Edited by Fred S. McChesney, De la Cruz/Mentschikoff Professor of Law and Economics, University of Miami Law School, Florida, US

‘If you’re involved in any way with law, economics, or finance, this book will undoubtedly enhance your understanding of the forces and phenomena than can and do impact on company law.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Fred S. McChesneyPART IBACKGROUND 1. R.H. Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’PART IITHE PERECEIVED PROBLEM2. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means (1933), ‘The Divergence of Interest between Ownership and Control’3. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’4. Michael C. Jensen (1986), ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers’PART IIIMERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 5. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’6. William J. Carney (1999), ‘The Legacy of “The Market for Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm’7. Fred S. McChesney (1999), ‘Manne, Mergers, and the Market for Corporate Control’PART IVHOW THE MARKET OPERATES: INTERNAL ISSUES8. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), ‘The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’9. Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), ‘The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers’10. David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1987), ‘Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers’11. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), ‘Corporate Control Transactions’12. Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas (2004), ‘The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions’PART VHOW THE MARKET OPERATES: EXTERNAL ISSUES13. William J. Carney and Leonard A. Silverstein (2003), ‘The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill’14. Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’15. John C. Coates, IV (2001), ‘Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers’PART VIEMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 16. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence’17. Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter (1988) ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980’