Stephen J. Cimbala – författare

The first book to analyze strategic war termination from a policy perspective, Strategic War Termination explores present US policy on termination and recommends strategies for improving it. Taking into account the impact of new weapons technologies, adversaries' expectations, and counter-command attacks, this unique work examines methods for deterrence of global protracted and nuclear wars as well as the conduct and termination of them. Timely and provocative, Strategic War Termination explains what policy is and should be on this pressing subject.

Challenge to Deterrence is based on a panel discussion from the 1985 American Political Science Association meeting in New Orleans. In this comprehensive study, eminent scholars address all aspects of U.S. deterrence policy from both technical and policy aspects. Along with discussions on technology currently available to the U.S. and how it can be used more effectively, contributors speculate on Soviet strategic planning and how the U.S. can get allies, such as Japan and Israel, more involved in deterrence activity.

The proverbial Soviet enigma has never seemed more elusive to Western analysts than now. General Secretary Gorbachev's demonstrated willingness to reallocate resources, the upheavals in the internal Soviet system wrought by perestroika and glasnost, and a new strategic reliance on defensive sufficiency may all have profound implications for U.S.-Soviet relations in the future. In this volume, distinguished academics, researchers, and government and military strategists look ahead to the 1990s and examine probable trends in the superpower relationship over the course of the next decade. An excellent source of readings for courses in international relations, national security, and foreign policy, the book focuses particularly on the strategic and military aspects of the relationship.The book is divided into four parts and begins by addressing concepts of strategy. The contributors outline U.S. strategic practice and Soviet global objectives in the context of nuclear deterrence and major conventional wars. In Part II, three chapters discuss the U.S. response to the Soviet threat in terms of U.S. strategy for war in Europe, strategic defense policies, and technology and policy choices. Low intensity conflicts, both unconventional conflicts and Third World involvements, are the subject of Part III. Finally, the contributors assess Soviet military power and U.S. defense resources, examining the question of which nation is currently better prepared to outlast the other in a protracted conflict. A concluding chapter ties the readings together by examining whether the Soviet challenge of the 1990s can best be characterized as peacefully offensive or as operational entrapment.

This is an excellent advanced study in strategy in the nuclear age. Cimbala covers the field thoroughly. He challenges much of the conventional and established approaches to deterrence and crisis management. . . . Cimbala's work is a valuable and refreshing addition to the literature. Scholars will find it enriching and challenging. . . . This is a must acquisition for university and professional libraries. ChoiceCimbala critically examines the rational behind Western defense policies based on deterrence. According to the author, nuclear strategizing--or coping with outside threats--is shortsighted--dependent as it is on economic analogies and technical fixation. It leaves unanswered important questions about the relationships between strategy, politics, and long-term defense goals. Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.

If a nuclear war between American and Soviet forces or the forces of their allies were to start, how would it end? This soberting analysis, one of the few published treatments of War termination, identifies the policies and strategic issues involved in the attempt to control and end a nuclear war should one ever start. The author presents both a comprehensive overview of the theory of war termination and a broad-based analysis of the specific aspects of the question. Throughout, the aim is to provide policymakers and students of military strategy with a tool for improved strategic war planning that emphasizes the importance of flexibility and durability rather than the current emphasis on damage infliction.Cimbala begins by discussing the compelling reasons for studying war termination, among them the potential deterrent value of such study. He then introduced pertinent issues in the literature of war termination, including the notion of an `agreed battle', escalation control, intrawar deterrence, and coercive diplomacy. The bulk of the study is devoted to a detailed discussion of specific aspects of nuclear war determination. Ih his concluding chapter, Cimbala integrates these aspects into a coherrent theory of nuclear war termination and assesses the potential implications of strategic defenses for American nuclear deterrence strategies.

