Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. is Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School. Wilmarth is the co-editor with Lawrence E. Mitchell of The Panic of 2008: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform and a member of the international advisory board of the Journal of Banking Regulation. He has testified before committees of the U.S. Congress and the California legislature on financial regulatory issues.

Wilmarth's wide-ranging commentary on underlying issues merits close attention in debates on the future of banking regulation.

• Introduction Chapter 1: Origins: The Emergence of Universal Banks in Early 20th Century America Chapter 2: Frenzy: Universal Banks Helped to Promote an Unsustainable Boom in the U.S. Economy during the 1920sChapter 3: Foreign Affairs: Sales of Risky Foreign Bonds by Universal Banks Produced a Speculative Foreign Lending Boom Chapter 4: Crash: Universal Banks Played Central Roles in the Stock Market Boom and Crash and the Onset of the Great DepressionChapter 5: Nemesis: The Universal Banking Model Failed during the Banking Crises of the Great DepressionChapter 6: Reckoning: Universal Banks Were Discredited by the Pecora Investigation and Abolished by the Glass-Steagall Act Chapter 7: Resurgence, Part I: Federal Agencies and Courts Opened Loopholes in the Glass-Steagall Act during the 1980s and 1990sChapter 8: Resurgence, Part II: Congress Enacted Three Statutes That Enabled Big Banks to Build Nationwide Financial ConglomeratesChapter 9: See No Evil: Policymakers and Regulators Allowed Large Financial Conglomerates to Inflate a Toxic Credit Bubble on Both Sides of the Atlantic during the "Roaring 2000s"Chapter 10: DéJà Vu - Reckless Lending and Securitization by Financial Conglomerates Triggered a Global Financial Crisis in 2007 Chapter 11: Bailouts Without End: Governments Provided Massive Bailouts to Rescue Troubled Universal Banks during the Financial Crisis Chapter 12: Unfinished Business: Post-Crisis Reforms Do Not Remove the Systemic Dangers Posed by Universal Banks and Shadow Banks ConclusionReferencesIndex

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. is Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School. Wilmarth is the co-editor with Lawrence E. Mitchell of The Panic of 2008: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform and a member of the international advisory board of the Journal of Banking Regulation. He has testified before committees of the U.S. Congress and the California legislature on financial regulatory issues.

Wilmarth's wide-ranging commentary on underlying issues merits close attention in debates on the future of banking regulation.

• Introduction Chapter 1: Origins: The Emergence of Universal Banks in Early 20th Century America Chapter 2: Frenzy: Universal Banks Helped to Promote an Unsustainable Boom in the U.S. Economy during the 1920sChapter 3: Foreign Affairs: Sales of Risky Foreign Bonds by Universal Banks Produced a Speculative Foreign Lending Boom Chapter 4: Crash: Universal Banks Played Central Roles in the Stock Market Boom and Crash and the Onset of the Great DepressionChapter 5: Nemesis: The Universal Banking Model Failed during the Banking Crises of the Great DepressionChapter 6: Reckoning: Universal Banks Were Discredited by the Pecora Investigation and Abolished by the Glass-Steagall Act Chapter 7: Resurgence, Part I: Federal Agencies and Courts Opened Loopholes in the Glass-Steagall Act during the 1980s and 1990sChapter 8: Resurgence, Part II: Congress Enacted Three Statutes That Enabled Big Banks to Build Nationwide Financial ConglomeratesChapter 9: See No Evil: Policymakers and Regulators Allowed Large Financial Conglomerates to Inflate a Toxic Credit Bubble on Both Sides of the Atlantic during the "Roaring 2000s"Chapter 10: DéJà Vu - Reckless Lending and Securitization by Financial Conglomerates Triggered a Global Financial Crisis in 2007 Chapter 11: Bailouts Without End: Governments Provided Massive Bailouts to Rescue Troubled Universal Banks during the Financial Crisis Chapter 12: Unfinished Business: Post-Crisis Reforms Do Not Remove the Systemic Dangers Posed by Universal Banks and Shadow Banks ConclusionReferencesIndex

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. is Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School. Wilmarth is the co-editor with Lawrence E. Mitchell of The Panic of 2008: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform and a member of the international advisory board of the Journal of Banking Regulation. He has testified before committees of the U.S. Congress and the California legislature on financial regulatory issues.

Wilmarth's wide-ranging commentary on underlying issues merits close attention in debates on the future of banking regulation.

• Introduction Chapter 1: Origins: The Emergence of Universal Banks in Early 20th Century America Chapter 2: Frenzy: Universal Banks Helped to Promote an Unsustainable Boom in the U.S. Economy during the 1920sChapter 3: Foreign Affairs: Sales of Risky Foreign Bonds by Universal Banks Produced a Speculative Foreign Lending Boom Chapter 4: Crash: Universal Banks Played Central Roles in the Stock Market Boom and Crash and the Onset of the Great DepressionChapter 5: Nemesis: The Universal Banking Model Failed during the Banking Crises of the Great DepressionChapter 6: Reckoning: Universal Banks Were Discredited by the Pecora Investigation and Abolished by the Glass-Steagall Act Chapter 7: Resurgence, Part I: Federal Agencies and Courts Opened Loopholes in the Glass-Steagall Act during the 1980s and 1990sChapter 8: Resurgence, Part II: Congress Enacted Three Statutes That Enabled Big Banks to Build Nationwide Financial ConglomeratesChapter 9: See No Evil: Policymakers and Regulators Allowed Large Financial Conglomerates to Inflate a Toxic Credit Bubble on Both Sides of the Atlantic during the "Roaring 2000s"Chapter 10: DéJà Vu - Reckless Lending and Securitization by Financial Conglomerates Triggered a Global Financial Crisis in 2007 Chapter 11: Bailouts Without End: Governments Provided Massive Bailouts to Rescue Troubled Universal Banks during the Financial Crisis Chapter 12: Unfinished Business: Post-Crisis Reforms Do Not Remove the Systemic Dangers Posed by Universal Banks and Shadow Banks ConclusionReferencesIndex