Deterrence under Uncertainty:

Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Warfare

AvEdward Geist

Inbunden, Engelska, 2023

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Beskrivning

For decades, films such as WarGames and The Terminator have warned that the combination of artificial intelligence and nuclear weapons might be a recipe for an apocalypse. Might these prophecies of doom become reality in coming decades? Using insights from computer science, Deterrence under Uncertainty: Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Warfare evaluates how AI could make nuclear war winnable, and whether that possibility is likely. Detailed chapters explain how the landscape of nuclear deterrence is changing and debunks the myths of machine intelligence and nuclear weapons. This book gives a practitioner's perspective on how artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies could change the role of nuclear weapons in international relations.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2023-08-31
Mått:161 x 240 x 18 mm
Vikt:628 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:288
Förlag:OUP OXFORD
ISBN:9780192886323

Utforska kategorier

Människa – datorinteraktion inom Data och IT
Artificiell intelligens inom Data och IT
Krig och försvar inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

Edward Geist is a Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation, where his research interests include Russia (primarily defense policy), civil defense, artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, and particularly the potential impact of emerging technologies on nuclear strategy. He is the author of Armageddon Insurance (University of North Carolina Press, 2019).

Recensioner i media

Geist, steeped in the history and craft of deception as a specialist in defence policy and security, thinks even the smartest agent can be made self destructively stupid by subterfuge. Fakery is so cheap and effective that Geist envisions a future where AI-driven "fog-of-war machines" create a world that favours neither side, but backs "those who seek to confound".

Innehållsförteckning

Introduction: Artificial Intelligence and the Nuclear Dilemma The Emerging Strategic Environment From Celluloid Nightmares to Silicon Realities No Place to Hide? Recipe for a WOPR Fog-of-War Machines Strategic Stability in a Deception-Dominant World Conclusion: A Case for (Tempered) Optimism Appendix A: The Mathematics of Tracking Appendix B: A Bayesian Perspective on Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Appendix C: A Rudimentary Model of Ontological Confrontation Index

Mer från samma författare

Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence

Danielle C Tarraf, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Leveille, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, Ali Wyne, Dan Elinoff, Edward Geist, Benjamin N Harris, Eric Hui, Sydne Newberry, Chandler Sachs, Peter Schirmer, Danielle Schlang, Victoria M Smith, Abbie Tingstad, Padmaja Vedula, Kristin Warren