Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons

A Case Study of Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy

AvMatthew Moran,Wyn Q. Bowen

Inbunden, Engelska, 2025

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Beskrivning

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that Syrian government usage of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line. In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons, Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy, covering the presidencies of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion involving both deterrent and compellent variants of that strategy. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria into giving up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions--involving credibility, motivations, and assurances--the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why. Deriving lessons from the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2025-06-11
Mått:156 x 234 x 19 mm
Vikt:567 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Bridging the Gap
Antal sidor:280
Förlag:OUP USA
ISBN:9780197770375

Utforska kategorier

Internationella relationer inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

Matthew Moran is Professor of International Security and Head of the Department of War Studies at King's College London. His research spans a range of security-related issues, and he has published on subjects ranging from the Iranian nuclear challenge to the coercive effects of sanctions. Wyn Q. Bowen is Professor of Non-Proliferation and International Security in the Department of War Studies and Co-Director of the Freeman Air and Space Institute at King's College London. His research has covered a range of issues, including nuclear and missile proliferation and non-proliferation, the Iranian and Libyan nuclear programmes, deterrence, and threat reduction. Previous roles have included Head of the Defence Studies Department and the Head of the School of Security Studies at King's.Jeffrey W. Knopf is Professor of Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS). He previously taught at the University of SouthernCalifornia, the University of California-Santa Cruz, and the Naval Postgraduate School. Since 2012, he has served as the chair of the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies program at MIIS. Dr. Knopf has published widely, mainly on issues related to nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. He has also published research on prospects for deterring terrorism and on the impacts of public opinion and social movements on US foreign policy.

Recensioner i media

The work reviewed here is an important piece in understanding the calculusstates use in deciding to pursue, develop, and use unconventional weapons.

Innehållsförteckning

Preface and Acknowledgments Postscript List of Abbreviations 1. Introduction: Responding to a Dictator's Use of Poison Gas 2. Analytical Framework: Credibility, Motivations, and Assurance as Factors in Coercion Outcomes 3. Syria and Chemical Weapons Prior to 2011: Relevant Precedents and the Evolution of Syria's Capability, Motives, and Strategy 4. From the Red Line to Ghouta 5. The Chemical Disarmament Deal 6. The Return to Chemical Weapons Use 7. Conclusion Epilogue Index