A large literature describes the benefits of federalism and regional autonomy for fostering peace and democracy in countries experiencing conflict among ethnic groups. Political leaders are often reticent about devolution, because they fear empowering political opponents or discontented groups that chafe under centralized rule. Yet, adopted early and generously in a conflict sequence, devolution has the potential to moderate it. In heterogeneous units (states in a federation, autonomous regions elsewhere), however, devolution often has an array of unanticipated dysfunctions, the most profound of which are conflicts among groups contending to control a unit and contested claims of priority based on indigenousness, some of them fostered by central governments or constitutional provisions.The book consists of three parts. The first depicts the arguments for, and benefits anticipated from, devolving power to subordinate units. The second part provides an evidence-based critique of the fears among political leaders and scholars about the risks inherent in devolving that power, especially the risk of secession. The third part of the book comprises an examination of the dysfunctions of devolution and provides a compelling analysis of judicial decisions and the role of courts in six Asian and African countries in dealing with them, especially with ethnic discrimination. Horowitz identifies a number of techniques in the toolkit of many judiciaries for addressing these problems, which remain unsolved. The final chapter points to the need for central governments to anticipate recurrent dysfunctions and specify legal rights in advance of devolution and suggests a few modest ways to strengthen the rule of law for purposes of remediation.
