State Aid and the European Economic Constitution

AvFrancesco de Cecco

Inbunden, Engelska, 2012

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Beskrivning

Recent years have seen the rise of EU State aid law as a crucial component of the European economic constitution. To date, however, the literature has neglected the contribution of this area of EU law to the internal market. This book seeks to fill this gap in our understanding of the economic constitution by exploring the significance of State aid law in addressing questions that go to the core of the internal market project. It does so by examining the case law relating to three different activities that Member States engage in: market participation, market regulation, and funding for Services of General Economic Interest. Each of these areas offers insights into fundamental questions surrounding the economic constitution, such as the separation between the State and the market, the scope for Member States to engage in regulatory competition, and the tension between market and nonmarket concerns.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2012-12-14
Mått:156 x 234 x 22 mm
Vikt:476 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Hart Studies in Competition Law
Antal sidor:210
Förlag:Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
ISBN:9781849461054

Utforska kategorier

Internationella relationer inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

Francesco de Cecco is a Lecturer in Law at Newcastle University.

Recensioner i media

The author's approach is scholarly and touches upon a rather neglected reading of this branch of law....this book is an original and thorough study of State aid law through the lenses of the European economic constitution. In particular, it will be of value to state aid scholars as it provides a critical and comprehensive analysis of the most contentious and current issues surrounding EU State aid law.

Innehållsförteckning

1. IntroductionPART I2. The Constitutional Framework 1. The Concept of a European Economic Constitution A. Ordo-liberalism and the European Economic Constitution B. The Continuing Relevance of the Concept of Economic Constitution 2. The Economic Orientation of the Internal Market Case Law A. The Role of Economic Liberalism B. The Balance between Internal Market and Social Rights 3. The Limits of Constitutional Adjudication A. National Identity and the Social Market Economy in the Court B. Varieties of Capitalism and Market Integration 4. Conclusion3. The Distinctive Nature of State Aid Law 1. Family Resemblances A. State Aid and Antitrust B. State Aid and Free Movement C. Competition Between States 2. Centralisation and its Rationale A. Direct Effect, Centralised and Decentralised Enforcement B. Administrative Rule-Making 3. Discretion A. Economic and Non-Economic Considerations B. Discretion and the European Interest 4. ConclusionPART II4. The State as Market Participant 1. State Attribution 2. The Market Operator Principle and its Ramifications A. Questioning the Market Operator Principle B. From Neutrality to Substantive Equality C. The Limits of the Market Paradigm D. Legal Certainty 3. Conclusion 5. The State as Regulator 1. The Market Participant–Regulator Boundary 2. Selectivity A. Competitors and Comparators B. The Relevance of Objectives C. Regulatory Justifications for Unequal Treatment D. Towards a 'Rule of Reason' in State Aid Law? 3. The Use of Public Resources 4. Conclusion PART III6. State Aid and Self-Government 1. The Geographic Dimension of Selectivity A. The Relevant Economic Space B. The Constitutional Dimension 2. The Shifting Scope of Tax Competition 3. Conclusion 7. Funding Public Services 1. Services of General Economic Interest 2. Compensation for Public Service Obligations A. The 'State Aid' and 'Compensation' Approaches B. Altmark and Beyond C. A Retreat from Altmark? D. The Commission Packages 3. Defining SGEIs A. State Aid and the Constitutional Relevance of Solidarity B. Evaluating Compensation4. Beyond the Market Participant-Regulator Dichotomy 5. Conclusion 8. Conclusion