Timothy S. Good – författare

The Lincoln-Douglas senatorial debates of 1858 marked a significant crossroads in the political career of Abraham Lincoln. Though he lost the Unites States senate seat for Illinois to Stephen A. Douglas, the debates launched Lincoln into political prominence and eventually contributed to his successful run for the presidency. This work reveals Lincoln's political evolution during the debates through a narrative approach, evaluating his debate strategy and seemingly inconsistent views on slavery and racial inequality. Organized chronologically, the book examines each of the seven debates individually, acknowledging Lincoln's disappointing turns at Jonesboro and Charleston but celebrating his powerful comeback at Alton in the final senatorial debate.

This is a narrative of Abraham Lincoln's bid for the White House from 1858 through 1860. Lincoln seemed like a long shot from the beginning--a one term congressmen, he'd never served as a judge or governor or in any statewide office, and he had lost two campaigns for the U.S. Senate. How, then, did he overtake several seemingly better-qualified candidates to ultimately defeat William Seward for his young party's nomination? This work offers a day-by-day account that demonstrates how Lincoln's character, and his upholding of the Declaration of Independence's bold statement of human equality, helped him triumph. Those traits, it is argued, were far more important than any political machinations or backroom deals at the convention.This book is a sequel to The Lincoln-Douglas Debates and the Making of a President by the same author (McFarland, 2007).

During the War of 1812, the U.S. Navy numbered several dozen ships and captured fewer than 200 British vessels. American privateers, on the other hand, commanded more than 200 vessels and captured more than 1,000 British ships. The privateers proved the only American force that consistently threatened Britain throughout the Atlantic, especially along the coasts of the British Isles.Although privateers had a far greater impact on the British merchant marine and the economy of Great Britain than the U.S. Navy, they have received relatively little scholarly attention. This reference work addresses this shortcoming by providing an accounting of all 248 American privateers during the war and a comprehensive list of all captures made by American forces--including privateers, Navy, and others--during that conflict.

On the evening of April 14, 1865, when President Abraham Lincoln was assassinated in Ford's Theatre, an entire audience was witness to the tragedy. From diaries, letters, depositions, affidavits, and periodicals, here is a collection of accounts from a variety of theatergoers--who by chance saw one of the truly pivotal events in U.S. history. Providing minute first-hand details recorded over a span of ninety years, We Saw Lincoln Shot explores an event that will forever be the subject of debate and controversy.""I was present at the theater and saw it all,"" said Samuel Koontz. ""In fact, I was only about fifteen feet from the President when he was shot, although he was in a private box in the theater.""In a letter to his parent, Jason S. Knox wrote, ""Dear Father, it is with sad feeling that I take up my pen and address you. Last Friday night at ten o'clock, I witnessed the saddest tragedy ever enacted in this country. Notwithstanding my promise to you not to visit the theater, I could not resist the temptation to see General Grant and the President, and when the curtain at Ford's rose on the play of Our American Cousin, my roommate and I were seated on the second row of orchestra seats, just beneath the President's box.""Although there have been many studies of the Lincoln assassination, few have been devoted to the actual event. Overwhelmingly, historians have been attracted to the conspiracy that preceded Lincoln's death or to the aftermath. Too few have relied sufficiently upon eyewitness accounts, and some, without considering how the human mind fails to preserve minute details in long-term memory, have trusted recollections transcribed many years after Lincoln died. With a sharp focus upon the circumstances reported by one hundred actual witnesses, We Saw Lincoln Shot provides vivid documentation of a momentous evening and exposes errors that have been perpetuated as the assassination has been rendered into written histories.

No weapon platform sank more U-boats in the Second World War than the Allied aircraft. Whether it was an American 'plane operating from American escort carriers, US aircraft from Royal Air Force bases, or British aircraft from bases throughout the world, these officers and men became the most decisive factor in turning the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic against the German submarine threat. While the German crews could threaten escort vessels with torpedoes, or avoid them by remaining submerged, their leaders never developed an effective strategy against aircraft.However, the Allied aircraft did not enjoy much early success. British, Canadian and Australian air crews that fought the U-boats from 1939 until 1941 achieved few triumphs. They possessed neither the aircraft nor the bases necessary to deliver consistent lethal attacks against German submarines.In 1941, the Royal Air Force finally began implementing an effective aircraft response when it initiated training on the American-built Consolidated B-24 Liberators. Supported by other types then in service, these four-engine bombers would prove to be decisive. With America's entry into the war, the United States Navy and the United States Army Air Forces also began employing Liberators against the U-boats so that by mid-1943, the Admiral Karl Donitz, commander of U-boat forces, withdrew his submarines from the North Atlantic in recognition of the Allied aircraft's new dominance.From Donitz's retreat to the end of the war, Allied aircraft continued to dominate the U-boat battle as it shifted to other areas including the Bay of Biscay. Donitz eventually ordered his U-boats to remain on the surface and engage Allied aircraft as opposed to submerging. This approach did lead to the demise of some Allied aircraft, but it also resulted in even more U-boat being sunk. Most critically, Donitz acknowledged with his new policy that he knew of no tactics or weapons that would defend his submarines from Allied aircraft. In the end, it was a matter of choosing whether his submariners would die submerged or die surfaced. Either way, Allied aircraft prevailed.The Allied Air Campaign Against Hitler's U-Boats is the most comprehensive study ever undertaken of this most crucial battle which helped turn the Battle of the Atlantic irrevocably in favour of the Allies.

