Safety of Computer Architectures

Jean-Louis Boulanger is an Independent Safety Assessor (ISA) for software in the railway industry. After 15 years working at the RATP (the authority that manages the subway in Paris) and 6 years as a researcher and teacher at the University of Technology of Compiegne in France, he is currently working as an expert for the French notified body CERTIFER in the field of certification of safety critical railway applications based on software (ERTMS, SCADA, automatic subway, etc.). His research interests include requirements, software verification and validation, traceability and RAMS with a special focus on safety.

"The text is clearly written, well-illustrated, and includes a helpful glossary." (Booknews, 1 February 2011)

• Introduction xiiiChapter 1. Principles 1Jean-Louis BOULANGER1.1. Introduction 11.2. Presentation of the basic concepts: faults, errors and failures 11.3. Safe and/or available architecture 71.4. Resetting a processing unit 71.5. Overview of safety techniques 81.6. Conclusion 451.7. Bibliography 45Chapter 2. Railway Safety Architecture 47Jean-Louis BOULANGER2.1. Introduction 472.2. Coded secure processor 472.3. Other applications 532.4. Regulatory and normative context 602.5. Conclusion 662.6. Bibliography 66Chapter 3. From the Coded Uniprocessor to 2oo3 69Gilles LEGOFF and Christophe GIRARD3.1. Introduction 693.2. From the uniprocessor to the dual processor with voter 713.3. CSD: available safety computer 803.4. DIVA evolutions 933.5. New needs and possible solutions 993.6. Conclusion 1013.7. Assessment of installations 1023.8. Bibliography 103Chapter 4. Designing a Computerized Interlocking Module: a Key Component of Computer-Based Signal Boxes Designed by the SNCF 105Marc ANTONI4.1. Introduction 1054.2. Issues 1074.3. Railway safety: fundamental notions 1164.4. Development of the computerized interlocking module 1244.5. Conclusion 1454.6. Bibliography 147Chapter 5. Command Control of Railway Signaling Safety: Safety at Lower Cost 149Daniel DRAGO5.1. Introduction 1495.2. A safety coffee machine 1495.3. History of the PIPC 1505.4. The concept basis 1555.5. Postulates for safety requirements 1575.6. Description of the PIPC architecture7 1595.7. Description of availability principles 1735.8. Software architecture 1765.9. Protection against causes of common failure 1865.10. Probabilistic modeling 1885.11. Summary of safety concepts 1945.12. Conclusion 1975.13. Bibliography 198Chapter 6. Dependable Avionics Architectures: Example of a Fly-by-Wire system 199Pascal TRAVERSE, Christine BEZARD, Jean-Michel CAMUS, Isabelle LACAZE, Hervé LEBERRE, Patrick RINGEARD and Jean SOUYRIS6.1. Introduction 1996.2. System breakdowns due to physical failures 2056.3. Manufacturing and design errors 2156.4. Specific risks 2236.5. Human factors in the development of flight controls 2256.6. Conclusion 2296.7. Bibliography 229Chapter 7. Space Applications 233Jean-Paul BLANQUART and Philippe MIRAMONT7.1. Introduction 2337.2. Space system 2337.3. Context and statutory obligation 2377.4. Specific needs 2437.5. Launchers: the Ariane 5 example 2527.6. Satellite architecture 2817.7. Orbital transport: ATV example 2927.8. Summary and conclusions 3027.9. Bibliography 304Chapter 8. Methods and Calculations Relative to “Safety Instrumented Systems” at TOTAL 307Yassine CHAABI and Jean-Pierre SIGNORET8.1. Introduction 3078.2. Specific problems to be taken into account  3088.3. Example 1: system in 2/3 modeled by fault trees 3228.4. Example 2: 2/3 system modeled by the stochastic Petri net 3288.5. Other considerations regarding HIPS 3338.6. Conclusion 3428.7. Bibliography 343Chapter 9. Securing Automobile Architectures 345David LIAIGRE9.1. Context 3459.2. More environmentally-friendly vehicles involving more embedded electronics 3479.3. Mastering the complexity of electronic systems 3489.4. Security concepts in the automotive field 3509.5. Which security concepts for which security levels of the ISO 26262 standard? 3649.6. Conclusion 3769.7. Bibliography 377Chapter 10. SIS in Industry 379Grégory BUCHHEIT and Olaf MALASSE10.1. Introduction 37910.2. Safety loop structure 38410.3. Constraints and requirements of the application 40710.4. Analysis of a safety loop 41310.5. Conclusion 42310.6. Bibliography 424Chapter 11. A High-Availability Safety Computer 425Sylvain BARO11.1. Introduction 42511.2. Safety computer 42611.3. Applicative redundancy 43311.4. Integrated redundancy 43311.5. Conclusion 44311.6. Bibliography 446Chapter 12. Safety System for the Protection of Personnel in the CERN Large Hadron Collider 447Pierre NININ, Silvia GRAU, Tomasz LADZINSKI and Francesco VALENTINI12.1. Introduction 44712.2. LACS 45012.3. LASS 45212.4. Functional safety methodology 45912.5. Test strategy 46612.6. Feedback 47212.7. Conclusions 47312.8. Bibliography 474Glossary 477List of Authors 485Index 487