Routledge Library Editions: Kant - Böcker

First published in 1951. This title aims to familiarise the reader with the ideas of the sometimes difficult philosopher Immanuel Kant by presenting them in a more comprehensible form. Kant for Everyman provides an overview of the different stages in Kant’s life, and delivers a breakdown of his philosophical ideology. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy.

First published in 1951. This title aims to familiarise the reader with the ideas of the sometimes difficult philosopher Immanuel Kant by presenting them in a more comprehensible form. Kant for Everyman provides an overview of the different stages in Kant’s life, and delivers a breakdown of his philosophical ideology. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy.

This book expounds Kant's Critique of Judgement by interpreting all the details in the light of what Kant himself declares to be his fundamental problem. Providing an excellent introduction to Kant's third critique, it will be of interest to students of philosophy.

This book expounds Kant's Critique of Judgement by interpreting all the details in the light of what Kant himself declares to be his fundamental problem. Providing an excellent introduction to Kant's third critique, it will be of interest to students of philosophy.

First published in 1990. The aim of this thesis is to show that the way to understand the central claims of Kant’s ethics is to accept the idea that morality is a distinctive form of rationality; that the moral "ought" belongs to a system of imperatives based in practical reason; and that moral judgment, therefore, is a species of rational assessment of agents’ actions. It argues, in effect, that you cannot understand Kant’s views about morality if you read him with Humean assumptions about rationality. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy.

First published in 1990. The aim of this thesis is to show that the way to understand the central claims of Kant’s ethics is to accept the idea that morality is a distinctive form of rationality; that the moral "ought" belongs to a system of imperatives based in practical reason; and that moral judgment, therefore, is a species of rational assessment of agents’ actions. It argues, in effect, that you cannot understand Kant’s views about morality if you read him with Humean assumptions about rationality. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy.

First published in 1962. Kant’s philosophical works, and especially the Critique of Pure Reason, have had some influence on recent British philosophy. But the complexities of Kant’s arguments, and the unfamiliarity of his vocabulary, inhibit understanding of his point of view. In Kant’s Theory of Knowledge an attempt is made to relate Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason to contemporary issues by expressing them in a more modern idiom. The selection of issues discussed is intended to present a continuous argument, of an epistemological kind, which runs centrally through the Critique. The argument deals with essentially with the problems, raised in the Transcendental Analytic, about the status of categories. It deals with certain preliminary assumptions made in setting these problems, and discusses the way in which the various sections of the Analytic contribute to their solution. It also deals with Kant’s criticisms of traditional metaphysics, and ends with an account of his effort in the Third Antinomy to resolve the conflict between freedom and causality, and so to effect a transition of knowledge to moral philosophy.

First published in 1962. Kant’s philosophical works, and especially the Critique of Pure Reason, have had some influence on recent British philosophy. But the complexities of Kant’s arguments, and the unfamiliarity of his vocabulary, inhibit understanding of his point of view. In Kant’s Theory of Knowledge an attempt is made to relate Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason to contemporary issues by expressing them in a more modern idiom. The selection of issues discussed is intended to present a continuous argument, of an epistemological kind, which runs centrally through the Critique. The argument deals with essentially with the problems, raised in the Transcendental Analytic, about the status of categories. It deals with certain preliminary assumptions made in setting these problems, and discusses the way in which the various sections of the Analytic contribute to their solution. It also deals with Kant’s criticisms of traditional metaphysics, and ends with an account of his effort in the Third Antinomy to resolve the conflict between freedom and causality, and so to effect a transition of knowledge to moral philosophy.

First published in 1966. Professor Dryer has furnished a highly illuminating account of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason by unfolding its central argument. Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics brings out the light which Kant has to throw on central topics of philosophy. It takes its place as an indispensable guide to every student of the Critique of Pure Reason.

First published in 1966. Professor Dryer has furnished a highly illuminating account of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason by unfolding its central argument. Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics brings out the light which Kant has to throw on central topics of philosophy. It takes its place as an indispensable guide to every student of the Critique of Pure Reason.

First published in 1990. This title, originally a Ph. D. dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University in July 1988, grew out of an interest in the foundations of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Believing that the idea of the primacy of judgment was an important one for understanding more recent issues in analytic philosophy, the author started to think about its historical antecedents. By examining Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Ginsborg explores the notion of a judgment of taste, as a judgment which has intersubjective validity without being objectively valid, and therefore bear’s directly on the notion of the primacy of judgment as an aspect of Kant's account of objectivity. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy.

First published in 1990. This title, originally a Ph. D. dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University in July 1988, grew out of an interest in the foundations of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Believing that the idea of the primacy of judgment was an important one for understanding more recent issues in analytic philosophy, the author started to think about its historical antecedents. By examining Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Ginsborg explores the notion of a judgment of taste, as a judgment which has intersubjective validity without being objectively valid, and therefore bear’s directly on the notion of the primacy of judgment as an aspect of Kant's account of objectivity. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy.