Edited by Chris William Sanchirico, Samuel A. Blank Professor of Law, Business, and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School, US

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroduction to Volume I Chris William SanchiricoPART IMODELS WITH EXOGENOUS LITIGATION SPENDING ASettlement and Plea Bargaining: Cooperative Game Theory Approach1. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’2. John P. Gould (1973), excerpt from ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’3. William M. Landes (1971), excerpt from ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’BSettlement and Plea Bargaining: Asymmetric Information Models4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1984), ‘Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information’5. Kathryn E. Spier (1992), ‘The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation’6. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’CThe Selection of Disputes for Litigation7. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), excerpts from ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’8. Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible’9. Joel Waldfogel (1995), ‘The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory’DThe Allocation of Legal Costs10. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’11. Geoffrey P. Miller (1986), ‘An Economic Analysis of Rule 68’ENegative Expected Value Suits12. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1988), ‘Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer’13. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1996), ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’FDiscovery14. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1994), ‘An Economic Model of Legal Discovery’15. Henry S. Farber and Michelle J. White (1991), ‘Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process’16. Bruce L. Hay (1994), ‘Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope’GLitigation and Primary Activity Incentives17. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System’18. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Mark Geistfeld (1987), ‘The Divergence between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow’19. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1988), ‘The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability’20. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liablility: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’PART IIMODELS WITH ENDOGENOUS LITIGATION SPENDINGAThe Litigation Expenditure Game21. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’22. Avery Katz (1988), ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure’23. George B. Shepherd (1999), ‘An Empirical Study of the Economics of Pretrial Discovery’BHow Results Change when Spending is Endogenous24. Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen and John Panzar (1984) ‘An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems’25. Albert Choi and Chris William Sanchirico (2004), ‘Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsIntroduction to Volume II Chris William SanchiricoPART ITHE PRODUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL EVIDENCE: FOUR APPROACHESAPure Probabilistic Deduction 1. Richard O. Lempert (1977), ‘Modeling Relevance’2. Ronald J. Allen (1986), ‘ A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials’BOmission Models3. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1986), ‘Relying on the Information of Interested Parties’CEndogenous Cost Evidence4. Chris William Sanchirico (2001), ‘Relying on the Information of Interested – and Potentially Dishonest – Parties’DCorrelated Private Information5. Chris William Sanchirico (2000), ‘Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History’PART IITRUTH FINDING VERSUS PRIMARY ACTIVITY INCENTIVE SETTING6. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’7. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages’8. Kathryn E. Spier (1994), ‘Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards’PART IIIADVERSARIAL PROCESS VERSUS INQUISITORIAL PROCESSABalance or Bias in Adversarial Competition9. Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi (1996), ‘Naive, Biased, yet Bayesian; Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?’10. Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum (2000), ‘On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias’BExplicit Comparison11. Hyun Song Shin (1998), ‘Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration’12. Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi (2001), ‘Evidence Production in Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Regimes’13. Francesco Parisi (2002), ‘Rent-seeking through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems Compared’PART IVSPECIFIC RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE AProof Burdens14. David Kaye (1982), ‘The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation’15. Chris William Sanchirico (1997), ‘The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation: A Simple Model of Mechanism Design’16. Bruce L. Hay and Kathryn E. Spier (1997), ‘Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective’BCharacter Evidence17. Chris Sanchirico (2001), excerpts from ‘Character Evidence and the Object of Trial’CHearsay18. Richard D. Friedman (1992), excerpts from ‘Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay’DPrivilege19. Stephen McG. Bundy and Einer Richard Elhauge (1991), excerpts from ‘Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation’EPerjury, Obstruction of Justice and Similar Sanctions: Optimal Level20. Steven Shavell (1989), ‘Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive to Provide Evidence to Legal Tribunals’21. Chris William Sanchirico (2004), excerpts from ‘Evidence Tampering’FPerjury, Obstruction of Justice and Similar Sanctions: Optimal Structure22. Chris William Sanchirico (2004), excerpt from ‘Evidence Tampering’Name Index

