This book has two related aims: to investigate the frequently voiced claim that legal argument is nonformal in nature and, within the limits of such an investigation, to ascertain the most general proper­ ties of law as a rational system. Examination of a number of views of legal argument, selected from recent discussions in Germany, Belgium, and the English-speaking countries, will lead to the follow­ ing main conclusions. The nonformalistic conceptions of the logic of legal argument are ambiguous and unclear. Moreover, insofar as these conceptions are capable of clarification in the light of recent analytical methodology, they can be seen to be either mistaken or else compatible with the formalistic position. Because law is socially directive and coordinative, it is dependent upon theoretical psycho­ sociology and calls, in principle, for a deontic and inductive logic. The primary function of legal argument is to provide continuing reinterpretation and confirmation of legal rules, conceived as theo­ retical prescriptions. On the basis of this conception, the old juris­ prudential conflict between formalism and rule-scepticism appears substantially resolved. Aristotle, the founder of the theory of argument, conceived it as "the science of establishing conclusions" (bnO'l;~fl'YJ &no~e!"u,,~), designed to guide people in rational argumentation. In time, how­ ever, logic forsook its practical function and developed as a highly abstract and disinterested study, today called "formal logic"; and the theory of practical argument was either neglected or relegated to an appendix to rhetoric.

to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zürich, April 1973 Mario Bunge From the Preface to the First Edition It may seem odd that aseries of works devoted to the natural sciences should indude - indeed begin with - a volume on phi­ losophy. Today, of course, it is generally agreed that philosophy and natural science are perfectly compatible. But to grant the theory of knowledge such a prominent position implies not only that these two fields are compatible, but that there is a natural connection between them. Thus the indusion of this book in the series can be justified only if such an intimate relation of mutual dependence and interpenetration really does exist. Without anticipating what is to come, the author would like first to explain his point of view on the relationship between epistemology and the sciences, and in so doing make dear at the outset the method to be followed in this book. It is my view - which I have already expressed elsewhere and which I never tire of repeating - that philosophy is not aseparate science to be placed alongside of or above the individual disciplines. Rather, the philosophical element is present in all of the scienccs; it is their true soul, and only by virtue of it are they sciences at all.

to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zürich, April 1973 Mario Bunge From the Preface to the First Edition It may seem odd that aseries of works devoted to the natural sciences should indude - indeed begin with - a volume on phi­ losophy. Today, of course, it is generally agreed that philosophy and natural science are perfectly compatible. But to grant the theory of knowledge such a prominent position implies not only that these two fields are compatible, but that there is a natural connection between them. Thus the indusion of this book in the series can be justified only if such an intimate relation of mutual dependence and interpenetration really does exist. Without anticipating what is to come, the author would like first to explain his point of view on the relationship between epistemology and the sciences, and in so doing make dear at the outset the method to be followed in this book. It is my view - which I have already expressed elsewhere and which I never tire of repeating - that philosophy is not aseparate science to be placed alongside of or above the individual disciplines. Rather, the philosophical element is present in all of the scienccs; it is their true soul, and only by virtue of it are they sciences at all.

The take-over of the philosophy of mathematics by mathematical logic is not complete. The central problems examined in this book lie in the fringe area between the two, and by their very nature will no doubt continue to fall partly within the philosophical re­ mainder. In seeking to treat these problems with a properly sober mixture of rhyme and reason, I have tried to keep philosophical jargon to a minimum and to avoid excessive mathematical compli­ cation. The reader with a philosophical background should be familiar with the formal syntactico-semantical explications of proof and truth, especially if he wishes to linger on Chapter 1, after which it is easier philosophical sailing; while the mathematician need only know that to "explicate" a concept consists in clarifying a heretofore vague notion by proposing a clearer (sometimes formal) definition or formulation for it. More seriously, the interested mathematician will find occasional recourse to EDWARD'S Encyclopedia of Philos­ ophy (cf. bibliography) highly rewarding. Sections 2. 5 and 2. 7 are of interest mainly to philosophers. The bibliography only contains works referred to in the text. References are made by giving the author's surname followed by the year of publication, the latter enclosed in parentheses. When the author referred to is obvious from the context, the surname is dropped, and even the year of publication or "ibid. " may be dropped when the same publication is referred to exclusively over the course of several paragraphs.

