Paul Russell is Professor in Philosophy at the University of British Columbia and Lund University. His publications include Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1995); The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (Oxford University Press, 2008); and editor of The Philosophy of Free Will (Oxford University, 2013).

It was both a pleasure and a revelation to revisit these articles together as a group, and to see what a powerful and unified vision of the nature of human freedom and responsibility Russell has put forward over these many years. What comes out most clearly after sustained engagement with Russell's work is his deep humanity and his clear-eyed appreciation of what he takes to be our basic human predicament: namely, that we must see ourselves as free and morally responsible agents, even as we recognize the myriad ways in which luck and fate play an ineliminable role in shaping the moral quality of our lives.

• IntroductionTable of ContentsAcknowledgements I. Free Will and Causal Relations1. Sorabji and the Dilemma of Determinism [With an Addendum, 2016]2. Causation, Compulsion and Compatibilism II. Responsibility, Skepticism and Moral Sentiment3. Strawson's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility4. Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense5. Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility6. Responsibility, Naturalism and 'the Morality System III. Practical Reason, Art and Manipulation7. Practical Reason and Motivational Skepticism8. Free Will, Art and Morality9. Selective Hard Compatibilism: Manipulation and Moral Standing IV. Pessimism and the Limits of Free Will10. Compatibilist-Fatalism: Finitude, Pessimism and the Limits of Free Will 11. Pessimists, Pollyannas and the New Compatibilism12. Free Will Pessimism List of related publicationsIndex

Paul Russell is Professor in Philosophy at the University of British Columbia and Lund University. His publications include Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1995); The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (Oxford University Press, 2008); and editor of The Philosophy of Free Will (Oxford University, 2013).

It was both a pleasure and a revelation to revisit these articles together as a group, and to see what a powerful and unified vision of the nature of human freedom and responsibility Russell has put forward over these many years. What comes out most clearly after sustained engagement with Russell's work is his deep humanity and his clear-eyed appreciation of what he takes to be our basic human predicament: namely, that we must see ourselves as free and morally responsible agents, even as we recognize the myriad ways in which luck and fate play an ineliminable role in shaping the moral quality of our lives.

• IntroductionTable of ContentsAcknowledgements I. Free Will and Causal Relations1. Sorabji and the Dilemma of Determinism [With an Addendum, 2016]2. Causation, Compulsion and Compatibilism II. Responsibility, Skepticism and Moral Sentiment3. Strawson's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility4. Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense5. Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility6. Responsibility, Naturalism and 'the Morality System III. Practical Reason, Art and Manipulation7. Practical Reason and Motivational Skepticism8. Free Will, Art and Morality9. Selective Hard Compatibilism: Manipulation and Moral Standing IV. Pessimism and the Limits of Free Will10. Compatibilist-Fatalism: Finitude, Pessimism and the Limits of Free Will 11. Pessimists, Pollyannas and the New Compatibilism12. Free Will Pessimism List of related publicationsIndex