Edited by Chris William Sanchirico, Samuel A. Blank Professor of Law, Business, and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School, US

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroduction to Volume I Chris William SanchiricoPART IMODELS WITH EXOGENOUS LITIGATION SPENDING ASettlement and Plea Bargaining: Cooperative Game Theory Approach1. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’2. John P. Gould (1973), excerpt from ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’3. William M. Landes (1971), excerpt from ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’BSettlement and Plea Bargaining: Asymmetric Information Models4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1984), ‘Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information’5. Kathryn E. Spier (1992), ‘The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation’6. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’CThe Selection of Disputes for Litigation7. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), excerpts from ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’8. Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible’9. Joel Waldfogel (1995), ‘The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory’DThe Allocation of Legal Costs10. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’11. Geoffrey P. Miller (1986), ‘An Economic Analysis of Rule 68’ENegative Expected Value Suits12. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1988), ‘Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer’13. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1996), ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’FDiscovery14. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1994), ‘An Economic Model of Legal Discovery’15. Henry S. Farber and Michelle J. White (1991), ‘Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process’16. Bruce L. Hay (1994), ‘Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope’GLitigation and Primary Activity Incentives17. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System’18. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Mark Geistfeld (1987), ‘The Divergence between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow’19. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1988), ‘The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability’20. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liablility: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’PART IIMODELS WITH ENDOGENOUS LITIGATION SPENDINGAThe Litigation Expenditure Game21. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’22. Avery Katz (1988), ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure’23. George B. Shepherd (1999), ‘An Empirical Study of the Economics of Pretrial Discovery’BHow Results Change when Spending is Endogenous24. Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen and John Panzar (1984) ‘An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems’25. Albert Choi and Chris William Sanchirico (2004), ‘Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsIntroduction to Volume II Chris William SanchiricoPART ITHE PRODUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL EVIDENCE: FOUR APPROACHESAPure Probabilistic Deduction 1. Richard O. Lempert (1977), ‘Modeling Relevance’2. Ronald J. Allen (1986), ‘ A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials’BOmission Models3. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1986), ‘Relying on the Information of Interested Parties’CEndogenous Cost Evidence4. Chris William Sanchirico (2001), ‘Relying on the Information of Interested – and Potentially Dishonest – Parties’DCorrelated Private Information5. Chris William Sanchirico (2000), ‘Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History’PART IITRUTH FINDING VERSUS PRIMARY ACTIVITY INCENTIVE SETTING6. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’7. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages’8. Kathryn E. Spier (1994), ‘Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards’PART IIIADVERSARIAL PROCESS VERSUS INQUISITORIAL PROCESSABalance or Bias in Adversarial Competition9. Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi (1996), ‘Naive, Biased, yet Bayesian; Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?’10. Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum (2000), ‘On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias’BExplicit Comparison11. Hyun Song Shin (1998), ‘Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration’12. Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi (2001), ‘Evidence Production in Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Regimes’13. Francesco Parisi (2002), ‘Rent-seeking through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems Compared’PART IVSPECIFIC RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE AProof Burdens14. David Kaye (1982), ‘The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation’15. Chris William Sanchirico (1997), ‘The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation: A Simple Model of Mechanism Design’16. Bruce L. Hay and Kathryn E. Spier (1997), ‘Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective’BCharacter Evidence17. Chris Sanchirico (2001), excerpts from ‘Character Evidence and the Object of Trial’CHearsay18. Richard D. Friedman (1992), excerpts from ‘Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay’DPrivilege19. Stephen McG. Bundy and Einer Richard Elhauge (1991), excerpts from ‘Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation’EPerjury, Obstruction of Justice and Similar Sanctions: Optimal Level20. Steven Shavell (1989), ‘Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive to Provide Evidence to Legal Tribunals’21. Chris William Sanchirico (2004), excerpts from ‘Evidence Tampering’FPerjury, Obstruction of Justice and Similar Sanctions: Optimal Structure22. Chris William Sanchirico (2004), excerpt from ‘Evidence Tampering’Name Index

