. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2002), ‘The Theory of Trade Agreements’12. Wilfred J. Ethier (2004), ‘Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World’13. Joseph F. Francois and Will Martin (2004), ‘Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings, and Market Access’PART IIINONDISCRIMINATION 14. Harry G. Johnson (1965), ‘An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions’15. Frieder Roessler (1985), ‘The Scope, Limits and Function of the GATT Legal System’16. Andrew Caplin and Karla Krishna (1988), ‘Tariffs and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Approach’17. Rodney D. Ludema (1991), ‘International Trade Bargaining and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause’18. Richard H. Snape (1993), ‘History and Economics of GATT's Article XXIV’19. Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes (1996), ‘Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System’20. Aaditya Mattoo (2000), ‘MFN and the GATS’21. Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (2001), ‘Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause’22. Damien J. Neven (2001), ‘How Should “Protection” be Evaluated in Article III GATT Disputes?’23. Phillip McCalman (2002), ‘Multi-lateral Trade Negotiations and the Most Favored Nation Clause’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsAn introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume IPART IRECIPROCITY 1. J.M. Finger (1974), ‘GATT Tariff Concessions and the Exports of Developing Countries – United States Concessions at the Dillon Round’2. J.M. Finger (1976), ‘Effects of the Kennedy Round Tariff Concessions on the Exports of Developing Countries’3. Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Douglas A. Irwin (1987), ‘The Return of the Reciprocitarians – US Trade Policy Today’ 4. Carolyn Rhodes (1989), ‘Reciprocity in Trade: The Utility of a Bargaining Strategy’5. Ayre L. Hillman and Peter Moser (1996), ‘Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access’6. Bernard M. Hoekman and Patrick A. Messerlin (2000), ‘Liberalizing Trade in Services: Reciprocal Negotiations and Regulatory Reform’7. J. Michael Finger and L. Alan Winters (2002), ‘Reciprocity in the WTO’PART IIPOLICY TRANSPARENCY: NOTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE 8. J.M. Finger (1982), ‘Incorporating the Gains from Trade into Policy’9. Richard Blackhurst (1991), ‘Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies’10. Sam Laird (1999), ‘The WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism – From Through the Looking Glass’11. Joseph F. Francois (2001), ‘Maximising the Benefits of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism for Developing Countries’PART IIIMODALITIES FOR NEGOTIATING MARKET ACCESS 12. Robert M. Stern (1976), ‘Evaluating Alternative Formulae for Reducing Industrial Tariffs’13. Robert E. Baldwin (1986), ‘Toward More Efficient Procedures for Multilateral Trade Negotiations’14. Robert E. Baldwin and Richard N. Clarke (1987), ‘Game-Modeling Multilateral Trade Negotiations’15. Aaditya Mattoo (2002), ‘Negotiating Improved Market Access Commitments’16. Simon J. Evenett (2002), ‘Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procurement’17. Joseph Francois and Will Martin (2003), ‘Formula Approaches for Market Access Negotiations’PART IVTARIFFICATION OF QUANTITATIVE TRADE RESTRICTIONS 18. Anne O. Krueger (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’19. James E. Anderson (1985), ‘The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas: The Cheese Case’20. L. Alan Winters (1987), ‘Negotiating the Abolition of Non-Tariff Barriers’21. Brian Hindley (1987), ‘GATT Safeguards and Voluntary Export Restraints: What Are the Interests of Developing Countries?’22. Irene Trela and John Whalley (1990), ‘Unraveling the Threads of the MFA’23. Bernard M. Hoekman and Michael P. Leidy (1990), ‘Policy Responses to Shifting Comparative Advantage: Designing a System of Emergency Protection’24. Merlinda D. Ingco (1996), ‘Tariffication in the Uruguay Round: How Much Liberalisation?’25. Dean Spinanger (1999), ‘Textiles Beyond the MFA Phase-Out’26. David W. Skully (2001), Economics of Tariff-Rate Quota Administration27. J. Michael Finger (2002), ‘Safeguards: Making Sense of GATT/WTO Provisions Allowing for Import Restrictions’Name Index