Elements in Public Economics – serie

Why is an understanding of political competition essential for the study of public economics and public policy generally? How can political competition be described and understood, and how does it differ from its strictly economic counterpart? What are the implications of the fact that policy proposals in a democracy must always pass a political test? What are the strengths and weaknesses of electoral competition as a mechanism for the allocation of economic resources? Why are tax structures in democratic polities so complicated, and what implications follow from this for normative views about good policy choice? How can the intensity of political competition be measured, why and how does it vary in mature democracies, and what are the consequences? This Element considers how answers to these questions can be approached, while also illustrating some of the interesting theoretical and empirical work that has been done on them.

The authors provide a broad overview of economic aspects of commodity taxation, focussing in particular on theory and on policy applications in OECD countries. Some major papers in public economics have discussed whether these taxes should be levied at a uniform rate, or whether different commodities should be taxed differently, for reasons of either equity or efficiency. The authors begin with this question, and then discuss further issues, including the economic incidence of commodity taxes, the properties of the VAT, the taxation of financial services, the international aspects of commodity taxation, and environmental and health policy aspects.

Our societies are witnessing a steady increase in longevity. This demographic evolution is accompanied by some convergence across countries, but at the same time substantial longevity inequalities persist within nations across income classes. This Element aims to survey some crucial implications of changing longevity on the design of optimal public policy. For that purpose, it first focuses on some difficulties raised by risky and varying lifetime for the representation of individual and social preferences. Then, it explore some central implications of changing longevity for optimal policy making, regarding prevention against premature death, pension policies, education, health care and long-term care. The author distinguishes between the case when longevity is partially the responsibility of individuals and the case when longevity is plainly exogenous.

This element offers a review and synthesis of the research on economic methods for evaluating regulations that improve air quality, save energy, and reduce climate risks. The intended audience is regulators and other constituencies interested in the nexus between scholarship and practice; analysts in government agencies and research organizations; and academic scholars and their graduate students. Topics include the evolution of regulatory impact assessment in the OECD; cost estimation, including engineering, partial equilibrium, and general equilibrium approaches; benefit valuation, with an emphasis on the value of reducing risk of illness and premature mortality, and methods for pricing carbon emissions; discounting methods, and their relationship to carbon pricing; the distribution of regulatory costs and benefits; and uncertainty evaluation methods for addressing less and more fundamental uncertainty. Perspective on the relevance and limitations of current research is offered. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The objective of this Element is to provide an analysis of social protection from an economic perspective. It relies on tools and methods widely used in public and insurance economics and comprises four main section besides the introduction. The first section is devoted to the design of social protection programs and their political sustainability. The second section assesses the efficiency and performance of social protection programs, and of the welfare state as a whole. In the third section, the relative merits of social and private insurance are analyzed as well as the design of optimum insurance contract with emphasis on health and pensions. The last section focuses on the implications of asymmetric information that may lead governments to adopt policies that would otherwise be rejected in a perfect information setting.

The objective of this Element is to provide an analysis of social protection from an economic perspective. It relies on tools and methods widely used in public and insurance economics and comprises four main section besides the introduction. The first section is devoted to the design of social protection programs and their political sustainability. The second section assesses the efficiency and performance of social protection programs, and of the welfare state as a whole. In the third section, the relative merits of social and private insurance are analyzed as well as the design of optimum insurance contract with emphasis on health and pensions. The last section focuses on the implications of asymmetric information that may lead governments to adopt policies that would otherwise be rejected in a perfect information setting.

This Element seeks to provide an in-depth survey of the papers written on the optimal taxation of the incomes of the members of family households, as opposed to households with just a single individual, over the period beginning with the early 1980s and ending in the late 2010s.This literature, solidly within the public finance tradition, is not large, and so the Element gives quite a full exposition and discussion of the main contributions. The papers are grouped according to the type of tax system they have dealt with: linear, piecewise linear and non-linear taxation.

This Element offers a review and synthesis of the theoretical analysis of mixed oligopoly, that is a hybrid market structure in which public (state-owned) and private firms interact, using a variety of strategic variables. A distinguishing feature of a mixed oligopoly is that firms have different objectives. A public firm's objective is a notion of social welfare while a private firm is profit maximising. Privatisation and partial-privatisation of a public firm is also discussed, together with several applications from diverse subfields spanning industrial organisation, applied microeconomic theory, innovation, international trade and environment policy. The authors also discuss ways in which the original analysis has been enriched to study the interaction between providers of public sector services as opposed to traditional goods.