No weapon platform sank more U-boats in the Second World War than the Allied aircraft. Whether it was an American ''plane operating from American escort carriers, US aircraft from Royal Air Force bases, or British aircraft from bases throughout the world, these officers and men became the most decisive factor in turning the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic against the German submarine threat. While the German crews could threaten escort vessels with torpedoes, or avoid them by remaining submerged, their leaders never developed an effective strategy against aircraft. However, the Allied aircraft did not enjoy much early success. British, Canadian and Australian air crews that fought the U-boats from 1939 until 1941 achieved few triumphs. They possessed neither the aircraft nor the bases necessary to deliver consistent lethal attacks against German submarines. In 1941, the Royal Air Force finally began implementing an effective aircraft response when it initiated training on the American-built Consolidated B-24 Liberators. Supported by other types then in service, these four-engine bombers would prove to be decisive. With America''s entry into the war, the United States Navy and the United States Army Air Forces also began employing Liberators against the U-boats so that by mid-1943, the Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander of U-boat forces, withdrew his submarines from the North Atlantic in recognition of the Allied aircraft''s new dominance. From Dönitz''s retreat to the end of the war, Allied aircraft continued to dominate the U-boat battle as it shifted to other areas including the Bay of Biscay. Dönitz eventually ordered his U-boats to remain on the surface and engage Allied aircraft as opposed to submerging. This approach did lead to the demise of some Allied aircraft, but it also resulted in even more U-boat being sunk. Most critically, Dönitz acknowledged with his new policy that he knew of no tactics or weapons that would defend his submarines from Allied aircraft. In the end, it was a matter of choosing whether his submariners would die submerged or die surfaced. Either way, Allied aircraft prevailed. The Allied Air Campaign Against Hitler''s U-Boats is the most comprehensive study ever undertaken of this most crucial battle which helped turn the Battle of the Atlantic irrevocably in favour of the Allies.

No weapon platform sank more U-boats in the Second World War than the Allied aircraft. Whether it was an American ’plane operating from American escort carriers, US aircraft from Royal Air Force bases, or British aircraft from bases throughout the world, these officers and men became the most decisive factor in turning the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic against the German submarine threat. While the German crews could threaten escort vessels with torpedoes, or avoid them by remaining submerged, their leaders never developed an effective strategy against aircraft. However, the Allied aircraft did not enjoy much early success. British, Canadian and Australian air crews that fought the U-boats from 1939 until 1941 achieved few triumphs. They possessed neither the aircraft nor the bases necessary to deliver consistent lethal attacks against German submarines. In 1941, the Royal Air Force finally began implementing an effective aircraft response when it initiated training on the American-built Consolidated B-24 Liberators. Supported by other types then in service, these four-engine bombers would prove to be decisive. With America’s entry into the war, the United States Navy and the United States Army Air Forces also began employing Liberators against the U-boats so that by mid-1943, the Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander of U-boat forces, withdrew his submarines from the North Atlantic in recognition of the Allied aircraft’s new dominance. From Dönitz’s retreat to the end of the war, Allied aircraft continued to dominate the U-boat battle as it shifted to other areas including the Bay of Biscay. Dönitz eventually ordered his U-boats to remain on the surface and engage Allied aircraft as opposed to submerging. This approach did lead to the demise of some Allied aircraft, but it also resulted in even more U-boat being sunk. Most critically, Dönitz acknowledged with his new policy that he knew of no tactics or weapons that would defend his submarines from Allied aircraft. In the end, it was a matter of choosing whether his submariners would die submerged or die surfaced. Either way, Allied aircraft prevailed. The Allied Air Campaign Against Hitler’s U-Boats is the most comprehensive study ever undertaken of this most crucial battle which helped turn the Battle of the Atlantic irrevocably in favour of the Allies.