Bridging the Gap – serie

A highly original comprehensive history of US military medicine.Decisions to go to war are often framed in cost-benefit terms, and typically such assessments do not factor in longer term costs. However, recent dramatic improvements in American military medicine have had an unanticipated effect: saving more soldiers' lives has vastly increased long-term, downstream costs of war with profound consequences for global politics in an era of heightened great power competition. In Military Medicine and the Hidden Costs of War, Tanisha M. Fazal traces the modern history of medical treatment and casualty rates in American conflicts from the Civil War to the more recent counterinsurgency wars. As she shows, wars became increasingly survivable for wounded troops, to the point now where a large majority of wounded soldiers survive. Yet the human and financial implications of this steep increase in the wounded-to-killed ratio are dramatic, and her powerful analysis of this shift provides a necessary corrective to how we understand the costs of war. For each major conflict, Fazal analyzes the weapons used, injuries sustained, and policies put in place for veterans' care and pensions. As she argues, these improvements have significant financial and deeply personal implications for the returned wounded and their families, as well as the US government and its citizenry. Fazal's analysis highlights the significance of policymakers underestimating the costs of war, which in turn makes it easier both to initiate and continue military action abroad, contributing to Americas' penchant for engaging in so-called "endless wars." A sweeping political history, Military Medicine and the Hidden Costs of War will fundamentally change our understanding of the lasting consequences of America's wars.

The Hand Behind Unmanned tells the fascinating story of the people, processes, and beliefs that led to the contemporary American unmanned arsenal. It takes an expansive look at automated and autonomous technologies, from mines and torpedoes, to guided bombs and missiles, satellites, and ultimately drones. Instead of asking the question: "why unmanned rather than manned," the book explains why certain types of unmanned systems became popular while others languished in research or in small pockets of the American military. In order to answer this question, Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald use interviews of senior decisionmakers, military doctrine and writings, and historical sources to detail the proliferation of over a hundred years of unmanned weapons in the US arsenal, from mines and balloons to Reapers and Global Hawks. Their exploration reveals how multiple factors--key policy entrepreneurs, like Andy Marshall in the Office of Net Assessment; critical junctures like the fall of the USSR or the 9/11 attacks; beliefs that emerged in the wake of the Vietnam War; and US military service culture--all interacted in complex ways to form today's unmanned arsenal. The Hand Behind Unmanned uses theories of organizational innovation and process tracing of historical cases to explain recent developments, including US precision munition shortfalls and the rise of unmanned aerial platforms. It also foreshadows where the US unmanned arsenal may be headed in the future. Ultimately, the book uses a remarkable case study to illustrate how ideas diffuse across people and organizations to build the weapons of modern warfare.

In 1960, President Kennedy warned of a dangerous future, rife with nuclear-armed states and a widespread penchant for conflict by the end of the century. Thankfully, his prediction failed to pass; in fact, roughly three times as many countries have since opted to give up their nuclear pursuit or relinquish existing weapons than have maintained their arsenals. Nevertheless, clandestine acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by states such as Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and a nuclear North Korea, has reaffirmed the need for United States' commitment to pursuing aggressive counterproliferation strategies, particularly with rogue states. This book looks at the experiences of countries that ventured down the path of nuclear proliferation but were stopped short, and examines how the international community bargains with proliferators to encourage nuclear reversal. It asks why so many states have relented to pressure to abandon their nuclear weapons programs, and which counterproliferation policies have been successful. Rupal N. Mehta argues that the international community can persuade countries to reverse their weapons programs with rewards and sanctions especially when the threat to use military force remains "on the table". Specifically, nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. Historically, the United States has relied on a variety of policy levers--including economic and civilian nuclear assistance and, sometimes, security guarantees, as well as economic sanctions--to achieve nuclear reversal. Underlying these negotiations is the possibility of military intervention, which incentivizes states to accept the agreement (often spearheaded by the United States) and end their nuclear pursuit. The book draws on interviews with current and former policymakers, as well as in-depth case studies of India, Iran, and North Korea, to provide policy recommendations on how best to manage nuclear proliferation challenges from rogue states. It also outlines the proliferation horizon, or the set of state and non-state actors that are likely to have interest in acquiring nuclear technology for civilian, military, or unknown purposes. The book concludes with implications and recommendations for U.S. and global nuclear counterproliferation policy.

