Since the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework of 2002 introduced competition law principles and methodologies into the regulatory regime, the so-called Article 7 procedure has (in the opinion of many) become no less than an impenetrable labyrinth. National regulatory authorities are obliged to analyse markets to identify undertakings which enjoy 舖significant market power舗 舒 a regime which has fostered troublesome and unresolved divergence between regulators and competition authorities and left both practitioners and academics in a particularly undefined sphere of interpretation and action.

Since the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework of 2002 introduced competition law principles and methodologies into the regulatory regime, the so-called Article 7 procedure has (in the opinion of many) become no less than an impenetrable labyrinth. National regulatory authorities are obliged to analyse markets to identify undertakings which enjoy 舖significant market power舗 舒 a regime which has fostered troublesome and unresolved divergence between regulators and competition authorities and left both practitioners and academics in a particularly undefined sphere of interpretation and action.

Since the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework of 2002 introduced competition law principles and methodologies into the regulatory regime, the so-called Article 7 procedure has (in the opinion of many) become no less than an impenetrable labyrinth. National regulatory authorities are obliged to analyse markets to identify undertakings which enjoy 舖significant market power舗 舒 a regime which has fostered troublesome and unresolved divergence between regulators and competition authorities and left both practitioners and academics in a particularly undefined sphere of interpretation and action.