This Element discusses the role of the government in the financing and provision of public health care. It summarises core knowledge and findings in the economics literature, giving a state-of-the-art account of public health care. The first section is devoted to health system financing. It provides policy rationales for public health insurance which rely on both equity and efficiency, the co-existence of public and private health insurance, how health systems deal with excess demand, and the effect of health insurance expansion. The second section covers the provision of health care and the effect of policy interventions that aim at improving quality and efficiency, including reimbursement mechanisms, competition, public-private mix, and integrated care. The third section is devoted to the market for pharmaceuticals, focusing on the challenges of regulating on-patent and off-patent markets, and discussing the main incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.

In a perfect market economy, the cost of raising another euro of tax revenue equals one. However, once distortionary taxes on goods and factors are introduced, the marginal cost of public funds, MCPF, typically deviates from one. Often it exceeds one, but one can also find cases where it falls short of one. This Element introduces the concept of the MCPF, sketches its history, and discusses a number of applications. It does this by undertaking economic evaluations of public sector projects involving a pure public good. An important distinction in the literature relates to where the government has access to lump-sum taxation versus where it must rely on changing a distortionary tax. These are often unit taxes or proportional taxes. Sometimes they are even introduced to alleviate a problem. An example is a tax on emissions of greenhouse gases. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

In a perfect market economy, the cost of raising another euro of tax revenue equals one. However, once distortionary taxes on goods and factors are introduced, the marginal cost of public funds, MCPF, typically deviates from one. Often it exceeds one, but one can also find cases where it falls short of one. This Element introduces the concept of the MCPF, sketches its history, and discusses a number of applications. It does this by undertaking economic evaluations of public sector projects involving a pure public good. An important distinction in the literature relates to where the government has access to lump-sum taxation versus where it must rely on changing a distortionary tax. These are often unit taxes or proportional taxes. Sometimes they are even introduced to alleviate a problem. An example is a tax on emissions of greenhouse gases. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

After briefly reviewing the received doctrine prior to the waves of privatisations beginning in the 1980s, this Element offers a survey of various analytical frameworks on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) from the perspective of applied welfare economics. The focus then shifts to a positive analysis of the comparative performance of private versus public enterprises, with a specific emphasis on SOEs in developed market economies over the past two decades; key metrics examined include profitability, productivity, internationalisation, innovativeness, and environmental sustainability. The Element also addresses empirical methodological issues, alongside contextual conditions and institutional factors that help explain the outcomes. It reviews selected contributions from public economics, industrial organisation, corporate governance, management studies and other social sciences. Overall, the Element aims to redefine a neglected research area in public economics, considering the new circumstances of the twenty-first century, where SOEs compete with other firms in developed market economies.

After briefly reviewing the received doctrine prior to the waves of privatisations beginning in the 1980s, this Element offers a survey of various analytical frameworks on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) from the perspective of applied welfare economics. The focus then shifts to a positive analysis of the comparative performance of private versus public enterprises, with a specific emphasis on SOEs in developed market economies over the past two decades; key metrics examined include profitability, productivity, internationalisation, innovativeness, and environmental sustainability. The Element also addresses empirical methodological issues, alongside contextual conditions and institutional factors that help explain the outcomes. It reviews selected contributions from public economics, industrial organisation, corporate governance, management studies and other social sciences. Overall, the Element aims to redefine a neglected research area in public economics, considering the new circumstances of the twenty-first century, where SOEs compete with other firms in developed market economies.

This Element on cost-benefit analysis provides a summary of recent theoretical and empirical developments and summarizes state-of-the-art stated-preference and revealed-preference valuation methods. The Element discusses how to assess small (or marginal) as well as large (or non-marginal) projects that have a significant impact on prices and/or other economic variables. It also discusses distortions like taxes, market power, and sticky prices. In addition, risk/uncertainty is considered. A novel feature is the elaboration on flexible evaluation rules for reasonably small projects. Conventional point-estimates of projects should be used with care, because they typically give biased results.

The traditionally, and wrongly, imagined vulnerabilities of the welfare state are economic. The true threats are demographic and political. The most frequently imagined threat is that the welfare state package reduces the level and growth of GDP. It does not, according to broad historical patterns and non-experimental panel econometrics. Large-budget welfare states achieve a host of social improvements without any clear loss of GDP. This Element elaborates on how this 'free lunch' is gained in practice. Other threats to the welfare state are more real, however. One is the rise of anti-immigrant backlash. If combined with heavy refugee inflows, this could destroy future public support for universalist welfare state programs, even though they seem to remain economically sound. The other is that population aging poses a serious problem for financing old age. Pension deficits threaten to crowd out more productive social spending. Only a few countries have faced this issue well.

