Mark N. Katz - Böcker

Mark Katz's highly readable and useful overview of Soviet military interest in the Third World will be an important resource for anyone doing research in this field. Francis Fukuyama, Deputy Director for East-West Relations, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of StateIn his timely and thoughtful assessment of Gorbachev's evolving military policy, Mark Katz cautions against concluding that Moscow has lost interest in retaining and acquiring positions of influence in areas such as Angola, the Arab world, Ethiopia, and Central America. By detailing for us the `new thinking' in Moscow, and the new policies that it has spawned in the USSR's Third World Policy, he has made a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the challenge that Gorbachev poses to the United States. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of Political Science, University of PennsylvaniaThis book examines the changes that have occurred in Soviet military policy toward the Third World under Gorbachev. Mark Katz studies Gorbachev's active pursuit of detente with the West in terms of his ambitious economic reform efforts. Katz maintains that since Gorbachev regards detente as so essential for the achievement of perestroika, he has adopted a less aggressive military policy in the Third World. This book examines the Soviet military statements since Gorbachev came to power, which indicate that the Soviet military, for the most part, does not oppose Gorbachev's retrenchment from the Third World. The Soviet military even seems to approve the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.The author points out that while Gorbachev has de-emphasized the expansion of Moscow's base network in the Third World, he has vigorously sought to reduce U.S. military access to it. Gorbachev has attempted to do this through a stepped-up diplomatic campaign to convince moderate Third World states that the Soviet Union is not their enemy and hence there is no need to ally with Washington against Moscow. Katz also analyzes the Soviet support of regional security proposals for Asia and the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, parts of Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. Katz maintains that if these security proposals are accepted, U.S. military access to them would definitely be reduced and that the Soviets' de-emphasis on obtaining new bases could mean that moderate Third World governments may become more amenable to accepting these regional security proposals.

Mark Katz's highly readable and useful overview of Soviet military interest in the Third World will be an important resource for anyone doing research in this field. Francis Fukuyama, Deputy Director for East-West Relations, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of StateIn his timely and thoughtful assessment of Gorbachev's evolving military policy, Mark Katz cautions against concluding that Moscow has lost interest in retaining and acquiring positions of influence in areas such as Angola, the Arab world, Ethiopia, and Central America. By detailing for us the `new thinking' in Moscow, and the new policies that it has spawned in the USSR's Third World Policy, he has made a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the challenge that Gorbachev poses to the United States. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of Political Science, University of PennsylvaniaThis book examines the changes that have occurred in Soviet military policy toward the Third World under Gorbachev. Mark Katz studies Gorbachev's active pursuit of detente with the West in terms of his ambitious economic reform efforts. Katz maintains that since Gorbachev regards detente as so essential for the achievement of perestroika, he has adopted a less aggressive military policy in the Third World. This book examines the Soviet military statements since Gorbachev came to power, which indicate that the Soviet military, for the most part, does not oppose Gorbachev's retrenchment from the Third World. The Soviet military even seems to approve the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.The author points out that while Gorbachev has de-emphasized the expansion of Moscow's base network in the Third World, he has vigorously sought to reduce U.S. military access to it. Gorbachev has attempted to do this through a stepped-up diplomatic campaign to convince moderate Third World states that the Soviet Union is not their enemy and hence there is no need to ally with Washington against Moscow. Katz also analyzes the Soviet support of regional security proposals for Asia and the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, parts of Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. Katz maintains that if these security proposals are accepted, U.S. military access to them would definitely be reduced and that the Soviets' de-emphasis on obtaining new bases could mean that moderate Third World governments may become more amenable to accepting these regional security proposals.

What did Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika mean for future Soviet support of Marxist revolution in the third world? In this book, four experts on Soviet relations with the third world take a sharp-eyed look at the role the Soviet Union played in providing assistance to Marxist revolutionaries and assess the changes in policy that occurred under Gorbachev's leadership. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and other Western nations regarded Soviet support of revolutions in developing countries as a serious threat to Western security interests. Yet the Soviet Union learned that it could not successfully initiate revolution in other countries; at best, it could only assist revolutionary groups that rose up against existing governments. Because the authors do not share a common perspective, their essays offer a detailed and challenging analysis of the complexities that have defined the Soviet Union's support of Marxist revolutions in the past and that will shape Soviet policy in the future.

As the United States withdraws its combat troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, politicians, foreign policy specialists, and the public are worrying about the consequences of leaving these two countries. Neither nation can be considered stable, and progress toward democracy in them - a principal aim of America and the West - is fragile at best. But, international relations scholar Mark N. Katz asks: Could ending both wars actually help the United States and its allies to overcome radical Islam in the long term? Drawing lessons from the Cold War, Katz makes the case that rather than signaling the decline of American power and influence, removing military forces from Afghanistan and Iraq puts the U.S. in a better position to counter the forces of radical Islam and ultimately win the war on terror. He explains that since both wars will likely remain intractable, for Washington to remain heavily involved in either is counter-productive. Katz argues that looking to its Cold War experience would help the U.S. find better strategies for employing America's scarce resources to deal with its adversaries now.This means that, although leaving Afghanistan and Iraq may well appear to be a victory for America's opponents in the short term-as was the case when the U.S. withdrew from Indochina-the larger battle with militant Islam can be won only by refocusing foreign and military policy away from these two quagmires. This sober, objective assessment of what went wrong in the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ways the West can disentangle itself and still move forward draws striking parallels with the Cold War. Anyone concerned with the future of the War on Terror will find Katz's argument highly thought provoking.

As the United States withdraws its combat troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, politicians, foreign policy specialists, and the public are worrying about the consequences of leaving these two countries. Neither nation can be considered stable, and progress toward democracy in them-a principal aim of America and the West-is fragile at best. But, international relations scholar Mark N. Katz asks: Could ending both wars actually help the United States and its allies to overcome radical Islam in the long term? Drawing lessons from the Cold War, Katz makes the case that rather than signaling the decline of American power and influence, removing military forces from Afghanistan and Iraq puts the U.S. in a better position to counter the forces of radical Islam and ultimately win the war on terror. He explains that since both wars will likely remain intractable, for Washington to remain heavily involved in either is counter-productive. Katz argues that looking to its Cold War experience would help the U.S. find better strategies for employing America's scarce resources to deal with its adversaries now.This means that, although leaving Afghanistan and Iraq may well appear to be a victory for America's opponents in the short term-as was the case when the U.S. withdrew from Indochina-the larger battle with militant Islam can be won only by refocusing foreign and military policy away from these two quagmires. This sober, objective assessment of what went wrong in the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ways the West can disentangle itself and still move forward draws striking parallels with the Cold War. Anyone concerned with the future of the War on Terror will find Katz's argument highly thought provoking.