Praeger Security International - Böcker

This book is comprised of essays by nationally recognized scholars and public figures who urge a reassessment of the impact of the nuclear winter hypothesis on current ideas of nuclear deterrence, limited nuclear war, and war fighting doctrines. It provides a timely discussion of the policy implications of the possible effects of nuclear war and creates a dialogue between those who believe that established deterrence policies are adequate and those arguing for a radical reconstruction of those policies. The book also addresses issues touching on the politics of prevention, identifying policies that should be adopted to prevent nuclear war, and the concerned citizens' role in this process.

This book looks at the historic use of foreign language by the U.S. armed forces. Through research into military documents, many of which are generally inaccessible, the author has investigated the purpose and extent of language capability in the armed services. A necessary skill in the acquisition of intelligence, language skill emerges from this study as being of concern as well for command, control, communications, and for civil military operations. The services' efforts to produce language skills are presented historically, from World War I through Vietnam, from extensive cooperation with academic institutions to short-term services contracted from entrepreneurs.

This book looks at the historic use of foreign language by the U.S. armed forces. Through research into military documents, many of which are generally inaccessible, the author has investigated the purpose and extent of language capability in the armed services. A necessary skill in the acquisition of intelligence, language skill emerges from this study as being of concern as well for command, control, communications, and for civil military operations. The services' efforts to produce language skills are presented historically, from World War I through Vietnam, from extensive cooperation with academic institutions to short-term services contracted from entrepreneurs.

The first book to analyze strategic war termination from a policy perspective, Strategic War Termination explores present US policy on termination and recommends strategies for improving it. Taking into account the impact of new weapons technologies, adversaries' expectations, and counter-command attacks, this unique work examines methods for deterrence of global protracted and nuclear wars as well as the conduct and termination of them. Timely and provocative, Strategic War Termination explains what policy is and should be on this pressing subject.

For nearly forty years, U.S. deterrence policy has depended on nuclear weapons, making the modernization of those weapons a key goal of every administration. Nuclear Weapons, Policies, and the Test Ban Issue presents a cogent discussion of the reasons why the United States should actively continue its nuclear weapons program. The authors claim that weapons testing and development has neither kept up with technological advances nor logically followed from professed U.S. policy. They attribute these shortcomings to such forces as budget limitations, alliance politics, domestic politics, and, most importantly, the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

This authoritative volume analyzes decision-making in American foreign policy using Eastern Europe as a case study. It focuses on specific functional issues, such as the influence of the American-Eastern European ethnic population on policy, the economic relationship between the U.S. and Eastern Europe, and the effect American human rights policies have on its dealings with the region. While focusing on this one region, From Potsdam to Poland also considers the intellectual and moral dilemmas that confront the United States in formulating its foreign policy.

This highly specialized volume examines the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for the first time, with critical emphasis on the impact SDI will have on technologically based industries. It reviews the policies and structures in the government, academia, and industry necessary to take full advantage of the commercial potential of the benefits-to-come from the SDI research program.

On February 4, 1985, the New Zealand government refused port access to the American warship U.S.S. Buchanan, on the grounds that it might be carrying nuclear weapons. The events leading up to this refusal, the refusal itself, and later developments relating to it are the subject of this book. The book is divided into four sections. The first deals with the developments within New Zealand that led to the decision to ban nuclear-powered warships and ones that might be armed. The next section examines the relationship between New Zealand and the United States and how this dispute affected it. The third considers the reaction of other countries and the fourth ponders the effects, both immediate and longer term, of the dispute itself and New Zealand-American relations.

Milton Leitenberg has done us a great service. His balanced and comprehensive reconstruction of the history of Soviet submarine operations in Swedish waters will benefit all students of Soviet policy and practice in Northern Europe. The accompanying discussions of the domestic and international political contexts within which those submarine operations were perceived, responded to, and reported on, doubles the value of the work. The full Soviet military rationale for those operations may remain somewhat elusive, but Leitenberg has clearly provided us with a cogent description of their political consequences. Robert G. Weinland, Consultant, Washington, D.CThe book first presents a comprehensive account of the overall incidence of violations, not only in Sweden but in other countries as well, between 1970 and 1987. The author then shows that the provisional, more exploratory stages of the operations in Sweden apparently began well before 1980 and have continued despite the Soviet Union's public campaign for a Nordic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. An analysis of the incursions is given next, including a look at Sweden's response to a problem it may not have anticipated when its own preconceptions and the norms of international behavior were clearly contradicted by reality. Also discussed are the motives behind the Soviet submarine operations and various provocation theories.

