Torin Alter is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama, USA. He is author of articles in Mind, Philosophical Studies, and elsewhere; co-author of A Dialogue on Consciousness and The God Dialogues: A Philosophical Journey (both OUP); and co-editor of Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader and Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (both OUP).

What can Mary know about the conscious experience of color from inside her black and white room, and what follows for the metaphysics of consciousness? Torin Alter gives a state-of-the-art analysis of these issues. He focuses especially on the crucial gap between structural and phenomenal aspects of reality, and articulates a powerful version of Russellian monism that traces this gap to a deep level of the physical world. Along the way he gives a definitive defense of anti-materialist arguments from objections old and new, shedding new light on this crucial nexus between consciousness, knowledge, and reality.

• Part I: The case for the epistemic gap 1: Introduction 2: The significance of structure 3: Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance 4: Phenomenal knowledge without experience 5: Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge 6: Phenomenal representation Part II: The case for the modal gap 7: Deduction and necessity 8: Epistemic-modal bridge principles 9: The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma 10: Consequences of social externalism 11: The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts Part III: The case for the ontological gap 12: The supervenience requirement on physicalism 13: Two final objections 14: Two final objections 15: The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration Conclusion

Torin Alter is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama, USA. He is author of articles in Mind, Philosophical Studies, and elsewhere; co-author of A Dialogue on Consciousness and The God Dialogues: A Philosophical Journey (both OUP); and co-editor of Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader and Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (both OUP).

What can Mary know about the conscious experience of color from inside her black and white room, and what follows for the metaphysics of consciousness? Torin Alter gives a state-of-the-art analysis of these issues. He focuses especially on the crucial gap between structural and phenomenal aspects of reality, and articulates a powerful version of Russellian monism that traces this gap to a deep level of the physical world. Along the way he gives a definitive defense of anti-materialist arguments from objections old and new, shedding new light on this crucial nexus between consciousness, knowledge, and reality.

• Part I: The case for the epistemic gap 1: Introduction 2: The significance of structure 3: Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance 4: Phenomenal knowledge without experience 5: Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge 6: Phenomenal representation Part II: The case for the modal gap 7: Deduction and necessity 8: Epistemic-modal bridge principles 9: The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma 10: Consequences of social externalism 11: The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts Part III: The case for the ontological gap 12: The supervenience requirement on physicalism 13: Two final objections 14: Two final objections 15: The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration Conclusion

Torin Alter is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama, USA. He is author of articles in Mind, Philosophical Studies, and elsewhere; co-author of A Dialogue on Consciousness and The God Dialogues: A Philosophical Journey (both OUP); and co-editor of Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader and Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (both OUP).

What can Mary know about the conscious experience of color from inside her black and white room, and what follows for the metaphysics of consciousness? Torin Alter gives a state-of-the-art analysis of these issues. He focuses especially on the crucial gap between structural and phenomenal aspects of reality, and articulates a powerful version of Russellian monism that traces this gap to a deep level of the physical world. Along the way he gives a definitive defense of anti-materialist arguments from objections old and new, shedding new light on this crucial nexus between consciousness, knowledge, and reality.

• Part I: The case for the epistemic gap 1: Introduction 2: The significance of structure 3: Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance 4: Phenomenal knowledge without experience 5: Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge 6: Phenomenal representation Part II: The case for the modal gap 7: Deduction and necessity 8: Epistemic-modal bridge principles 9: The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma 10: Consequences of social externalism 11: The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts Part III: The case for the ontological gap 12: The supervenience requirement on physicalism 13: Two final objections 14: Two final objections 15: The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration Conclusion