Unique Solutions for Strategic Games

Equilibrium Selection Based on Resistance Avoidance

AvWerner Güth,Brigitte Kalkofen

Häftad, Engelska, 1989

Del 328 i serien Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

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Beskrivning

This book develops a general solution concept for strategic games which resolves strategic uncertainty completely. The concept is described by a mathematically formulated solution procedure and illustrated by applying it to many interesting examples. A long nontechnical introduction tries to survey and to discuss the more technical parts of the book. The book and especially the introduction provide firm and consistent guidance for scholars of game theory. There are many open problems which could inspire further research efforts.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1989-04-12
Mått:170 x 244 x 12 mm
Vikt:382 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Antal sidor:200
Förlag:Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
ISBN:9783540509745

Utforska kategorier

Nationalekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Innehållsförteckning

Introduction: On equilibrium selection.- 1. The equilibrium concept.- 2. Examples of games with multiple equilibria.- 3. Refinement concepts versus equilibrium selection theory.- 4. The state of the art in equilibrium selection.- 5. Equilibrium selection based on resistance avoidance (ESBORA).- I: The concept of resistance avoidance.- 1. Modelling finite noncooperative games.- 2. The definition of resistance dominance.- 3. General properties of resistance dominance.- 4. Applying the principle of resistance avoidance.- II: Generating complete (agent) normal forms and candidate sets.- 1. Uniformly perturbed (agent) normal forms.- 2. Cell composition.- 3. Completing cell games and the residual game.- 4. Generating irreducible games.- 5. Generating candidate sets for irreducible games.- 6. The limit solution for the unperturbed game.- 7. Simplifications of the solution procedure in nondegenerate games.- 8. Examples.- III: Generalizing the weights for normalized individual resistances.- 1. The ‘one seller and n-1 buyers’-problem.- 2. The generalized ESBORA-concept.- 3. Examples.- IV: Further perspectives for improving the ESBORA-concept.- 1. Continuous weights.- 2. Defining restricted games by the formation structure.- 3. Mixed strategy equilibria as solution candidates.- Final Remarks.- Notations.- References.