One of this century's greatest tragedies, and one of our greatest challenges, has been the movement of millions of refugees. . . . This book, by an expert in the field, gives a comprehensive view of where we have been, and where we are likely to go, in coping with this world's endless stream of refugees. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee AffairsThis survey of post-World War II refugees by a former UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees focuses on those assisted through the United Nations and its affiliated Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee for Migration, and the World Food Program. . . . Smyser argues that refugee problems and crises are far from over and will continue to require urgent international cooperative treatment. He presents a lengthy agenda with recommendations `to preserve the global structure of refugee protection and care, to help those who need help, to prevent abuse, and to bring refugee concepts and practices into a framework appropriate to our troubled times. Choice

Games of Chicken proposes basing nuclear weapons policies on both historical and analytical arguments. Schwartzman analyzes the trade-off between the aggression risk, which U.S. policy has sought to minimize, and the pre-emption risk, which has been ignored. This analysis is then applied to policy developments under each of the post-war U.S. presidents. The historical analysis also demonstrates the importance of the role of myths in the development of policy, most notably: the myth of the nuclear strategy expert; the evil empire myth; and the economic necessity myth. Finally, the author proposes a viable solution to the increasing build-up of nuclear weapons, one which would minimize the preemption risk.

The contributors come from a range of backgrounds, but meet one imperative qualification: residence or repeated physical presence in South Africa. By bringing together this notable collection of authors, Kitchen impresses upon readers (especially Americans) that the South Africa that will emerge from today's strife will be determined primarily by internal factors. As this volume notes, recent evidence suggests that externally devised initiatives such as Eminent Persons interlocutors, constructive engagement, disinvestment, and economic sanctions can affect but not mandate how or whether South Africa's fractured society can find a way to avoid a lemmings scenario. Policy makers, policy analysts, and other actors both in the U.S. government and policy community concerned with what is going on inside South Africa today will find South Africa to be provocative reading.

The contributors come from a range of backgrounds, but meet one imperative qualification: residence or repeated physical presence in South Africa. By bringing together this notable collection of authors, Kitchen impresses upon readers (especially Americans) that the South Africa that will emerge from today's strife will be determined primarily by internal factors. As this volume notes, recent evidence suggests that externally devised initiatives such as Eminent Persons interlocutors, constructive engagement, disinvestment, and economic sanctions can affect but not mandate how or whether South Africa's fractured society can find a way to avoid a lemmings scenario. Policy makers, policy analysts, and other actors both in the U.S. government and policy community concerned with what is going on inside South Africa today will find South Africa to be provocative reading.

Lethal Frontiers is one of the first samples of Soviet scholarship on nuclear strategy readily available to Western readers. A rising star in the Soviet foreign policy establishment, Arbatov offers a remarkable view of the evaluation of U.S. nuclear policy and strategy. This scholarly book is free of the ideological constraints and negative effects of excessive Soviet secrecy so often characterizing Soviet works on this subject. The author begins by tracing the buildup of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and examines initial U.S. reactions to the achievement of strategic nuclear parity by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s. From notions of flexible response, to the Schlesinger doctrine, and ideas of fighting a limited nuclear war, Arbatov argues that the U.S. national security establishment has had enormous difficulty in reconciling itself with Soviet strategic parity. Consequently, U.S. strategy and arms programs have invariably collided with and contradicted the arms control process and efforts to decrease U.S.-Soviet tensions. In light of this, and of the new Soviet approach to security, Arbatov observes the challenges lying ahead in the new era of Soviet-American relations.