The 2011 Arab Spring protests seemed to mark a turning point in Middle East politics, away from authoritarianism and toward democracy. Within a few years, however, most observers saw the protests as a failure given the outbreak of civil wars and re-emergence of authoritarian strongmen in countries like Egypt. But in Delta Democracy, Catherine E. Herrold argues that we should not overlook the ongoing mobilization taking place in grassroots civil society. Drawing upon ethnographic research on Egypt's nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the wake of the uprisings, Herrold uncovers the strategies that local NGOs used to build a more democratic and just society. Departing from US-based democracy advocates' attempts to reform national political institutions, local Egyptian organizations worked with communities to build a culture of democracy through public discussion, debate, and collective action. At present, these forms of participatory democracy are more attainable than establishing fair elections or parliaments, and they are helping Egyptians regain a sense of freedom that they have been denied as the long-time subjects of a dictator. Delta Democracy advances our understanding of how civil society organizations maneuver under state repression in order to combat authoritarianism. It also offers a concrete set of recommendations on how US policymakers can restructure foreign aid to better help local community organizations fighting to expand democracy.

The 2011 Arab Spring protests seemed to mark a turning point in Middle East politics, away from authoritarianism and toward democracy. Within a few years, however, most observers saw the protests as a failure given the outbreak of civil wars and re-emergence of authoritarian strongmen in countries like Egypt. But in Delta Democracy, Catherine E. Herrold argues that we should not overlook the ongoing mobilization taking place in grassroots civil society. Drawing upon ethnographic research on Egypt's nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the wake of the uprisings, Herrold uncovers the strategies that local NGOs used to build a more democratic and just society. Departing from US-based democracy advocates' attempts to reform national political institutions, local Egyptian organizations worked with communities to build a culture of democracy through public discussion, debate, and collective action. At present, these forms of participatory democracy are more attainable than establishing fair elections or parliaments, and they are helping Egyptians regain a sense of freedom that they have been denied as the long-time subjects of a dictator. Delta Democracy advances our understanding of how civil society organizations maneuver under state repression in order to combat authoritarianism. It also offers a concrete set of recommendations on how US policymakers can restructure foreign aid to better help local community organizations fighting to expand democracy.

A critical look into how and why the U.S. military needs to become more adaptable.Every military must prepare for future wars despite not really knowing the shape such wars will ultimately take. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once noted: "We have a perfect record in predicting the next war. We have never once gotten it right." In the face of such great uncertainty, militaries must be able to adapt rapidly in order to win. Adaptation under Fire identifies the characteristics that make militaries more adaptable, illustrated through historical examples and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.Authors David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that militaries facing unknown future conflicts must nevertheless make choices about the type of doctrine that their units will use, the weapons and equipment they will purchase, and the kind of leaders they will select and develop to guide the force to victory. Yet after a war begins, many of these choices will prove flawed in the unpredictable crucible of the battlefield. For a U.S. military facing diverse global threats, its ability to adapt quickly and effectively to those unforeseen circumstances may spell the difference between victory and defeat. Barno and Bensahel start by providing a framework for understanding adaptation and include historical cases of success and failure. Next, they examine U.S. military adaptation during the nation's recent wars, and explain why certain forms of adaptation have proven problematic. In the final section, Barno and Bensahel conclude that the U.S. military must become much more adaptable in order to address the fast-changing security challenges of the future, and they offer recommendations on how to do so before it is too late.

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical.This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first coherent theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies.Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.

A complete guide for how small states can be strikingly successful and influential--if they assess their situations and adapt their strategies.Small states are crucial actors in world politics. Yet, they have been relegated to a second tier of International Relations scholarship. In A Small State's Guide to Influence in World Politics, Tom Long shows how small states can identify opportunities and shape effective strategies to achieve their foreign policy goals. To do so, Long puts small states' relationships at the center of his approach. Although small states are defined by their position as materially weaker actors vis-a-vis large states, Long argues that this condition does not condemn them to impotence or irrelevance. Drawing on typological theory, Long builds an explanation of when and how small states might achieve their goals. The book assesses a global range of cases-both successes and failures-and offers a set of tools for scholars and policymakers to understand how varying international conditions shape small states' opportunities for influence.

A complete guide for how small states can be strikingly successful and influential--if they assess their situations and adapt their strategies.Small states are crucial actors in world politics. Yet, they have been relegated to a second tier of International Relations scholarship. In A Small State's Guide to Influence in World Politics, Tom Long shows how small states can identify opportunities and shape effective strategies to achieve their foreign policy goals. To do so, Long puts small states' relationships at the center of his approach. Although small states are defined by their position as materially weaker actors vis-a-vis large states, Long argues that this condition does not condemn them to impotence or irrelevance. Drawing on typological theory, Long builds an explanation of when and how small states might achieve their goals. The book assesses a global range of cases-both successes and failures-and offers a set of tools for scholars and policymakers to understand how varying international conditions shape small states' opportunities for influence.

The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives.In Planning to Fail, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict.Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.

