This book investigates the tensions between EU law and international commercial arbitration, i.e. tensions between two phenomena at opposite ends of the public to private ordering continuum. It focuses on the Commercial Agents Directive’s regime for indemnity and compensation as one of the most frequent source of these tensions. To mitigate the consequential problems, the book proposes and describes a comprehensive framework for a preferable system of reviewing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. To this end, it explores the prerequisites of this system through comparative legal analysis of the German, Belgian, French and English systems of review, an assessment of the observable aspects of arbitral practice, game theoretical analysis of the arbitral process, and microeconomic analysis of the cross-border market for commercial agency.

This book investigates the tensions between EU law and international commercial arbitration, i.e. tensions between two phenomena at opposite ends of the public to private ordering continuum. It focuses on the Commercial Agents Directive’s regime for indemnity and compensation as one of the most frequent source of these tensions. To mitigate the consequential problems, the book proposes and describes a comprehensive framework for a preferable system of reviewing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. To this end, it explores the prerequisites of this system through comparative legal analysis of the German, Belgian, French and English systems of review, an assessment of the observable aspects of arbitral practice, game theoretical analysis of the arbitral process, and microeconomic analysis of the cross-border market for commercial agency.

This book investigates the tensions between EU law and international commercial arbitration, i.e. tensions between two phenomena at opposite ends of the public to private ordering continuum. It focuses on the Commercial Agents Directive’s regime for indemnity and compensation as one of the most frequent source of these tensions. To mitigate the consequential problems, the book proposes and describes a comprehensive framework for a preferable system of reviewing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. To this end, it explores the prerequisites of this system through comparative legal analysis of the German, Belgian, French and English systems of review, an assessment of the observable aspects of arbitral practice, game theoretical analysis of the arbitral process, and microeconomic analysis of the cross-border market for commercial agency.