Much of the freedom of expression enjoyed by civilians in the United States, and guaranteed to them by the constitution, is illegal for American military personnel. Freedom of Expression in the American Military addresses the issues at the root of this First Amendment dichotomy. The author examines free expression for service members as a communications issue rather than simply an issue of military traditions and necessities. The book examines court decisions involving First Amendment rights, the literature on military communication, and models that illustrate how communication works. Then the author presents and critiques the communication model used by the military to curtail the First Amendment rights of soldiers.Among the subjects covered in this volume is an interesting comparison of the First Amendment rights of civilians and soldiers who protested U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Using such examples and analysis of both communication and First Amendment literature, the author concludes that the view of military as a separate society and the validity of the rationales used to curb military speech are only weakly supported. Thus, she concludes, no compelling proof of need exists for the degree of curtailment of expression existing in the military. The final chapter offers a revised model of military communication that allows greater freedom of expression without jeopardizing the military mission.

Terrorism and the State is a volume on the political economy of terrorism. Emphasizing the role of ideological systems in the definition of political violence, this book is theoretical, historical, and critical. It first presents and refutes the two most commonly expressed definitions of terrorism: the absolutist view, a simplistic picture of international deviance on the part of fanatics, and the liberal relativistic view, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Both views focus on the definition of behaviors rather than on the real relations of domination and subjugation embodied in the social structure. Neither view can be used as a vehicle when analyzing institutionalized forces of domination through fear. The author suggests that there is presently a double standard of terrorism, one for the state and the other for its opponents. Terrorism and the State reframes the terrorism debate. A historical review supports a revisionist position that places the issue in the context of global relations. Attention is given to the role of the media in the selective selling of international terrorism. Having established his framework, the author proceeds through the investigation of historically grounded cases to systematically analyze state terrorism: the coercive power of today's nuclear weapon state, global apartheid, terrornoia, settler terrorism, holy terror, and, finally, surrogate terrorism.Terrorism and the State develops its framework for the terrorism debate within the first three chapters: The Ideology of Terrorism, Terrorism and the State, and Mediaspeak: The Selling of International Terrorism. The remainder of this volume concentrates on historically grounded cases: The Real Nuclear Terrorism; Racial Terrorism: Apartheid in South Africa; Terrornoia and Zonal Revolution: The Case of Libya; Settler Terrorism: Israel and the P.L.O.; Holy Terror: Iran and Irangate; Surrogate Terrorism: The United States and Nicaragua

The Latin Amnerican drug trade has become one of the major problems confronting the United States in the late twentieth century. The key dynamic of that trade is cocaine, which is primarily produced in the Andean nations of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The cocaine trade's influence, however, has spread outwards into other Andean states--Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Moreover, countries on the Andean periphery, such as Panama, have become enmeshed in the trade as transit points and money-lanudering centers. This book examines the cocaine trade in the Andean states and Panana with a special emphasis given to the relationship between cocaine and power.MacDonald examines the linkages between the political and economic power of those in the cocaine trade, the narcotraficantes, and the governments in the region. Important parts of this issue are the drug-insurgency nexus and the significance of the debt crisis. Although the book concentrates on the structure of the cocaine industry in the Andean states and Panama, the final chapters offer policy options on how to contend with the problem.

Mark Katz's highly readable and useful overview of Soviet military interest in the Third World will be an important resource for anyone doing research in this field. Francis Fukuyama, Deputy Director for East-West Relations, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of StateIn his timely and thoughtful assessment of Gorbachev's evolving military policy, Mark Katz cautions against concluding that Moscow has lost interest in retaining and acquiring positions of influence in areas such as Angola, the Arab world, Ethiopia, and Central America. By detailing for us the `new thinking' in Moscow, and the new policies that it has spawned in the USSR's Third World Policy, he has made a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the challenge that Gorbachev poses to the United States. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of Political Science, University of PennsylvaniaThis book examines the changes that have occurred in Soviet military policy toward the Third World under Gorbachev. Mark Katz studies Gorbachev's active pursuit of detente with the West in terms of his ambitious economic reform efforts. Katz maintains that since Gorbachev regards detente as so essential for the achievement of perestroika, he has adopted a less aggressive military policy in the Third World. This book examines the Soviet military statements since Gorbachev came to power, which indicate that the Soviet military, for the most part, does not oppose Gorbachev's retrenchment from the Third World. The Soviet military even seems to approve the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.The author points out that while Gorbachev has de-emphasized the expansion of Moscow's base network in the Third World, he has vigorously sought to reduce U.S. military access to it. Gorbachev has attempted to do this through a stepped-up diplomatic campaign to convince moderate Third World states that the Soviet Union is not their enemy and hence there is no need to ally with Washington against Moscow. Katz also analyzes the Soviet support of regional security proposals for Asia and the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, parts of Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. Katz maintains that if these security proposals are accepted, U.S. military access to them would definitely be reduced and that the Soviets' de-emphasis on obtaining new bases could mean that moderate Third World governments may become more amenable to accepting these regional security proposals.

Are the nuclear industry's efforts to prepare the public during emergency situations adequate? This study critiques risk communication programs and questions whether these programs have convinced residents close to nuclear power plants to follow instructions in an emergency. The government invests the responsibility of nuclear risk communication essentially with the utilities that operate the plants, with little supervision by either federal or state officials. The study demonstrates that such programs do not communicate critical safety information, that people living near plants will make decisions in an emergency contrary to those recommended, and that disparity exists between technical and lay perceptions of risk. A unique investigation of non-governmental public communication, the book analyzes the persuasive efforts of corporate advocacy and risk management.Risk communication is seen as a substitute for the more stringent regulatory measures necessary to protect public health and safety in a technological age. Speak No Evil begins with a discussion of issues surrounding risk communication, then describes how the narrative of the promotional history of nuclear power developed and eventually contaminated modern nuclear risk communication messages. Students of organizational communication, rhetoric, political communication, and public relations issue management will find this book illuminating.

Giovanni Graziani examines Gorbachev's reforms in terms of economic relations with the Third World and presents a detailed and sophisticated statistical analysis of Soviet economic assistance and trade. This book critically evaluates all the statistical data from Soviet and United Nations sources and presents the changing Soviet attitude toward indebtedness and the growing dissatisfaction expressed by both the Third World and the U.S.S.R. over the management of Soviet aid.The author notes a contradiction between Gorbachev's strategy and statistical evidence for the first years of his office, but stresses that the recent moves to trade with South Korea and other Asian countries are bound to affect the Soviet geographical pattern of trade. His estimates show the increasing importance of agricultural products and fuels in Soviet imports and of military equipment and fuels in its exports. Particularly interesting is what Graziani calls the oil imbroglio, a triangular trade pattern in which the U.S.S.R. has increased its imports of crude oil from the Third World for reexport to the West in order to stabilize its export earnings in hard currencies threatened by falling oil prices. The book concludes that no expansion of Soviet economic ties with the Third World is foreseen in the short run and that eventual Soviet participation in international economic organizations might further entail new conflicts with the Third World.

Giovanni Graziani examines Gorbachev's reforms in terms of economic relations with the Third World and presents a detailed and sophisticated statistical analysis of Soviet economic assistance and trade. This book critically evaluates all the statistical data from Soviet and United Nations sources and presents the changing Soviet attitude toward indebtedness and the growing dissatisfaction expressed by both the Third World and the U.S.S.R. over the management of Soviet aid.The author notes a contradiction between Gorbachev's strategy and statistical evidence for the first years of his office, but stresses that the recent moves to trade with South Korea and other Asian countries are bound to affect the Soviet geographical pattern of trade. His estimates show the increasing importance of agricultural products and fuels in Soviet imports and of military equipment and fuels in its exports. Particularly interesting is what Graziani calls the oil imbroglio, a triangular trade pattern in which the U.S.S.R. has increased its imports of crude oil from the Third World for reexport to the West in order to stabilize its export earnings in hard currencies threatened by falling oil prices. The book concludes that no expansion of Soviet economic ties with the Third World is foreseen in the short run and that eventual Soviet participation in international economic organizations might further entail new conflicts with the Third World.

