Collected Works of James M. Bu – serie

While this volume presents the important writings of James M. Buchanan on taxation and debt, Geoffrey Brennan makes it clear in the foreword that the thrust of Buchanan's work in this area has been to integrate theories of taxation and debt with public-expenditure theory. Therefore, the editors strongly urge that the present volume on taxation and debt be read in tandem with the subsequent Volume 15, 'Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory'. Included in this present volume are thirty-five important writings by Buchanan on taxation and debt. These are grouped into the following major subject categories: taxation, politics, and public choice; earmarking and incidence in democratic process; analytical and ethical foundations of tax limits; the fiscal constitution; confessions of a burden monger; Ricardian equivalence; the constitution of a debt-free polity. As Geoffrey Brennan points out in the foreword to this volume, "Although James Buchanan's interests are wide-ranging, the core of his professional reputation as an economist and the origin of much of his broader thinking lie in public economics -- in engagement with the questions of what governments do and how governments should properly finance what they do." This volume together with its partner subsequent volume present clear and accessible insights into the rich economic work for which Buchanan is best known.

Commenting on his collaboration with Geoffrey Brennan on THE POWER TO TAX, James M. Buchanan says that the book is "demonstrable proof of the value of genuine research collaboration across national-cultural boundaries." Buchanan goes on to say that "THE POWER TO TAX is informed by a single idea -- the implications of a revenue-maximizing government." Originally published in 1980, THE POWER TO TAX was a much-needed answer to the tax revolts sweeping across the United States. It was a much-needed answer as well in the academic circles of tax theory, where orthodox public finance models were clearly inadequate to the needs at hand. The public-choice approach to taxation which Buchanan had earlier elaborated stood in direct opposition to public-finance orthodoxy. What Buchanan and Brennan constructed in THE POWER TO TAX was a middle ground between the two. As Brennan writes in the foreword, "The underlying motivating question was simple: Why not borrow the motivational assumptions standard in public-choice theory and put them together with assumptions about policy-maker discretion taken from public-finance orthodoxy?" The result was a controversial book -- and a much misunderstood one as well. Looking back twenty years later, Brennan feels confirmed in the rightness of the theories he and Buchanan espoused, particularly in their unity with the public-choice tradition: "The insistence on motivational symmetry is a characteristic feature of the public choice approach, and it is in this dimension that THE POWER TO TAX and the orthodox public- finance approach diverge."

"Politics by principle is that which modern politics is not. What we observe is 'politics by interest', whether in the form of explicitly discriminatory treatment (rewarding or punishing) of particular groupings of citizens or of some elitist-dirigiste classification of citizens into the deserving or non-deserving on the basis of a presumed superior wisdom about what is really 'good' for us all. The proper principle for politics is that of generalization of generality." -- James M Buchanan, from the Preface. In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt sums up the main objective of James M Buchanan and Roger Congleton's 'Politics by Principle': "Imposing constitutional constraints on majoritarian politics such that a more principled pattern might emerge must be a political aim of high priority for all who wish for free and responsible citizens to live together peacefully as political equals under the rule of general laws. Buchanan and Congleton's efforts to revive the classical liberal agenda in Politics by Principle, Not Interest are of the greatest interest in that regard. And this interest is not merely a theoretical one." As James Buchanan notes in introducing his co-author Roger Congleton, 'Politics by Principle, Not Interest' "embodies the working out and presentation of a single idea... the extension and application of the generality principle to majoritarian politics." After laying out the theory, Buchanan and Congleton attempt to work it out in practical political reality. Buchanan notes that "it is much easier to discuss the generality principle as an abstract ideal than it is to define the precise conditions for its satisfaction in any particular setting." Not daunted by the difficulty of the task, the two authors succeed brilliantly in applying the generality principle to the political arena. They are interested not in laying down precise do's and don'ts for politics, but in pointing out the ideal of nondiscriminatory governance and calling for constitutional constraints on political action so it conforms more closely to the generality norm.

"Politics by principle is that which modern politics is not. What we observe is 'politics by interest', whether in the form of explicitly discriminatory treatment (rewarding or punishing) of particular groupings of citizens or of some elitist-dirigiste classification of citizens into the deserving or non-deserving on the basis of a presumed superior wisdom about what is really 'good' for us all. The proper principle for politics is that of generalization of generality." -- James M Buchanan, from the Preface. In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt sums up the main objective of James M Buchanan and Roger Congleton's 'Politics by Principle': "Imposing constitutional constraints on majoritarian politics such that a more principled pattern might emerge must be a political aim of high priority for all who wish for free and responsible citizens to live together peacefully as political equals under the rule of general laws. Buchanan and Congleton's efforts to revive the classical liberal agenda in Politics by Principle, Not Interest are of the greatest interest in that regard. And this interest is not merely a theoretical one. "As James Buchanan notes in introducing his co-author Roger Congleton, 'Politics by Principle, Not Interest' "embodies the working out and presentation of a single idea... the extension and application of the generality principle to majoritarian politics. "After laying out the theory, Buchanan and Congleton attempt to work it out in practical political reality. Buchanan notes that "it is much easier to discuss the generality principle as an abstract ideal than it is to define the precise conditions for its satisfaction in any particular setting. "Not daunted by the difficulty of the task, the two authors succeed brilliantly in applying the generality principle to the political arena. They are interested not in laying down precise do's and don'ts for politics, but in pointing out the ideal of nondiscriminatory governance and calling for constitutional constraints on political action so it conforms more closely to the generality norm.