An important contribution to the international relations and military studies literature, this study considers the problem of conflict termination in Europe--an area of immense strategic importance to both the United States and the Soviet Union. The author argues that a well-thought-out policy for conflict termination is lacking within the NATO alliance, which currently relies almost exclusively on policies that emphasize the prevention of war. This lack of a conflict termination strategy, Cimbala asserts, leaves nations open to the danger of a quickly escalating nuclear conflict, should prevention policies fail and a war in Europe actually occur. In developing his arguments, Cimbala considers the relationship between war and politics as perceived by Soviet and Western planners; compares the superpowers' likely views on the process of escalation; and assesses the command, control, and communications perspectives implicit in Soviet and American writings and deployments and their implications for war termination.Cimbala begins with an overview of the problems and choices involved in ending war in Europe under contemporary conditions. Subsequent chapters examine such topics as the philosophical and practical issues related to the problem of preemption; the problem of military stability and its specific applications to modern Europe; and Western and Soviet approaches to the escalation and limitation of war. Soviet perspectives on command and control as well as the Soviet view of war termination receive extended treatment in two chapters. Finally, Cimbala contrasts the orthodox view of mutual assured destruction with the strategic revisionism of defense dominance or mutual assured survival. He concludes that policymakers and military planners must recognize that nuclear weapons will almost certainly be a part of any war in Europe and that termination must focus on limiting the use of these weapons before the pressures of in the field escalation tendencies begin to work against the early conclusion of a conflict. Students and scholars of military policy will find Cimbala's work enlightening and provocative reading.

The profound political changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe during 1989 have forced the United States and its Western European allies to reevaluate both their long held military strategy of nuclear deterrence and the traditional role of NATO in European affairs. In this volume, Stephen Cimbala considers the ways in which American military priorities will have to change now that the tangible threat to Europe has been removed, exploring the options available to America and NATO given the new political and economic realities in Europe and the Soviet Union. Drawing upon a rich literature of Soviet and American defense strategy, Cimbala examines the structure and effectiveness of deterrence as a military strategy, the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons, the likely course of future conflicts, and alternative military strategies.Following an introductory chapter which defines the concepts of deterrence and dissuasion and offers an overview of the changing character of European politics, Cimbala reviews the political context for the development of military strategy in Europe. Subsequent chapters consider the relationship between military stability and the likelihood of winning wars in their initial stages, analyze the issue of deterrence during war, discuss the potential for atypical wars in the future, and investigate the linkages between deception and deterrence. A separate chapter addresses the attempt to substitute non-nuclear dissuasion for nuclear deterrence, in the form of anti-nuclear strategic defenses which could defeat nuclear offenses. In the final chapter, Cimbala summarizes his conclusions and makes some additional observations about the implications of our new view of NATO and deterrence. Students of international relations, foreign policy, and military studies will find Cimbala's work enlightening and provocative reading.

This study is an initial effort to assess the post-Cold War international environment in terms of its implications for the relationship between force and policy. This relationship between force and policy in the future, based on a retrospective look at U.S., allied NATO, and Soviet doctrine strategy is one of uncertain fidelity and potentially destabilizing content. Assuming that informed speculation about the post-Cold War world requires a sense of connection to the historical past, Cimbala sees that issues with which Europe was forced to deal prior to the Second World War will reappear in the aftermath of a socially reconstructed Soviet Union, a defunct Warsaw Pact, and a newly reunited Germany. He finds that nationalism and economic competition will contend for the attention of policymakers along with traditional security issues for the remainder of the 1990s and thereafter. The peace and stability provided for more than forty years by U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear bipolarity and the bloc politics of the Cold War will no longer be taken for granted.Cimbala sees that opportunities exist for collaboration between Washington and Moscow, and among other major powers, toward the development of a systems consciousness in favor of international peace and stability. Military security was not only the cause of peace in post-World War II Europe it was also the product of political stability made possible by economic prosperity. The economic prosperity of Western Europe eventually proved too embarrassing for the regimes of Eastern Europe to maintain their political legitimacy and the demise of communism in part came from the process of transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial age. This work will interest students and scholars in security and international studies, as well as policy analysts and policy makers concerned with world affairs.

