Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems

Theory and Implications for Reforms

AvMarkus Berndt

Häftad, Tyska, 2002

Del i serien Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts

551 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Beskrivning

Markus Berndt explains the observable evolution and persistence of differences in financial systems by elaborating on the influence of network effects on corporate governance systems. He develops a coherent theoretical framework pulling together existing agency theories and providing new theoretical foundations wherever there is a gap in the current theoretical understanding of corporate governance.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2002-08-30
Mått:148 x 210 x 10 mm
Vikt:221 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Tyska
Serie:Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts
Antal sidor:143
Upplaga:2002
Förlag:Deutscher Universitats-Verlag
ISBN:9783824476947

Utforska kategorier

Rättsvetenskap inom Juridik
Makroekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap
Affärsstrategi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Mer om författaren

Dr. Markus Berndt promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Manfred J. Holler im Rahmen des Graduiertenkollegs für "Recht und Ökonomik" der Universität Hamburg. Er ist Referent am Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung in Bonn.

Innehållsförteckning

1. Introduction.- 2. Differences in Corporate Governance Systems.- 2.1 Components of a Corporate Governance System - Scope of the Analysis.- 2.2 Empirical Evidence.- 2.3 Explanations for the Evolution of Different Systems.- 2.4 Explanations for the Persistence of Different Systems.- 3. Analytical Framework.- 3.1 Purpose of Corporate Governance.- 3.2 The Role of Institutions and Law.- 4. Dispersed Control - the Outsider System.- 4.1 Takeover Market and the Agency Costs of Dispersed Control.- 4.2 Institutional Innovation.- 4.3 A Case for Mandatory Disclosure.- 5. Concentrated Control - the Insider System.- 5.1 Differences with Dispersed Control.- 5.2 Modeling the Reputation Mechanism of Concentrated Control.- 5.3 Implications.- 5.4 Legislative Intervention.- 6. Network Effects via Capital Markets.- 6.1 Influence of Corporate Governance on Capital Market Liquidity.- 6.2 The Influence of Capital Market Liquidity on Corporate Governance.- 6.3 Resulting Network Effects.- 7. Evolutionary Model.- 7.1 Intention and Structure.- 7.2 Setup.- 7.3 Control Strategy.- 7.4 Legislation and Financial System.- 8. Implications for Corporate Governance Reforms.- 8.1 Sequencing of Reforms.- 8.2 Hysteresis of Inefficient Systems.- 8.4 An Outlook on Privatization Strategies.- 9. The Influence of Coordination Benefits on Corporate Governance and Accounting Standards.- 9.1 Objective of this Chapter.- 9.2 Setup.- 9.3 Equilibria.- 9.4 Social Welfare.- 9.5 Implications of the Coordination Model.- 10. Conclusion.- Appendix: Difference between Entry-Inducement and Entry-Deterrence -A Theoretical Note.- References.