Edited by Chris William Sanchirico, Samuel A. Blank Professor of Law, Business, and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School, US

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroduction to Volume I Chris William SanchiricoPART IMODELS WITH EXOGENOUS LITIGATION SPENDING ASettlement and Plea Bargaining: Cooperative Game Theory Approach1. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’2. John P. Gould (1973), excerpt from ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’3. William M. Landes (1971), excerpt from ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’BSettlement and Plea Bargaining: Asymmetric Information Models4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1984), ‘Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information’5. Kathryn E. Spier (1992), ‘The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation’6. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’CThe Selection of Disputes for Litigation7. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), excerpts from ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’8. Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible’9. Joel Waldfogel (1995), ‘The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory’DThe Allocation of Legal Costs10. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’11. Geoffrey P. Miller (1986), ‘An Economic Analysis of Rule 68’ENegative Expected Value Suits12. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1988), ‘Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer’13. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1996), ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’FDiscovery14. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1994), ‘An Economic Model of Legal Discovery’15. Henry S. Farber and Michelle J. White (1991), ‘Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process’16. Bruce L. Hay (1994), ‘Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope’GLitigation and Primary Activity Incentives17. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System’18. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Mark Geistfeld (1987), ‘The Divergence between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow’19. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1988), ‘The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability’20. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liablility: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’PART IIMODELS WITH ENDOGENOUS LITIGATION SPENDINGAThe Litigation Expenditure Game21. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’22. Avery Katz (1988), ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure’23. George B. Shepherd (1999), ‘An Empirical Study of the Economics of Pretrial Discovery’BHow Results Change when Spending is Endogenous24. Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen and John Panzar (1984) ‘An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems’25. Albert Choi and Chris William Sanchirico (2004), ‘Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsIntroduction to Volume II Chris William SanchiricoPART ITHE PRODUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL EVIDENCE: FOUR APPROACHESAPure Probabilistic Deduction 1. Richard O. Lempert (1977), ‘Modeling Relevance’2. Ronald J. Allen (1986), ‘ A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials’BOmission Models3. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1986), ‘Relying on the Information of Interested Parties’CEndogenous Cost Evidence4. Chris William Sanchirico (2001), ‘Relying on the Information of Interested – and Potentially Dishonest – Parties’DCorrelated Private Information5. Chris William Sanchirico (2000), ‘Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History’PART IITRUTH FINDING VERSUS PRIMARY ACTIVITY INCENTIVE SETTING6. Richard A. Posner (1973), excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’7. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages’8. Kathryn E. Spier (1994), ‘Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards’PART IIIADVERSARIAL PROCESS VERSUS INQUISITORIAL PROCESSABalance or Bias in Adversarial Competition9. Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi (1996), ‘Naive, Biased, yet Bayesian; Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?’10. Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum (2000), ‘On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias’BExplicit Comparison11. Hyun Song Shin (1998), ‘Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration’12. Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi (2001), ‘Evidence Production in Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Regimes’13. Francesco Parisi (2002), ‘Rent-seeking through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems Compared’PART IVSPECIFIC RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE AProof Burdens14. David Kaye (1982), ‘The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation’15. Chris William Sanchirico (1997), ‘The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation: A Simple Model of Mechanism Design’16. Bruce L. Hay and Kathryn E. Spier (1997), ‘Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective’BCharacter Evidence17. Chris Sanchirico (2001), excerpts from ‘Character Evidence and the Object of Trial’CHearsay18. Richard D. Friedman (1992), excerpts from ‘Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay’DPrivilege19. Stephen McG. Bundy and Einer Richard Elhauge (1991), excerpts from ‘Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation’EPerjury, Obstruction of Justice and Similar Sanctions: Optimal Level20. Steven Shavell (1989), ‘Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive to Provide Evidence to Legal Tribunals’21. Chris William Sanchirico (2004), excerpts from ‘Evidence Tampering’FPerjury, Obstruction of Justice and Similar Sanctions: Optimal Structure22. Chris William Sanchirico (2004), excerpt from ‘Evidence Tampering’Name Index