Uncertainty surrounds every major decision in international politics. Yet there is almost always room for reasonable people to disagree about what that uncertainty entails. No one can reliably predict the outbreak of armed conflict, forecast economic recessions, anticipate terrorist attacks, or estimate the countless other risks that shape foreign policy choices. Many scholars and practitioners therefore believe that it is better to keep foreign policy debates focused on the facts - that it is, at best, a waste of time to debate uncertain judgments that will often prove to be wrong.In War and Chance, Jeffrey A. Friedman explains how avoiding the challenge of assessing uncertainty undermines foreign policy analysis and decision making. Drawing on an innovative combination of historical and experimental evidence, he shows that foreign policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in international affairs, and shows that placing greater emphasis on assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any foreign policy debate.A clear-eyed examination of the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty, War and Chance provides scholars and practitioners with new foundations for understanding one of the most controversial elements of foreign policy discourse.

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. This argument is reasonable, but, empirically, we see that the US has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, this book provides the first coherent theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies.

Given the turbulence in the international order in recent years, one of the central concerns among observers of world politics is the question of China's ultimate goals. As China emerges as a superpower that rivals the United States, American policymakers grappling with this century's greatest geopolitical challenge are looking for answers to a series of critical questions. Does China have expansive ambitions? Does it have a grand strategy to achieve them? If so, what is it and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, and memoirs by party leaders, to demonstrate that China is in fact playing a long, methodical game to replace America as a regional and global hegemon. He traces the basic evolution of Chinese strategy, showing how it evolved in response to changes in US policy and its position in the world order. After charting these shifts over time, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet "asymmetric" plan for an effective US response to this challenge: one that undermines China's ambitions without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan. Ironically, the approach mirrors China's own current strategy of subtly weakening Chinese leverage in the region and elsewhere while expanding US leverage over China.A bold assessment of what the Chinese government's true foreign policy objectives are, The Long Game offers valuable insight to the most important rivalry in world politics.

Uncertainty surrounds every major decision in international politics. Yet there is almost always room for reasonable people to disagree about what that uncertainty entails. No one can reliably predict the outbreak of armed conflict, forecast economic recessions, anticipate terrorist attacks, or estimate the countless other risks that shape foreign policy choices. Many scholars and practitioners therefore believe that it is better to keep foreign policy debates focused on the facts - that it is, at best, a waste of time to debate uncertain judgments that will often prove to be wrong.In War and Chance, Jeffrey A. Friedman shows how foreign policy officials often try to avoid the challenge of assessing uncertainty, and argues that this behavior undermines high-stakes decision making. Drawing on an innovative combination of historical and experimental evidence, he explains how foreign policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in international politics, and shows how placing greater emphasis on assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any foreign policy debate.A clear-eyed examination of the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty, War and Chance provides scholars and practitioners with new foundations for understanding one of the most controversial elements of foreign policy discourse.

A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.

A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.

For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it?In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that Syrian government usage of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line. In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons, Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy, covering the presidencies of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion involving both deterrent and compellent variants of that strategy. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria into giving up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions--involving credibility, motivations, and assurances--the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why. Deriving lessons from the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers.

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that Syrian government usage of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line. In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons, Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy, covering the presidencies of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion involving both deterrent and compellent variants of that strategy. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria into giving up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions--involving credibility, motivations, and assurances--the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why. Deriving lessons from the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, governments around the world have expelled, en masse, more than 30 million people. Yet despite its prevalence, mass expulsion remains an understudied phenomenon as scholarly attention has been directed toward the gravest atrocities--genocide and mass killing--or toward forced migration more broadly. Mass Expulsion: The Politics of Forced Population Removal examines why and how governments expel, providing a systematic, cross-regional account of mass expulsion over the longue durée. Using the original Government-Sponsored Mass Expulsion (GSME) dataset, the book explains when and where expulsion occurs, who is targeted, and what regimes are most likely to expel. The book identifies two overarching categories of mass expulsion--security and economic--and develops a typology of four corresponding types: counter-irredentist, counter-subversive, reprisal, and nativist. It advances a theory of mass expulsion that traces the decision-making process, showing how key structural, proximate, precipitating, and intervening factors combine to shape the conditions under which governments expel or are restrained. Evidence is drawn from archival research conducted at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Nations archives in Geneva, Switzerland. This research contributes to the fields of international peace and security, political violence, and forced migration. Conceptually, it fills a gap in the literature by systematically examining mass expulsion as a distinct eliminationist policy aimed at the intentional removal of ethnic groups. Theoretically, it extends existing explanations beyond war and security threats, highlighting an entire class of expulsions targeting perceived economic threats. The book deepens our understanding of critical atrocity restraints, demonstrating the importance of alliances, the “homeland” state of the target group, and international organizations. These restraints generate core policy recommendations that seek to spur greater attention to deterring mass expulsion as a priority for atrocity prevention.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, governments around the world have expelled, en masse, more than 30 million people. Yet despite its prevalence, mass expulsion remains an understudied phenomenon as scholarly attention has been directed toward the gravest atrocities--genocide and mass killing--or toward forced migration more broadly. Mass Expulsion: The Politics of Forced Population Removal examines why and how governments expel, providing a systematic, cross-regional account of mass expulsion over the longue durée. Using the original Government-Sponsored Mass Expulsion (GSME) dataset, the book explains when and where expulsion occurs, who is targeted, and what regimes are most likely to expel. The book identifies two overarching categories of mass expulsion--security and economic--and develops a typology of four corresponding types: counter-irredentist, counter-subversive, reprisal, and nativist. It advances a theory of mass expulsion that traces the decision-making process, showing how key structural, proximate, precipitating, and intervening factors combine to shape the conditions under which governments expel or are restrained. Evidence is drawn from archival research conducted at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Nations archives in Geneva, Switzerland. This research contributes to the fields of international peace and security, political violence, and forced migration. Conceptually, it fills a gap in the literature by systematically examining mass expulsion as a distinct eliminationist policy aimed at the intentional removal of ethnic groups. Theoretically, it extends existing explanations beyond war and security threats, highlighting an entire class of expulsions targeting perceived economic threats. The book deepens our understanding of critical atrocity restraints, demonstrating the importance of alliances, the “homeland” state of the target group, and international organizations. These restraints generate core policy recommendations that seek to spur greater attention to deterring mass expulsion as a priority for atrocity prevention.

