Peg O’Connor is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Gender, Women, and Sexuality Studies Program at Gustavus Adolphus College. She is the author of Oppression and Responsibility: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory (Penn State, 2002) and co-editor (with Naomi Scheman) of Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Penn State, 2002).

“Peg O’Connor offers a compelling Wittgensteinian alternative to the realist-versus-antirealist debates in metaethics. Grounded in ‘deep conventionalism,’ she argues that ‘our world is not one part natural and one part social, but rather is a shared world where these are intermingled and tangled, resulting in ways of acting and conventions that are inescapably bound together.’ In a field that remains paralyzed by whether there exist objective moral values, O’Connor’s work offers a breath of fresh air.”—Wendy L. Lee, Bloomsburg University

• ContentsAcknowledgmentsProlegomenon to Any Future Feminist MetaethicsList of Abbreviations1.Feminist Wittgensteinian Metaethics? Revising the Big Book2.Does the Fabric of the World Include Moral Properties? Realist/Antirealist Debates3.Neither a Realist nor an Antirealist Be4.Felted Contextualism: Heterogeneous Stability5.Normativity and Grammar6.Philosophical Rags and Mice: Changing the Subject in Moral Epistemology7.Stability and Objectivity: The Felted WorldBibliographyIndex

Peg O’Connor is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Gender, Women, and Sexuality Studies Program at Gustavus Adolphus College. She is the author of Oppression and Responsibility: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory (Penn State, 2002) and co-editor (with Naomi Scheman) of Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Penn State, 2002).

“Peg O’Connor offers a compelling Wittgensteinian alternative to the realist-versus-antirealist debates in metaethics. Grounded in ‘deep conventionalism,’ she argues that ‘our world is not one part natural and one part social, but rather is a shared world where these are intermingled and tangled, resulting in ways of acting and conventions that are inescapably bound together.’ In a field that remains paralyzed by whether there exist objective moral values, O’Connor’s work offers a breath of fresh air.”—Wendy L. Lee, Bloomsburg University

• ContentsAcknowledgmentsProlegomenon to Any Future Feminist MetaethicsList of Abbreviations1.Feminist Wittgensteinian Metaethics? Revising the Big Book2.Does the Fabric of the World Include Moral Properties? Realist/Antirealist Debates3.Neither a Realist nor an Antirealist Be4.Felted Contextualism: Heterogeneous Stability5.Normativity and Grammar6.Philosophical Rags and Mice: Changing the Subject in Moral Epistemology7.Stability and Objectivity: The Felted WorldBibliographyIndex

Peg O’Connor is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Gender, Women, and Sexuality Studies Program at Gustavus Adolphus College. She is the author of Oppression and Responsibility: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory (Penn State, 2002) and co-editor (with Naomi Scheman) of Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Penn State, 2002).

“Peg O’Connor offers a compelling Wittgensteinian alternative to the realist-versus-antirealist debates in metaethics. Grounded in ‘deep conventionalism,’ she argues that ‘our world is not one part natural and one part social, but rather is a shared world where these are intermingled and tangled, resulting in ways of acting and conventions that are inescapably bound together.’ In a field that remains paralyzed by whether there exist objective moral values, O’Connor’s work offers a breath of fresh air.”—Wendy L. Lee, Bloomsburg University

• ContentsAcknowledgmentsProlegomenon to Any Future Feminist MetaethicsList of Abbreviations1.Feminist Wittgensteinian Metaethics? Revising the Big Book2.Does the Fabric of the World Include Moral Properties? Realist/Antirealist Debates3.Neither a Realist nor an Antirealist Be4.Felted Contextualism: Heterogeneous Stability5.Normativity and Grammar6.Philosophical Rags and Mice: Changing the Subject in Moral Epistemology7.Stability and Objectivity: The Felted WorldBibliographyIndex