From the 1980s onward, income inequality increased in many advanced countries. It is very difficult to account for the rise in income inequality using the standard labour supply/demand explanation. Fiscal redistribution has become less effective in compensating increasing inequalities since the 1990s. Some of the basic features of redistribution can be explained through the optimal tax framework developed by J. A. Mirrlees in 1971. This Element surveys some of the earlier results in linear and nonlinear taxation and produces some new numerical results. Given the key role of capital income in the overall income inequality, it also considers the optimal taxation of capital income. It examines empirically the relationship between the extent of redistribution and the components of the Mirrlees framework. The redistributive role of factors such as publicly provided private goods, public employment, endogenous wages in the overlapping generations model and income uncertainty are analysed.

This Element discusses the role of the government in the financing and provision of public health care. It summarises core knowledge and findings in the economics literature, giving a state-of-the-art account of public health care. The first section is devoted to health system financing. It provides policy rationales for public health insurance which rely on both equity and efficiency, the co-existence of public and private health insurance, how health systems deal with excess demand, and the effect of health insurance expansion. The second section covers the provision of health care and the effect of policy interventions that aim at improving quality and efficiency, including reimbursement mechanisms, competition, public-private mix, and integrated care. The third section is devoted to the market for pharmaceuticals, focusing on the challenges of regulating on-patent and off-patent markets, and discussing the main incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.

This Element offers a review and synthesis of the theoretical analysis of mixed oligopoly, that is a hybrid market structure in which public (state-owned) and private firms interact, using a variety of strategic variables. A distinguishing feature of a mixed oligopoly is that firms have different objectives. A public firm's objective is a notion of social welfare while a private firm is profit maximising. Privatisation and partial-privatisation of a public firm is also discussed, together with several applications from diverse subfields spanning industrial organisation, applied microeconomic theory, innovation, international trade and environment policy. The authors also discuss ways in which the original analysis has been enriched to study the interaction between providers of public sector services as opposed to traditional goods.

Have you ever wondered how your telephone company or Internet service provider can give you access to almost all people in the world, or how electricity suppliers can compete with each other if there is only one electric supply line passing through your street? This Element deals with the economics and public regulation of such network industries. It puts particular emphasis on the specific economic concepts used for analyzing them and on the regulatory reform movement and the compatibility of regulation and competition. Worldwide most of these industries have changed dramatically in recent years, telecommunications in particular. Network industries mostly exhibit economies of scale in production and similar economies in consumption. Both of these properties cause market power problems that often require industry-specific regulation. However, due to technological and market changes network policies have moved on from end-user regulation to wholesale regulation and in some cases to deregulation.

Existing corporate taxes distort many aspects of firm behavior. To the extent that the corporate tax rate is lower than personal tax rates, taxes favor corporate activity, and favor retaining earnings rather than paying earnings out to employees and investors. Multinationals can even avoid these taxes by shifting income into tax havens. Given the ease with which multinationals can evade tax, the existing income tax structure faces major pressures, as reflected in average statutory corporate tax rates halving in recent decades. The Element speculates on alternative tax structures that will avoid these problems.

Fiscal federalism has long been an important topic of inquiry in applied public economics, and interest in the functioning of intergovernmental fiscal relationships in multi-tiered public sector structures does not seem to be fading. Rather, the recent economic downturn and sovereign debt crisis have brought the analysis of multi-level fiscal governance to the forefront of academic discourse and stimulated the search for tax assignments that ease coordination between authorities at different tiers while preserving local fiscal autonomy and minimizing the harmful effects of taxation on the prospects of economic recovery. This Element examines the recent empirical work in this area and discusses the most critical issues that future research will need to address in order to push further the frontier of econometric analysis in fiscal federalism.

Tax policies are informed by principles developed in the tax theory and policy literature. This Element surveys the policy lessons that emerge from optimal tax analysis since the 1970s. This Element begins with the evolution of tax policy principles from the comprehensive income approach to the expenditure tax approach to normative tax analysis based on social welfare maximization and recounts key results from the optimal income tax analysis inspired by Mirrlees and extended by Diamond to the extensive margin approach. This Element also emphasizes analytical techniques that yield empirically relevant concepts and show the equity-efficiency trade-off at the heart of tax policy. We also extend the analysis to recent literature incorporating involuntary unemployment, and policies like welfare and unemployment insurance.

This Element seeks to provide an in-depth survey of the papers written on the optimal taxation of the incomes of the members of family households, as opposed to households with just a single individual, over the period beginning with the early 1980s and ending in the late 2010s.This literature, solidly within the public finance tradition, is not large, and so the Element gives quite a full exposition and discussion of the main contributions. The papers are grouped according to the type of tax system they have dealt with: linear, piecewise linear and non-linear taxation.