This work offers a broad interpretation of the extraordinary changes that have taken place in Soviet arms control policy since Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet head of state in March of 1985. Gorbachev's policy is usually portrayed as an effort to ease the Soviet defense burden and to improve relations with the West, but Daniel Calingaert goes further, arguing that the Gorbachev leadership has embarked on a basically new policy of nuclear disarmament. Calingaert outlines how this policy allows the Soviets to divert resources to industrial modernization, restructure the armed forces, and join the global economy, thereby revitalizing their economic strength and exerting a renewed influence on international affairs.Organized thematically rather than chronologically, the book concentrates on interpreting the major decisions affecting nuclear weapons in Europe, strategic arms, and ballistic missile defenses. The first five chapters explore the various components of Soviet arms control policy: the personnel and institutional changes that gave impetus to revisions in Soviet security policy; the strong economic inducements to pursue disarmament; changes in national security aims that provide the rationale for undertaking nuclear disarmament; the impact of revisions in nuclear strategy on force requirements and on Soviet disarmament initiatives; and the pursuit of foreign policy objectives through arms control. A final chapter interprets Soviet conduct of nuclear arms talks in light of this analysis of the nation's security, nuclear strategy, and foreign policy. With its broad overview of Gorbachev's arms control policy, as well as its original analyses, this study will be a useful resource for both students and experts of Soviet policy and security studies.

This book analyzes President Bush's new Regional Defense Strategy--the master plan that will guide the transformation of U.S. defense policy for the post-Cold War era. Most recent books on defense prescribe how U.S. policy ought to change or critique past policies without taking Bush's new strategy into account. This book takes a different approach, providing the first comprehensive assessment of the new Regional Defense Strategy, analyzing the consequences for U.S. forces and alliance relations, and examining the political difficulties of transforming President Bush's vision into reality. It explains major changes in U.S. defense doctrine and strategy, force and command structure, future programming requirements, and the major question of how such a significant change was managed in the United States.Much is new and even radical about the Regional Defense Strategy. Bush has built it around the concept of reconstitution, under which the United States will scrap the forces needed to fight a large-scale conflict and rely on the ability to create new forces if such a conflict looms on the horizon. However, reconstitution will impose demanding requirements on U.S. intelligence and the defense industrial base. Congress will also have an important say over this proposal and the new national security strategy as a whole. So will U.S. allies in Europe and the Far East, some of whom are already moving to recast the strategy's proposals for basing U.S. forces abroad. The primary audience of this book is politico-military strategic planners and those interested in organizational theory, management of change in large organizations, and government policy.

This book is an analysis of President Bush's Regional Defense Strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. This strategy involves a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental United States where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the United States would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation Desert Storm. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25 percent budget cut negotiated with Congress, a greatly depleted Russian threat, and a new international security environment that assumes two-years' warning of a European-centered global war with the former USSR.There are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends: (1) the continued decline of the Russians as a threat to world stability; (2) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges; (3) the behavior of the allies and Congress; and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy, but rather a fundamental revision of the way the United States has approached defense since 1945. Students and scholars interested in politico-military strategy and government policy will find this book of great interest.

Although the Pacific islands were front-page news during the 1941-1945 Pacific War, today they are seldom in the American consciousness--except as a perception of Micheneresque tropical paradises. But the islands--10,000 strong and scattered over nearly one-fifth of the earth's surface--still straddle or remain close to the sea and air lanes that link the United States with Australia and Asia, and carry nearly one-half of U.S. foreign trade. New political interests also exist with the recent emergence of a new panoply of independent Pacific island states, extension of U.S. sovereignty to other Pacific islands, and new defense responsibilities in several states linked to the United States by free association.John C. Dorrance offers an exceptionally authoritative and comprehensive assessment of U.S. interests in and policy toward a poorly understood region. The islands, highly aid dependent and uniquely vulnerable to external influences, have experienced insurrections, military coups, secessionist rebellion, political assassinations, Soviet in-roads, and even Libyan mischief-making. Ethnic conflict and developmental problems also threaten democratic institutions and the region's stability. Dorrance thoroughly explores the regional policy environment and the issues that face the United States. His book is of lasting value to scholars and especially to policy-makers and practitioners.

This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.

The United States has committed itself to an unprecedented number and variety of arms control and nonproliferation obligations in the past decade. At least ten major new agreements have been signed since 1986, and some of them have now been in force for several years. After a brief review of Cold War arms control and the lessons to be learned from it, the book surveys the commitments the United States has made during the past decade across the full spectrum of arms control, including nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. It describes the bureaucratic structure the United States has created to implement its own commitments and to verify that other countries are complying with theirs. The book then analyzes the costs and benefits of the new regimes, the persistent problems encountered in managing them, and the causes and appropriate responses to incidents of noncompliance. It concludes with an argument for continued U.S. leadership in international arms control.