In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, "The papers in this volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanan's papers in this area." Buchanan's work on the subject of what governments should do and his insistence on Knut Wicksell's ideal that taxation and public expenditure be integrated topics have contributed significantly to the current thinking of most economists on the topic. Geoffrey Brennan summarises Buchanan's central themes in this way, "There are two messages that emerge from this work: one is that a proper sense of the extent of market failure, rather than its mere presence, is relevant in all cases; the other is that 'correcting' for such market failure is often a complex multidimensional business not captured by direct public provision at zero price and not necessarily involving expansion of market output." The twenty-nine papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories: public services and collective action, externalities, clubs and joint supply, public goods theory, applications -- city, health, and social security, distributive norms and collective action. This volume also includes what are arguably Buchanan's two most famous articles: 'Externality', which he wrote with William Stubblebine, and 'Economic Theory of Clubs'.

Constitutional political economy is the theme of the papers collected in this volume. This entire area of contemporary economic thought is a legacy of James M Buchanan. In outlining the importance of this volume to the contemporary study of economics and to the work of James M Buchanan, Robert D Tollison states in his foreword, "Buchanan literally founded the field of constitutional political economy... (His) insistence on the importance of rules was an important innovation in economics, and, over the past thirty years or so, the analytical and empirical relevance of Buchanan's constitutional perspective has become apparent." The thirty-five papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories: foundational issues; the method of constitutional economics; incentives and constitutional choice; constitutional order; market order; distributional issues; fiscal and monetary constitutions; reform. For Buchanan, his work in constitutional political economy is just the first step. He is concerned with inducing economists and other scholars to take the constitutional problem seriously. As they do, says Robert D Tollison, "the face of modern economics will be changed."

As diverse as the papers presented in this volume may seem at first glance, all of them touch on two characteristic themes of James Buchanan's work: the respect for individual sovereignty and the threat of monopoly power on the rights of the individual. In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt says, "As opposed to more extreme and more utopian libertarians, (Buchanan) well understands that in our world it takes a state to defend the individual from the state. Buchanan, therefore, is not an anarchist but, rather, what may be called a 'reluctant anarchist' who accepts both that the state is the greatest threat to individual sovereignty and that without some statelike monopoly, individual sovereignty cannot be protected." The twenty-six essays included in FEDERALISM, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW are grouped into these categories: the analytics of federalism; federalism and freedom; liberty, man, and the state; the constitution of markets; economists, efficiency, and the law; law, money, and crime. The central issue that unites the pieces in this volume is monopoly power and its control. As a libertarian, Buchanan sees government as the greatest threat -- and also the greatest protector -- of individual liberties.

This final volume (save for the Index) in Liberty Fund's 'The Collected Works of James M Buchanan' acquaints us most intimately with the man himself. Included are essays and short pieces that shed light on Buchanan's view of the world. Ranging from personal reflections on the art and science of economics, to restatements of his central themes and reminiscences of his encounters and collaborations with other great thinkers, this volume presents James Buchanan as a multidimensional human being, not just as a great economic and political thinker. The thirty-three pieces collected in IDEAS, PERSONS, AND EVENTS are grouped into these categories: autobiographical and personal reflections; reflections on fellow political economists; political economy in the post-socialist century; reform without romance. As Hartmut Kliemt states in his foreword, "The personal and the theoretical are often inseparably intertwined in the essays of this volume... As a case in point, consider James Buchanan's account of his relationship to Frank Knight. This account not only sheds some interesting light on the personal element in the development of science, it also offers some new perspectives on the concept of the 'relatively absolute absolutes', which has been so central to Buchanan's thinking in general."

This final volume (save for the Index) in Liberty Fund's 'The Collected Works of James M Buchanan' acquaints us most intimately with the man himself. Included are essays and short pieces that shed light on Buchanan's view of the world. Ranging from personal reflections on the art and science of economics, to restatements of his central themes and reminiscences of his encounters and collaborations with other great thinkers, this volume presents James Buchanan as a multidimensional human being, not just as a great economic and political thinker. The thirty-three pieces collected in IDEAS, PERSONS, AND EVENTS are grouped into these categories: autobiographical and personal reflections; reflections on fellow political economists; political economy in the post-socialist century; reform without romance. As Hartmut Kliemt states in his foreword, "The personal and the theoretical are often inseparably intertwined in the essays of this volume... As a case in point, consider James Buchanan's account of his relationship to Frank Knight. This account not only sheds some interesting light on the personal element in the development of science, it also offers some new perspectives on the concept of the 'relatively absolute absolutes', which has been so central to Buchanan's thinking in general."

This volume presents a comprehensive index to the entire series of 'The Collected Works of James M Buchanan'. Included is an annotated copy of the entire curriculum vitae, indicating in which volume in the series the various items appear and, correspondingly, those items that have been omitted. As the editors observe, "This is a series that no serious scholar of public choice theory, public economics, or contemporary political theory will want to be without. It is a series that will also appeal to the general student of liberty, for Buchanan has -- perhaps more than any other contemporary scholar -- helped us to view politics without the romantic gloss that characterises so much normative political theory and that slips unthinkingly into so much popular commentary. Buchanan has been a resolute defender of 'the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals,' and has been a painstaking analyst of the institutional structure that might best support such a society. Buchanan stands with von Mises, Hayek, Popper, and Friedman as one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty."