Douglas A. Macgregor – författare

This work proposes the reorganization of America's ground forces on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Central to the proposal is the simple thesis that the U.S. Army must take control of its future by exploiting the emerging revolution in military affairs. The analysis argues that a new Army warfighting organization will not only be more deployable and effective in Joint operations; reorganized information age ground forces will be significantly less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize than the Army's current Cold War division-based organizations. And while ground forces must be equipped with the newest Institute weapons, new technology will not fulfill its promise of shaping the battlefield to American advantage if new devices are merely grafted on to old organizations that are not specifically designed to exploit them. It is not enough to rely on the infusion of new, expensive technology into the American defense establishment to preserve America's strategic dominance in the next century. The work makes it clear that planes, ships, and missiles cannot do the job of defending America's global security issues alone. The United States must opt for reform and reorganization of the nation's ground forces and avoid repeating Britain's historic mistake of always fielding an effective army just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor.

This work proposes the reorganization of America's ground forces on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Central to the proposal is the simple thesis that the U.S. Army must take control of its future by exploiting the emerging revolution in military affairs. The analysis argues that a new Army warfighting organization will not only be more deployable and effective in Joint operations; reorganized information age ground forces will be significantly less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize than the Army's current Cold War division-based organizations. And while ground forces must be equipped with the newest Institute weapons, new technology will not fulfill its promise of shaping the battlefield to American advantage if new devices are merely grafted on to old organizations that are not specifically designed to exploit them. It is not enough to rely on the infusion of new, expensive technology into the American defense establishment to preserve America's strategic dominance in the next century. The work makes it clear that planes, ships, and missiles cannot do the job of defending America's global security issues alone. The United States must opt for reform and reorganization of the nation's ground forces and avoid repeating Britain's historic mistake of always fielding an effective army just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor.

Are we prepared to meet the challenges of the next war? What should our military look like? What lessons have we learned from recent actions in Afghanistan and Iraq? Macgregor has captured the attention of key leaders and inspired a genuine public debate on military reform. With the dangerous world situation of the early 21st century-and possible flashpoints ranging from the Middle East to the Far East-interservice cooperation in assembling small, mobile units and a dramatically simplified command structure is essential. MacGregor's controversial ideas, favored by the current Bush administration, would reduce timelines for deployment, enhance responsiveness to crises, and permit rapid decision-making and planning.The Army is the nation's primary instrument of land warfare, but what capabilities can the Army field today, and what is the Joint Commander likely to need tomorrow? Stuck with a force structure that hasn't changed since Word War II, as well as an outdated command system, today's Army faces potential failure in a modern war. Without a conceptual redefinition of warfare as a joint operation, a new military culture that can execute joint expeditionary warfare will not emerge. New technology both compels and enables evolution of the armed forces' organization. MacGregor's visionary plan to integrate ground maneuver forces with powerful strike assets is the foundation for a true revolution in military affairs, and has sparked heated debates in policy and military circles.

Are we prepared to meet the challenges of the next war? What should our military look like? What lessons have we learned from recent actions in Afghanistan and Iraq? Macgregor has captured the attention of key leaders and inspired a genuine public debate on military reform. With the dangerous world situation of the early 21st century-and possible flashpoints ranging from the Middle East to the Far East-interservice cooperation in assembling small, mobile units and a dramatically simplified command structure is essential. MacGregor's controversial ideas, favored by the current Bush administration, would reduce timelines for deployment, enhance responsiveness to crises, and permit rapid decision-making and planning.The Army is the nation's primary instrument of land warfare, but what capabilities can the Army field today, and what is the Joint Commander likely to need tomorrow? Stuck with a force structure that hasn't changed since Word War II, as well as an outdated command system, today's Army faces potential failure in a modern war. Without a conceptual redefinition of warfare as a joint operation, a new military culture that can execute joint expeditionary warfare will not emerge. New technology both compels and enables evolution of the armed forces' organization. MacGregor's visionary plan to integrate ground maneuver forces with powerful strike assets is the foundation for a true revolution in military affairs, and has sparked heated debates in policy and military circles.

The German Democratic Republic's emergence as the key political player within the Warsaw Pact intensified debates concerning the critical East German military role in Soviet strategy for the future of Eastern Europe. Douglas Macgregor traces the origins of collaboration to earlier forms of Russo-German military alliance. He explores the development of military cooperation since the formation of the GDR National People's Army in 1956 and discusses the importance of East Germany as a military model for the Warsaw Pact's Northern Tier. German cooperation is historically as normal as one of conflict. The need for cooperation has been alternately balanced by the propensity to conflict of incompatible nationalisms. Specific historical circumstances have determined which tendency has prevailed at any given point; contemporary elites in East Berlin and Moscow do no more than revive an earlier convergence of strategic and political interests.