Robert A. Katzmann – författare

In an ideal world, the laws of Congress-known as federal statutes-would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant?Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress.When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.

This case study of transportation policy for disabled people illustrates the flaws in policymaking that lead many Americans to believe government is not working as it should. Robert A. Katzmann examines the workings of the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes, both separately and in interaction, as he relates the erratic path of transportation policy for the disabled over two decades. An estimated 13.4 million people in this country have difficulty using public transportation, but the federal response to their problems of mobility is of fairly recent vintage, beginning with legislation in the early 1970s. Since then, there have been many twists and turns in policy, involving a wide array of governmental institutions. These constant shifts have confused state and local governments, the transit industry, and the disabled community. Assessing why policy was so erratic, Katzmann concludes that in part the confusion resulted from the inability to choose between conflicting approaches to the problem--one oriented toward the rights of equal access for the disabled, and the other favoring effective mobility by any practical means. In addition, the conflict between these two policy approaches was compounded by increasing fragmentation within and among national institutions.

"The Judiciary and Congress not only do not communicate on their most basic concerns; they do not know how they may properly do so," writes Frank M. Coffin, a federal appeals court judge and former representative, in Judges and Legislators. "The condition is that of a chronic, debilitating fever." Though the Senate lavishes it's attention from time to time on particular judicial nominees, Congress remains largely oblivious of the wellbeing of the federal judiciary as an institution. And the judiciary seems often unaware of the critical nuances of the legislative process. This state of affairs has had an adverse effect not only on relations between the two branches, but also on public policy more generally. Some forty-five people—including a Supreme Court justice, federal and state court judges, legislators and legislative staffers, scholars, and members of the private bar—gathered for a series of discussion to identify fundamental issues affecting judicial-congressional relations. The articles published in this volume are an outgrowth of those discussions.

What can law firms do to ensure justice for all? How can they serve the needs of those unable to pay? How can law firms improve the quality of life for their lawyers? At a time when government support for legal aid is limited and under fire, when recent U.S. presidents have urged increased volunteerism, when the American Bar Association's Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge is under way, and when some within the legal profession have called for mandatory pro bono work, this new book examines these important questions.The Law Firm and the Public Good blends academic scholarship with real world experience as it brings together lawyers who have wrestled with the pressures of everyday practice. Concerned about deepening the commitment of large law firms to the wider community, the authors seek to provide a blueprint for firms concerned with creating, developing, implementing, and evaluating pro bono programs.Moving beyond the ethical arguments which justify a law firm's commitment to community service, the authors argue that pro bono work is in the firm's self-interest. They show that a heightened concern with the public good can improve a lawyer's spirit, sharpen lawyering skills, and enhance the humanistic traditions of law practice. They conclude that professional responsibility and self-interest support the same conclusion: that the law firm and the public good are inextricably linked and that each can draw strength from the other in ways that nourish both.The contributors are William A. Bradford, Jr., Hogan & Hartson; Senior Circuit Judge Frank M. Coffin, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Detroit Edison; Marc Galanter, University of Wisconsin-Madison; Donald W. Hoagland, Davis, Graham & Stubbs; William C. Kelly, Jr., Latham & Watkins; Esther F. Lardent, director of the ABA's Law Firm Pro Bono Project; Edwin L. Noel, Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly & Davis; Thomas Palay, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J