A detailed account, based on fieldwork and interviews, of how Women, Peace and Security norms are militarized and put at the service of operational effectiveness.International organizations and governments want to increase women's participation in military operations and peacebuilding. Gender equality is increasingly seen as the antidote to conflict, a key factor in achieving stability. While feminist activism inspired the emergence of these norms on gender and conflict, they were institutionalized through the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, with the military at the forefront of those changes. In Deploying Feminism, Stéfanie von Hlatky tells the story of how the military has been delegated authority to advance gender equality as part of their activities, while simultaneously tackling increasingly complex threats. Drawing upon fieldwork and interviews, she illustrates how NATO, the world's foremost alliance, has even embedded these ideas in the planning and execution of its missions. For troops deployed on NATO missions, this often means seeking out women in their operating area to improve intelligence gathering activities. While this helps the mission, does it help women and conflict-affected communities? Because of the military's focus on operational effectiveness above all else, von Hlatky argues that there is a distortion of WPS norms, as gender equality concerns fade into the background. Looking at NATO's ongoing operations in Iraq, Kosovo, and the Baltics, Deploying Feminism details the process by which Women, Peace and Security norms are militarized and put at the service of operational effectiveness. Further, it shows why an adjustment is necessary for gender equality to become a true planning priority.

The core argument of Cyber Persistence and Campaigning is straightforward: to avoid being drawn into unwanted crisis or armed conflict (or prevail in both if they emerge), policymakers must apply cyber resources through coherent continuous cyber campaigns that set and structure conditions and circumstances to their advantage. The optimal way for policymakers to do this is to conduct concurrent campaigns for cyber contingency and advantage in competition. Cyber resources are not optimized as substitutes for conventional or nuclear weapons in war, or for coercion in crisis settings. They are, rather, the anticipatory stage-setters for those contingencies. As such, they are critical to ensuring the military forces that deter and fight are always ready and able to do so, and they play a parallel, simultaneous role in advancing state interests short of those contingencies. This means that states seeking and sustaining cyber initiative will have the advantage across the competition-conflict spectrum over those that do not. Cyber persistence through campaigning combines a single logic with a 21st century artform. Those states that master this combination will thrive in the digital age.

The core argument of Cyber Persistence and Campaigning is straightforward: to avoid being drawn into unwanted crisis or armed conflict (or prevail in both if they emerge), policymakers must apply cyber resources through coherent continuous cyber campaigns that set and structure conditions and circumstances to their advantage. The optimal way for policymakers to do this is to conduct concurrent campaigns for cyber contingency and advantage in competition. Cyber resources are not optimized as substitutes for conventional or nuclear weapons in war, or for coercion in crisis settings. They are, rather, the anticipatory stage-setters for those contingencies. As such, they are critical to ensuring the military forces that deter and fight are always ready and able to do so, and they play a parallel, simultaneous role in advancing state interests short of those contingencies. This means that states seeking and sustaining cyber initiative will have the advantage across the competition-conflict spectrum over those that do not. Cyber persistence through campaigning combines a single logic with a 21st century artform. Those states that master this combination will thrive in the digital age.