As proven by the recent discovery of ongoing research and tests in India and Pakistan, the nuclear age is not dead. Nuclear weapons, deployed in plentiful numbers during the Cold War by the Americans and Soviets, and, in lesser numbers, by others, were nevertheless controlled in their use by the essential equivalence, of U.S. and Soviet strategic power and by the ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to dominate the international security environment by means of their global military power. Now the setting within which nuclear weapons exist has been transformed.Now that the Cold War has ended, and the Soviet Union has vanished, states seeking nuclear weapons operate under decision making rules that are sometimes opaque to Western observers. If the end of the Cold War leads to the unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons, Cimbala stresses that a combination of military hubris and arms control insolvency could lead to new nuclear crises or worse. The author provides a provocative analysis for policy makers and professional military staff as well as scholars and researchers involved with international relations, security studies, and arms control.

This edited collection considers the future of nuclear weapons in world politics in terms of security issues that are important for U.S. and other policy makers. The spread of nuclear weapons also is related to the equally dangerous proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, and of ballistic missiles of medium and longer ranges.Cold War studies of nuclear weapons emphasized the U.S.-Soviet relationship, deterrence, and bilateral arms control. A less structured post-Cold War world will require more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of roles that nuclear weapons might play in the hands of new nuclear states or non-state actors. As the essays suggest as well, the possibility of terrorism by means of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction introduces other uncertainties into military and policy planning. An important analysis for scholars, students, and researchers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

The future of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in the 21st century is not entirely predictable from the Cold War past. Nor is it easy to foresee on the basis of what has happened since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Cimbala contends that nuclear weapons and the psychology of nuclear deterrence will remain important after 2000, but the character of that importance will change. No longer will nuclear weapons be the dominators of military technology. Instead, advanced technology conventional weapons, based on information and electronics, will supplant nuclear weapons as the instruments of military supremacy in the 21st century.What, Cimbala asks, can be expected of nuclear weapons in the 21st century, given what we have learned from previous experience in the Cold War and in the 1990s? Cimbala expects that nuclear weapons will spread among currently non-nuclear states, and states with regional grievances or hegemonic aspirations will seek to deploy small nuclear forces as deterrents against neighbors or against outside intervention by the United States in regional conflicts. Regional rogue states may also obtain nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, as Cimbala explains, the international balance of power is unlikely to change. As he makes clear, power will be less dependent on deployed military platforms and more dependent on information warfare. A thoughtful and provocative analysis that will be of particular interest to policy makers, scholars, and other researchers involved with arms control, security studies, and international relations.

The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic On War, introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.

Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled. This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved.They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship between the United States and Russia—one characterized by cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars, and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues.

Cimbala shows why the prevention, management, and concluding of war all require an understanding of the subjective aspects of decision making as well as the hardware and tactics of military operations. A review of past cases of U.S. security policy decision making and a preview of some future problems are combined to distill important lessons about coping with conflict in the post-Cold War world.These lessons include the awareness that some conflicts are unnecessarily provoked or prolonged on account of the gap between the perspectives and experiences of civilian policy makers and the views of the armed forces leadership. Another important lesson is that, in resolving or managing conflicts, perceptions, and expectations of leaders filter out alternatives that might have led to preferred solutions had they been attempted in good time. Of particular interest to policy makers, military professionals, and researchers involved with contemporary military issues.

