Abraham L. Newman is Associate Professor in the Government Department and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He is the Director of the Mortara Center for International Studies and senior editor at International Studies Quarterly. His research focuses on the ways in which economic interdependence and globalization have transformed international politics. His publications include Protectors of Privacy: Regulating Personal Data in the Global Economy (Cornell University Press, 2008), and How Revolutionary was the Digital Revolution: National Responses, Market Transitions, and Global Technologies (co-edited wtih John Zysman, Stanford University Press, 2006). His work has appeared in a range of journals including Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, Science, and World Politics.Elliot Posner is Associate Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University where he teaches courses on international relations, the international political economy, finance, the European Union, Sub-Saharan Africa and international non-governmental organizations. His research focuses on international cooperation and conflict, regulatory power and new market formation. His publications on the politics of finance explore the internal sources of the EU's external power, the changing terms of Transatlantic regulatory cooperation and the political relevance of transnational soft law. He is the author of The Origins of Europe's New Stock Markets (Harvard University Press, 2009), and articles and book chapters that appear in the European Journal of International Relations, Journal of European Public Policy, International Organization, the Review of International Political Economy, World Politics and edited volumes.

In Voluntary Disruptions, [Abraham Newman and Elliot Posner] present a fascinating and important argument about the potential for disruption created by non-enforceable (or voluntary) agreements on financial-market regulation.

• 1: Introduction 2: International Soft Law and Mechanisms of Political Disruption 3: International Financial Regulation 4: Legitimacy Claims and Pre-Crisis Transatlantic Alignment 5: Arena Expansion and the Transnationalization of Business Advocacy 6: Disruptive Soft Law and Post-Crisis US Reform 7: Conclusion

Abraham L. Newman is Associate Professor in the Government Department and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He is the Director of the Mortara Center for International Studies and senior editor at International Studies Quarterly. His research focuses on the ways in which economic interdependence and globalization have transformed international politics. His publications include Protectors of Privacy: Regulating Personal Data in the Global Economy (Cornell University Press, 2008), and How Revolutionary was the Digital Revolution: National Responses, Market Transitions, and Global Technologies (co-edited wtih John Zysman, Stanford University Press, 2006). His work has appeared in a range of journals including Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, Science, and World Politics.Elliot Posner is Associate Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University where he teaches courses on international relations, the international political economy, finance, the European Union, Sub-Saharan Africa and international non-governmental organizations. His research focuses on international cooperation and conflict, regulatory power and new market formation. His publications on the politics of finance explore the internal sources of the EU's external power, the changing terms of Transatlantic regulatory cooperation and the political relevance of transnational soft law. He is the author of The Origins of Europe's New Stock Markets (Harvard University Press, 2009), and articles and book chapters that appear in the European Journal of International Relations, Journal of European Public Policy, International Organization, the Review of International Political Economy, World Politics and edited volumes.

In Voluntary Disruptions, [Abraham Newman and Elliot Posner] present a fascinating and important argument about the potential for disruption created by non-enforceable (or voluntary) agreements on financial-market regulation.

• 1: Introduction 2: International Soft Law and Mechanisms of Political Disruption 3: International Financial Regulation 4: Legitimacy Claims and Pre-Crisis Transatlantic Alignment 5: Arena Expansion and the Transnationalization of Business Advocacy 6: Disruptive Soft Law and Post-Crisis US Reform 7: Conclusion