During its first two years of publication, Philosophy & Public Affairs contributed to the public debate on abortion a set of remarkable and brilliant articles which examine the basic philosophical issues posed by this controversial subject: whether the fetus is a person, whether it has a right to life, whether a woman has a right to decide what happens in and to her body, whether there is an ethical connection between abortion and infanticide, whether there is any point after conception where it is possible to draw the line beyond which killing is impermissible. These five essays, together here for the first time in a single volume, offer radically differing points of view; they provide the best sustained discussion of these philosophical issues available anywhere. Contents: Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion"; Roger Wertheimer, "Understanding the Abortion Argument"; Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide"; John Finnis, "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion"; and Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Rights and Deaths."

These essays, with one exception originally published in Philosophy & Public Affairs, consider the moral problems associated with improving the social and economic position of disadvantaged groups. If the situation of women and minorities improves so that their opportunities are equal to those of more favored groups, will they then be in a competitive position conducive to equal achievement? If not, can preferential hiring or preferential admission to educational institutions be justified? The contributors explore the complexities of this problem from several points of view. The discussions in Part I are more theoretical and concentrate on the application to this case of general considerations from ethical theory. The discussions in Part II also take up theoretical questions, but they start from specific problems about the constitutionality and the effectiveness of certain methods of achieving equality and counteracting discrimination. The two groups of essays demonstrate admirably the close connection between moral philosophy and questions of law and policy.The issues discussed include compensation, liability, victimization, the significance of group membership, the intrinsic importance of racial, sexual, or meritocratic criteria, and the overall effects of preferential policies.

This book is comprised of essays previously published in Philosophy & Public Affairs and also an extended excerpt from Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars.

The problem of justifying legal punishment has been at the heart of legal and social philosophy from the very earliest recorded philosophical texts. However, despite several hundred years of debate, philosophers have not reached agreement about how legal punishment can be morally justified. That is the central issue addressed by the contributors to this volume. All of the essays collected here have been published in the highly respected journal Philosophy & Public Affairs. Taken together, they offer not only significant proposals for improving established theories of punishment and compelling arguments against long-held positions, but also ori-ginal and important answers to the question, "How is punishment to be justified?" Part I of this collection, "Justifications of Punishment," examines how any practice of punishment can be morally justified. Contributors include Jeffrie G. Murphy, Alan H. Goldman, Warren Quinn, C. S. Nino, and Jean Hampton. The papers in Part II, "Problems of Punishment," address more specific issues arising in established theories. The authors are Martha C. Nussbaum, Michael Davis, and A. John Simmons.In the final section, "Capital Punishment," contributors discuss the justifiability of capital punishment, one of the most debated philosophical topics of this century. Essayists include David A. Conway, Jeffrey H. Reiman, Stephen Nathanson, and Ernest van den Haag.

During its first two years of publication, Philosophy & Public Affairs contributed to the public debate on abortion a set of remarkable and brilliant articles which examine the basic philosophical issues posed by this controversial subject: whether the fetus is a person, whether it has a right to life, whether a woman has a right to decide what happens in and to her body, whether there is an ethical connection between abortion and infanticide, whether there is any point after conception where it is possible to draw the line beyond which killing is impermissible. These five essays, together here for the first time in a single volume, offer radically differing points of view; they provide the best sustained discussion of these philosophical issues available anywhere. Contents: Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion"; Roger Wertheimer, "Understanding the Abortion Argument"; Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide"; John Finnis, "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion"; and Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Rights and Deaths."

These essays, with one exception originally published in Philosophy & Public Affairs, consider the moral problems associated with improving the social and economic position of disadvantaged groups. If the situation of women and minorities improves so that their opportunities are equal to those of more favored groups, will they then be in a competitive position conducive to equal achievement? If not, can preferential hiring or preferential admission to educational institutions be justified? The contributors explore the complexities of this problem from several points of view. The discussions in Part I are more theoretical and concentrate on the application to this case of general considerations from ethical theory. The discussions in Part II also take up theoretical questions, but they start from specific problems about the constitutionality and the effectiveness of certain methods of achieving equality and counteracting discrimination. The two groups of essays demonstrate admirably the close connection between moral philosophy and questions of law and policy.The issues discussed include compensation, liability, victimization, the significance of group membership, the intrinsic importance of racial, sexual, or meritocratic criteria, and the overall effects of preferential policies.

This book is comprised of essays previously published in Philosophy & Public Affairs and also an extended excerpt from Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars.

The problem of justifying legal punishment has been at the heart of legal and social philosophy from the very earliest recorded philosophical texts. However, despite several hundred years of debate, philosophers have not reached agreement about how legal punishment can be morally justified. That is the central issue addressed by the contributors to this volume. All of the essays collected here have been published in the highly respected journal Philosophy & Public Affairs. Taken together, they offer not only significant proposals for improving established theories of punishment and compelling arguments against long-held positions, but also ori-ginal and important answers to the question, "How is punishment to be justified?" Part I of this collection, "Justifications of Punishment," examines how any practice of punishment can be morally justified. Contributors include Jeffrie G. Murphy, Alan H. Goldman, Warren Quinn, C. S. Nino, and Jean Hampton. The papers in Part II, "Problems of Punishment," address more specific issues arising in established theories. The authors are Martha C. Nussbaum, Michael Davis, and A. John Simmons.In the final section, "Capital Punishment," contributors discuss the justifiability of capital punishment, one of the most debated philosophical topics of this century. Essayists include David A. Conway, Jeffrey H. Reiman, Stephen Nathanson, and Ernest van den Haag.