Cimbala argues that nuclear complacency is based on a misreading of history and on unsound political and military analysis. The stability factors built into the Cold War international system are now missing. The spread of nuclear weapons after the Cold War moved toward regional actors outside of Europe, some with religious or national scores to settle. Technology transfer of ballistic missiles and other delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical as well as nuclear weapons, brings the danger of nuclear eruption closer to reality. Finally, the mechanism of deterrence that seemed so dependable as a means of war prevention from 1947 to 1991 only seems so by virtue of nostalgia.The early decades of the Cold War were made somewhat unpredictable by uncertain U.S.-Soviet political relations, by nuclear force building based on worst-case estimates, and by rickety command and control systems that could have failed both sides in a crisis. The Soviets and Americans gradually improved their relationship and stabilized Cold War competition, including nuclear rivalry, but they had more than 40 years to practice and no immediate territorial disputes. As Cimbala makes clear, it cannot be assumed that the Soviet-American nonbelligerence of the Cold War is transferable into a multipolar, post-Cold War international system marked by spreading weapons and trigger-sensitive control systems. This provocative analysis will be of interest to all scholars, students, and policy makers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

Cimbala analyzes military persuasion—the art of using armed force to support diplomacy, deterrence, crisis management, unconventional conflicts, peace operations, and other military activities short of major conventional war. As he shows, military persuasion requires that policy makers and diplomats understand the subtle interaction between force and diplomacy; each supports, or destroys, the other, depending upon the situation. Even conventional wars have aspects of armed persuasion. The Powell doctrine that calls for overwhelming force in case of any U.S. military intervention was not even employed by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell in the Gulf War of 1991, despite the popular impression to the contrary. Since U.S. policy is not based on imperial policing, but on constructive engagement with the object of supporting democratic regimes and market economies, the use of deterrence and limited military commitments of highly trained, specialized warrior-diplomats will be typical of 21st century-conflicts.As Cimbala shows in his various case studies, armed forces are used most of the time for coercion, not for mass destruction. Yet much professional military thinking, expert lay opinion, and U.S. government analysis presupposes that there is a clear dividing line between all-out peace and all-out war. In addition, U.S. political culture is insensitive to the requirement for matching the political objective to the military means available, as opposed to clamoring for a psychologically satisfying form of victory. Despite these apparent obstacles, Cimbala maintains that the United States must master military persuasion because its resources for defense are limited and its commitments are ubiquitous. This book will be of particular interest to scholars, students, and professionals involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

Cimbala shows why the prevention, management, and concluding of war all require an understanding of the subjective aspects of decision making as well as the hardware and tactics of military operations. A review of past cases of U.S. security policy decision making and a preview of some future problems are combined to distill important lessons about coping with conflict in the post-Cold War world.These lessons include the awareness that some conflicts are unnecessarily provoked or prolonged on account of the gap between the perspectives and experiences of civilian policy makers and the views of the armed forces leadership. Another important lesson is that, in resolving or managing conflicts, perceptions, and expectations of leaders filter out alternatives that might have led to preferred solutions had they been attempted in good time. Of particular interest to policy makers, military professionals, and researchers involved with contemporary military issues.

The future of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in the 21st century is not entirely predictable from the Cold War past. Nor is it easy to foresee on the basis of what has happened since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Cimbala contends that nuclear weapons and the psychology of nuclear deterrence will remain important after 2000, but the character of that importance will change. No longer will nuclear weapons be the dominators of military technology. Instead, advanced technology conventional weapons, based on information and electronics, will supplant nuclear weapons as the instruments of military supremacy in the 21st century.What, Cimbala asks, can be expected of nuclear weapons in the 21st century, given what we have learned from previous experience in the Cold War and in the 1990s? Cimbala expects that nuclear weapons will spread among currently non-nuclear states, and states with regional grievances or hegemonic aspirations will seek to deploy small nuclear forces as deterrents against neighbors or against outside intervention by the United States in regional conflicts. Regional rogue states may also obtain nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, as Cimbala explains, the international balance of power is unlikely to change. As he makes clear, power will be less dependent on deployed military platforms and more dependent on information warfare. A thoughtful and provocative analysis that will be of particular interest to policy makers, scholars, and other researchers involved with arms control, security studies, and international relations.

Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled. This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved.They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship between the United States and Russia—one characterized by cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars, and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues.

