Fighting Talk

Colin S. Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies, and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Reading, England. He is the author of nineteen books, more than three hundred articles, and several dozen reports for the government. His work is often cited in the fields of arms control, maritime strategy, nuclear strategy, and strategic culture.

[Gray] has sustained and enhanced a reputation as the English-speaking world's leading strategic thinker. Gray's work has always eschewed abstraction for empiricism. His theoretical studies never fall prey to wishful thinking or mirror-imaging. His strategic analyses incorporate strong historical elements. Fighting Talk, though unpretentious in structure, represents the distillation of a career's worth of study and reflection in these contexts.

• PrefaceIntroduction: Getting the Big Things Right EnoughPart I: War and Peace1 The Contexts of War Are All Important2 War Is About Peace, and Peace Can Be About War3 It Is More Difficult to Make Peace than It Is to Make War4 War Works!—But Always Has Unintended and Unanticipated Consequences5 Peace and Order Are Not Self-Enforcing, They Have to Be Organized and Kept by Somebody6 Not Only Polities, but Societies and Their Cultures Make War and Peace7 Reason Reigns Over War, but Passion and Chance Threaten to Rule8 There Is More to War than Warfare9 Policy Is King, but Often Is Ignorant of the Nature and Character of War10 War Is Always a GamblePart II: Strategy11 Knowledge of Strategy Is Vital: The Flame of Strategic Understanding Has to Be Kept Lit12 Strategy Is More Difficult than Policy or Tactics13 Bad Strategy Kills, but So Also Do Bad Policy and Tactics14 If Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz Did Not Say It, It Probably Is Not Worth Saying15 The Strategic "Concept du Jour" Will Be Tomorrow's Stale Left-Over, Until It Is Rediscovered, Recycled, and Revealed as a New Truth16 The Enemy Too Has a Vote17 Time Is the Least Forgiving Dimension of Strategy18 Friction Is Unavoidable, but Need Not Be Fatal19 All Strategy Is Geostrategy: Geography Is Fundamental20 Strategy Is Not Wholly Military21 The Impossible Is Impossible; It Is a Condition, Not a Problem for Which a Solution Has Yet to Be FoundPart III: Military Power and Warfare22 People Matter Most23 Military Power Is Trumps in Politics24 Military Excellence Can Only Be Verified by Performance in War25 Military Excellence Cannot Guarantee Strategic Success26 Victory in Battle Does Not Ensure Strategic or Political Success, but Defeat All but Guarantees Failure27 There Is More to War than Firepower: The Enemy Is Not Just a Target Set28 Logistics Is the Arbiter of Strategic OpportunityPart IV: Security and Insecurity29 Bad Times Return30 There Are Always Thugs, Villains, Rogues, and Fools Out There, as Well Some in Here, Who Mean Us Harm31 Superthreats Do Appear32 Prudence Is the Supreme Virtue in Statecraft and Strategy33 Strategic History Punishes Good Intentions34 Defense Costs Are Certain, but Security Benefits Are Uncertain and Arguable35 Arms Can Be Controlled, but Not by Arms ControlPart V: History and the Future36 Nothing of Real Importance Changes: Modern History Is Not Modern37 History Can Be Misused to "Prove" Anything, but It Is All That We Have as a Guide to the Future38 The Future Is Not Foreseeable: Nothing Dates So Rapidly as Today's Tomorrow39 Surprise Is Unavoidable, but Its Effect Is Not40 Tragedy HappensAfterword: Cannon LoreNotesBibliographyIndex