Theory of Corporate Finance

Edited by Michael J. Brennan, Goldyne and Irwin Hearsh Professor of Banking and Finance, University of California, Los Angeles, US

’The work is an exceptional collection of articles, one that I have already utilized in teaching a Ph.D. seminar in corporate finance. I would recommend the volumes as worthwhile investment to anyone desiring to explore the frontiers of corporate finance research.’

• Volume IAcknowledgementsForeword by Richard RollIntroduction by the editorPart I Shareholder Objectives1. H. DeAngelo (1981), ‘Competition and Unanimity’2. L. Makowski (1983), ‘Competition and Unanimity Revisited’3. H. Leland (1977), ‘Information, Managerial Choice and Stockholder Unanimity’Part II Agency and Monitoring4. M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’5. S.C. Myers (1977), ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’6. R.M. Stulz (1990), ‘Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies’7. A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1986), ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’8. B. Holmström and J. Tirole (1993), ‘Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring’Part III Adverse Selection and Signalling9. S.C. Myers and N.S. Majlup (1984), ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors do not have’10. H.E. Leland and D.H. Pyle (1977), ‘Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation’11. M.H. Miller and K. Rock (1985), ‘Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information’12. R. Ambarish, K. John and J. Williams (1987), ‘Efficient Signalling with Dividends and Investments’13. M.J. Brennan and A. Kraus (1987), ‘Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information’Part IV Reputation14. D.W. Diamond (1989), ‘Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets’15. A.W.A. Boot, S.I. Greenbaum and A.V. Thakor (1993), ‘Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting’Part V Contracting and Incentives16. P. Aghion and P. Bolton (1992), ‘An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting’17. M.P. Narayanan (1985), ‘Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results’18. D. Hirshleifer and Y. Suh (1992), ‘Risk, Managerial Effort and Project Choice’Part VI Initial Public Offerings19. K. Rock (1986), ‘Why New Issues are Underpriced’20. I. Welch (1992), ’Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades’21. C. Spatt and S. Srivastava (1991), ‘Preplay Communication, Participation Restrictions, and Efficiency in Initial Public Offerings’Part VII Debt Markets22. R.G. Rajan (1992),’ Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s-Length Debt’23. D.W. Dimand (1993), ‘Seniority and Maturity of Debt Contracts’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsAn Introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume IPart I Financial Structure and the Real Asset and Products Markets1. S. Titman (1984), ‘The Effect of Capital Structure on a Firm’s Liquidation Decision’2. V. Maksimovic and J. Zechner (1991), ‘Debt, Agency Costs, and Industry Equilibrium’3. A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1992), ‘Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach’4. P. Volton and D.S. Scharfstein (1990), ‘A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting’Part II Capital Investment and Valuation5. M.J. Brennan (1990), ‘Latent Assets’6. M.J. Brennan and D.S. Schwartz (1985), ‘ Evaluating Natural Resource Investments’7. J.E. Ingersoll, Jr. and S.A. Ross (1992), ‘Waiting to Invest: Investment and Uncertainty’8. H.E. Leland (1994), ‘Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure’Part III Hedging, Disclosure Policy and Insider Trading9. P.M. deMarzo and D. Duffie (1991), ‘Corporate Financial Hedging with Proprietary Information’10. K.A. Froot, D.S. Scharfstein and J.C. Stein (1993), ‘Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies’11. M.J. Fishman and K.M. Hagerty (1989), ‘Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency’12. H.E. Leland (1992), ‘Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?’Part IV Taxes and Financial Policy13. M.H. Miller (1977), ‘Debt and Taxes’14. F. Modigliani (1982), ‘Debt, Dividend Policy, Taxes, Inflation and Market Valuation’15. S.A. Ross (1985), ‘Debt and Taxes and Uncertainty’Part V Voting and Control16. S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart (1988), ‘One Share–One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’17. M. Harris and A. Raviv (1989), ‘The Design of Securities’Part VI Takeover Contests18. S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart (1980), ‘Takeover Bids the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation’19. M.J. Fishman (1989), ‘Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions’20. D. Hirshleifer and S. Titman (1990), ‘Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids’Part VII Corporate Bankruptcy21. R.M. Giammarino (1989), ‘The Resolution of Financial Distress’22. R. Gertner and D. Scharfstein (1991), ‘A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law’23. R.M. Mooradian (1994), ‘The Effect of Bankruptcy Protection on Investment: Chapter 11 as a Screening Device’Name Index