The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

Why Strategic Superiority Matters

AvMatthew Kroenig

Häftad, Engelska, 2020

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Beskrivning

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. This argument is reasonable, but, empirically, we see that the US has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, this book provides the first coherent theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2020-07-17
Mått:155 x 231 x 20 mm
Vikt:408 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Bridging the Gap
Antal sidor:280
Förlag:OUP USA
ISBN:9780197506585

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Mer om författaren

Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He is the author or editor of seven books, including The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the Present.

Recensioner i media

Because there is now more available data, the time is right to reexamine some long-held assumptions about whether a significant advantage in nuclear weapons is, in fact, an advantage. Matthew Kroenig offers new theoretical and methodological perspectives in his attempt to do just that. Theoretically, he proposes a synthesis of two theories to argue that nuclear superiority allows for a state to be more aggressive in international crises. Methodologically, he seeks to demonstrate the effect a single independent variable has on multiple dependent variables. Either one of these advances would represent a significant contribution to the literature of nuclear statecraft and compellence. Kroenig combines both in a thorough and compelling work.

Innehållsförteckning

Preface New Foreword for the Paperback Edition Abbreviations and Acronyms Introduction PART I. The Advantages of Nuclear Advantages Chapter 1. Toward a New Theory of Nuclear Deterrence: The Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory Chapter 2. Nuclear War Outcomes Chapter 3. The Correlates of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes Chapter 4. The Mechanisms of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes Chapter 5. Nuclear Deterrence and Compellence PART II. The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages? Chapter 6. Strategic Stability Chapter 7. Arms Races Chapter 8. Nuclear Nonproliferation Chapter 9. The Defense Budget Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index