Albert L. Weeks - Böcker

A longtime scholar of the Cold War deftly weaves together the tradition of "just war" and an examination of current events to show how the time-honored concepts of jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war) apply to the U.S. military involvement in Iraq.This timely analysis of President George W. Bush's foreign policy deals with the cornerstone of his administrations—the "war on terror"—as implemented in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and at Abu Ghraib prison. The Choice of War: The Iraq War and the "Just War" Tradition discusses NSS 2002, the national security statement that became the blueprint for the Bush Doctrine. It explains the differences and similarities between preventive and pre-emptive war and explores the administration's justification of the necessity of the March 2003 invasion. Finally, it analyzes the conduct of the war, the occupation, and the post-occupation phases of the conflict.In evaluating the Bush Doctrine, both as declared strategy and as implemented, Albert L. Weeks asks whether going it virtually alone in the global struggle against 21st-century terrorism should be incorporated permanently into American political and military policy. Answering no, he suggests an alternative to a doctrine that has isolated the United States and left the world divided.

This book documents dictator Joseph Stalin's brilliant tactics as well as missteps in taking preemptive actions that guaranteed ultimate victory over the German invaders. It also covers the policies implemented after the war that made the Soviet Union a menace to world peace and led to collapse of Soviet rule.A detailed reexamination of historical facts indicates that Stalin could deserve to be regarded as a "great leader." Yet Stalin clearly failed as his nation's leader in a post-World War II milieu, where he delivered the Cold War instead of rapid progress and global cooperation. It is the proof of both Stalin's brilliance and blunders that makes him such a fascinating figure in modern history.Today, most of the Russian population acknowledges that Stalin achieved "greatness." The Soviet dictator's honored place in history is largely due to Stalin successfully attending to the Soviet Union's defense needs in the 1930s and 1940s, and leading the USSR to victory in the war on the Eastern Front against Nazi Germany and its allies. This book provides an overdue critical investigation of how the Soviet leader's domestic and foreign policies actually helped produce this victory, and above all, how Stalin's timely support of a wartime alliance with the Western capitalist democracies assured the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945.

"The United States is a country of machines. Without the use of these machines through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war." —Josef Stalin (1943), quoted in W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, Random House, N.Y., 1975, p. 277The United States shipped more than $12 billion in Lend-Lease aid to Stalin's Russia during World War II. Materials lent, beginning in late 1941 before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, included airplanes and tanks, locomotives and rails, construction materials, entire military production assembly lines, food and clothing, aviation fuel, and much else. Lend-Lease is now recognized by post-Soviet Russian historians as essential to the Soviet war effort. Wielding many facts and statistics never before published in the U.S., author Albert L. Weeks keenly analyzes the diplomatic rationale for and results of this assistance. Russia's Life-Saver is a brilliant contribution to the study of U.S.-Soviet relations and its role in World War II.

Myths of the Cold War: Amending Historiographic Distortions provides a corrective for the distortions and omissions of many previous domestic and foreign (including Russian) studies of the Cold War, especially those published since 2000. The “present interest” motivation in Weeks's analysis is gaining a clear understanding of the bi-polar, $4 trillion, nuclear-war-threatening standoff that lasted over 40 years after World War II until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.Without such knowledge and understanding of this dangerous conflict, any future encounter of the cold-war type with another nation-state is liable to be construed in confusing ways just as the U.S.-Soviet Cold War was. The consequence of such misunderstanding in the historiographic sense as well as in policy-making at the highest level is that the populations of the contending powers will have distorted conceptions of the reasons for the confrontation. The result of this, in turn, is skewed tendentiousness that masks concrete, underlying causes of intense inter-state contention.Practical benefits thus flow from an unprejudiced analysis of the past Cold War with Communist Russia. This understanding can help prevent a future conflict, such as one with Communist China, which some reputed sinologists are currently predicting, as well as one with post-Soviet Russia. Conversely, if a new cold war is imposed on the West, a clearer understanding of the post-World War II archetypical Cold War will be edifying.

On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941.Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup—it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack—Hitler simply beat him to the punch.