J. Christopher Maloney is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Arizona. He began his career at Oakland University after completing his doctorate at Indiana University. His interests and publications center on foundational issues in the intersection of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Maloney's project is original, ambitious, and timely. His book is one of the first to elaborate a view about the metaphysical nature of perception that is explicitly predicated on a version of the extended mind hypothesis. It engages admirably with decades of conceptual arguments concerning the representational structure of perception and the prospects for direct (and naive) realism.

• Introduction Chapter 1: Intentionalism and Recurrent Cognitive ContentChapter 2: Intentionalism, Cognition, and RepresentationChapter 3: Intentionalism's Troubles BeginChapter 4: Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual ContentChapter 5: Higher Order TheoryChapter 6: Dual Aspect TheoryChapter 7: Direct Realism and the Extended MindChapter 8: Direct Realism and IllusionChapter 9: Direct Realism and Hallucination Works Cited

J. Christopher Maloney is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Arizona. He began his career at Oakland University after completing his doctorate at Indiana University. His interests and publications center on foundational issues in the intersection of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Maloney's project is original, ambitious, and timely. His book is one of the first to elaborate a view about the metaphysical nature of perception that is explicitly predicated on a version of the extended mind hypothesis. It engages admirably with decades of conceptual arguments concerning the representational structure of perception and the prospects for direct (and naive) realism.

• Introduction Chapter 1: Intentionalism and Recurrent Cognitive ContentChapter 2: Intentionalism, Cognition, and RepresentationChapter 3: Intentionalism's Troubles BeginChapter 4: Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual ContentChapter 5: Higher Order TheoryChapter 6: Dual Aspect TheoryChapter 7: Direct Realism and the Extended MindChapter 8: Direct Realism and IllusionChapter 9: Direct Realism and Hallucination Works Cited

J. Christopher Maloney is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Arizona. He began his career at Oakland University after completing his doctorate at Indiana University. His interests and publications center on foundational issues in the intersection of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Maloney's project is original, ambitious, and timely. His book is one of the first to elaborate a view about the metaphysical nature of perception that is explicitly predicated on a version of the extended mind hypothesis. It engages admirably with decades of conceptual arguments concerning the representational structure of perception and the prospects for direct (and naive) realism.

• Introduction Chapter 1: Intentionalism and Recurrent Cognitive ContentChapter 2: Intentionalism, Cognition, and RepresentationChapter 3: Intentionalism's Troubles BeginChapter 4: Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual ContentChapter 5: Higher Order TheoryChapter 6: Dual Aspect TheoryChapter 7: Direct Realism and the Extended MindChapter 8: Direct Realism and IllusionChapter 9: Direct Realism and Hallucination Works Cited