There is probably no area of more crucial concern nor one more subject to possible misunderstanding and riddled with paradox than nuclear weapons and their use, not only in war, but as deterrents to war. In Strategic Impasse, Cimbala examines the critical issues, problems, and paradoxes inherent in the current nuclear situation. It is from a fundamental contradiction--the usefulness of nuclear weapons versus the undesirability of nuclear war--that nuclear deadlock arises. Their usefulness as deterrents is based on their destructive potential and the balance of power in Europe cannot be adjusted until the inflexible, bipolar balance of terror is addressed. Ironically, superpower sovereignty in nuclear first strike/retaliation capability, shared across the divided East-West political buffer zone, created the impetus for improvements in conventional warfare. To the extent war can be contained below the nuclear threshold, conventional weaponry contributes to deterrence by denial. One difficulty lies in the improbability of completely isolating the nuclear from the conventional battlefield in a European scenario. Also, a level of superpower force perceived to be adequate in peacetime might prove to be an inadequate intrawar deterrent. Because of the underdevelopment of conceptual frameworks, credible deterrence--the creation of nuclear campaigns designed to prevent war--remains conjectural. Highly usable weapons require a command system that can provide for simultaneous fighting and escalation, but escalation beyond a certain level conflicts with control and therefore usability. In turn, low expectations of weapon usability may weaken deterrence. In Gorbachev's defensive sufficiency, forces for aggression and surprise attack would be diminished, while forces for defense would be strengthened. The problem lies not only in differentiating between offensive and defensive weaponry but in achieving a consensus on such a definition by NATO's member countries.The book is divided into three parts: the first section, Issues of Theory and Strategy, scrutinizes the relationship between offense and defense and examines SDI and more inclusive strategic defense matters. It also questions the connection between policy objectives and force, and explores the complication of externalities, such as relations with allies. In section two, Stretching Deterrence, Cimbala reviews the operational art likely to be employed by the Soviets in a conventionally fought European war and defines and appraises the sensor-cyber revolution in technology and its impacts on preferred strategies. The final part, Beyond Deterrence, considers war termination scenarios and related issues, including sociopolitical aspects, surveys the part nuclear weapons play in superpower competition in the Third World, and explains how issues of sovereignty effect deterrence, avoidance, and future super power relations. Strategic Impasse will enable scholars and students of military affairs as well as political scientists and government officials to see beyond current nuclear rhetoric and to make informed judgments on an issue that fundamentally affects this nation's and the world's future.

The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including reductions in forces and political realignment, remains disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas that are most important to actual security.Broad aspects of the problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between political and military levels of analysis discussed in the conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of nature and the state of war, explains how they apply to the problem of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war, including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on the New Soviet Thinking and why the probability of accidental and inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four, reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and students of military affairs, political scientists, government officials, and members of the military establishment will find the up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on this profoundly important world issue.

Knowing how to end war and to prevent the escalation of conflict is of paramount importance today when weapons of mass destruction have spread beyond the control of major powers and democratically accountable governments, and when regional and global stability have become more precarious. Stephen Cimbala and Sidney Waldman have drawn together prominent analysts with different perspectives to discuss key issues before and after the Cold War. This authoritative and provocative study assesses military and political strategies of serious concern to military historians and professionals, political scientists, academics, and policymakers.The book covers all the major aspects of conflict termination before and after the Cold War and defines the basic concepts and principles involved. Noted contributors offer insights into how military and political strategies to end and limit various types of conflict must adapt to political change, to nationalism, irredentism, and boundary disputes. Chapters deal with deterrence, Soviet military doctrine, an American-Soviet war, the changing role of nuclear weapons, behavioral and institutional factors, the maritime component, civil wars, coalition war, nuclear deterrence and political hostility. The book ends with new determinations about the major issues and points to future research agendas.