This book has two related aims: to investigate the frequently voiced claim that legal argument is nonformal in nature and, within the limits of such an investigation, to ascertain the most general proper­ ties of law as a rational system. Examination of a number of views of legal argument, selected from recent discussions in Germany, Belgium, and the English-speaking countries, will lead to the follow­ ing main conclusions. The nonformalistic conceptions of the logic of legal argument are ambiguous and unclear. Moreover, insofar as these conceptions are capable of clarification in the light of recent analytical methodology, they can be seen to be either mistaken or else compatible with the formalistic position. Because law is socially directive and coordinative, it is dependent upon theoretical psycho­ sociology and calls, in principle, for a deontic and inductive logic. The primary function of legal argument is to provide continuing reinterpretation and confirmation of legal rules, conceived as theo­ retical prescriptions. On the basis of this conception, the old juris­ prudential conflict between formalism and rule-scepticism appears substantially resolved. Aristotle, the founder of the theory of argument, conceived it as "the science of establishing conclusions" (bnO'l;~fl'YJ &no~e!"u,,~), designed to guide people in rational argumentation. In time, how­ ever, logic forsook its practical function and developed as a highly abstract and disinterested study, today called "formal logic"; and the theory of practical argument was either neglected or relegated to an appendix to rhetoric.

to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zürich, April 1973 Mario Bunge From the Preface to the First Edition It may seem odd that aseries of works devoted to the natural sciences should indude - indeed begin with - a volume on phi­ losophy. Today, of course, it is generally agreed that philosophy and natural science are perfectly compatible. But to grant the theory of knowledge such a prominent position implies not only that these two fields are compatible, but that there is a natural connection between them. Thus the indusion of this book in the series can be justified only if such an intimate relation of mutual dependence and interpenetration really does exist. Without anticipating what is to come, the author would like first to explain his point of view on the relationship between epistemology and the sciences, and in so doing make dear at the outset the method to be followed in this book. It is my view - which I have already expressed elsewhere and which I never tire of repeating - that philosophy is not aseparate science to be placed alongside of or above the individual disciplines. Rather, the philosophical element is present in all of the scienccs; it is their true soul, and only by virtue of it are they sciences at all.

to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zürich, April 1973 Mario Bunge From the Preface to the First Edition It may seem odd that aseries of works devoted to the natural sciences should indude - indeed begin with - a volume on phi­ losophy. Today, of course, it is generally agreed that philosophy and natural science are perfectly compatible. But to grant the theory of knowledge such a prominent position implies not only that these two fields are compatible, but that there is a natural connection between them. Thus the indusion of this book in the series can be justified only if such an intimate relation of mutual dependence and interpenetration really does exist. Without anticipating what is to come, the author would like first to explain his point of view on the relationship between epistemology and the sciences, and in so doing make dear at the outset the method to be followed in this book. It is my view - which I have already expressed elsewhere and which I never tire of repeating - that philosophy is not aseparate science to be placed alongside of or above the individual disciplines. Rather, the philosophical element is present in all of the scienccs; it is their true soul, and only by virtue of it are they sciences at all.

The take-over of the philosophy of mathematics by mathematical logic is not complete. The central problems examined in this book lie in the fringe area between the two, and by their very nature will no doubt continue to fall partly within the philosophical re­ mainder. In seeking to treat these problems with a properly sober mixture of rhyme and reason, I have tried to keep philosophical jargon to a minimum and to avoid excessive mathematical compli­ cation. The reader with a philosophical background should be familiar with the formal syntactico-semantical explications of proof and truth, especially if he wishes to linger on Chapter 1, after which it is easier philosophical sailing; while the mathematician need only know that to "explicate" a concept consists in clarifying a heretofore vague notion by proposing a clearer (sometimes formal) definition or formulation for it. More seriously, the interested mathematician will find occasional recourse to EDWARD'S Encyclopedia of Philos­ ophy (cf. bibliography) highly rewarding. Sections 2. 5 and 2. 7 are of interest mainly to philosophers. The bibliography only contains works referred to in the text. References are made by giving the author's surname followed by the year of publication, the latter enclosed in parentheses. When the author referred to is obvious from the context, the surname is dropped, and even the year of publication or "ibid. " may be dropped when the same publication is referred to exclusively over the course of several paragraphs.