Although considerable attention has been paid to deterrence theory and crisis management, the equally important topic of ending wars has been virtually ignored. Conflict termination is the stepchild of U.S. strategy for a number of reasons. Thinking about how wars should end presupposes acceptance of the fact that war—especially nuclear war— is possible. Further, analyzing options for ending conflicts implies less-than-total victory, a concept that not only runs counter to the U.S. approach to warfare but also raises the specter of “limited war,†an approach that fell into disfavor following Korea and Vietnam. Finally, defining conflict termination objectives assumes that we think more about ends than means, that we know what is important to us and why, and thus understand the risks we will accept to defend specific interests and objectives. The contributors examine a wide variety of topics, ranging from Soviet and U.S. views on conflict termination to past, present, and future U.S. military service contributions. Their aim is to demonstrate the importance of careful evaluation of conflict termination goals during peacetime because when war begins passions and emotions will cloud decisionmaking.

This book examines a wide variety of topics, ranging from Soviet and U.S. views on conflict termination to past, present, and future U.S. military service contributions. It demonstrates the importance of careful evaluation of conflict termination goals during peacetime.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to develop a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system has both short-range and long-range risks as well as potential benefits. For the most part, however, strategic, technological, and political issues relevant to SDI have been analyzed in isolation from one another. This book provides a more inclusive framework for assessing the possible development and deployment of a BMD system by the United States or the Soviet Union. Contributors discuss the risks for arms race stability, probable reactions of the Soviet Union to any U.S. space-based defense system, and implications for the stability of extended deterrence commitments to NATO European allies. They also evaluate Soviet research and development programs in missile defense that must be considered in any extrapolation of the requirements for U.S. deterrence in the next several decades.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to develop a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system has both short-range and long-range risks as well as potential benefits. For the most part, however, strategic, technological, and political issues relevant to SDI have been analyzed in isolation from one another. This book provides a more inclusive framework for assessing the possible development and deployment of a BMD system by the United States or the Soviet Union. Contributors discuss the risks for arms race stability, probable reactions of the Soviet Union to any U.S. space-based defense system, and implications for the stability of extended deterrence commitments to NATO European allies. They also evaluate Soviet research and development programs in missile defense that must be considered in any extrapolation of the requirements for U.S. deterrence in the next several decades.

This study establishes that the political, economic and military-technological changes that transform the international system also alter the way in which a state views its and others' responsibilities and burdens for responding to international crises. It assesses the distribution of the costs of raising and supporting arms of service, the risks of deploying them overseas and using them in combat or peace operations, and the extent to which members have a responsibility for maintaining international order in the context of three instances of multinational military intervention: the Multinational Force deployment in Lebanon in 1982-83; the first Persian Gulf War in 1990-91; and the UN and NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This book looks at the prospects for international cooperation over nuclear weapons proliferation in the 21st century.Nuclear weapons served as stabilizing forces during the Cold War, or the First Nuclear Age, on account of their capability for destruction, the fear that this created among politicians and publics, and the domination of the nuclear world order by two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the potential for nuclear weapons acquisition among revisionist states, or even non-state actors including terrorists, creates the possibility of a 'wolves eat dogs' phenomenon in the present century. In the 21st century, three forces threaten to undo or weaken the long nuclear peace and fast-forward states into a new and more dangerous situation: the existence of large US and Russian nuclear weapons arsenals; the potential for new technologies, including missile defenses and long-range, precision conventional weapons, and a collapse or atrophy of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the opening of the door for nuclear weapons to spread among more than the currently acknowledged nuclear states.This book explains how these three 'weakening' forces interact with one another and with US and Russian policy-making in order to create an environment of large possibilities for cooperative security - but also of considerable danger. Instead, the choices made by military planners and policy-makers will create an early twenty-first century story privileging nuclear stability or chaos. The US and Russia can, and should, make incremental progress in arms control and nonproliferation. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation and arms control, strategic studies, international security and IR in general.Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University. He is the author of numerous works in the fields of international security, defense studies, nuclear arms control and other topics. He has consulted for various US government agencies and defense contractors.