What Stalin Knew

The Enigma of Barbarossa

AvDavid E. Murphy

Häftad, Engelska, 2007

546 kr

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Beskrivning

“A riveting account of one of history’s greatest blunders.”—William L. O’Neill, The New LeaderThis extensively researched book illuminates many of the enigmas that have surrounded the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, offering keen insights into Stalin’s thinking and the reasons for his catastrophic blunder. “If, after the war, the Soviet Union had somehow been capable of producing an official inquiry into the catastrophe of 6/22—comparable in its mandate to the 9/11 commission here—its report might have read a little like [this book]. . . . Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider’s grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used—or not.”—Niall Ferguson, New York Times Book Review"A fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment that culminated in Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June 1941. Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented."—Henry A. Kissinger

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2007-03-30
Mått:156 x 235 x 22 mm
Vikt:535 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:352
Förlag:Yale University Press
ISBN:9780300119817

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David E. Murphy, now retired, was chief of CIA’s Berlin base from the early 1950s to 1961 and then became chief of Soviet operations at CIA headquarters in the U. S. He is coauthor of Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, also published by Yale University Press.

Recensioner i media

"'A fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment that culminated in Hitler's invasion of Russia in June 1941. Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented.' Henry A. Kissinger 'Murphy comes to his subject as a retired chief of Soviet operations in the Central Intelligence Agency. The result is an account by an American intelligence insider about the practice of espionage and counter-espionage in Stalin's USSR. And it is a gripping tale he tells.' Robert Service, Sunday Times 'If, after the war, the Soviet Union had somehow been capable of producing an official inquiry into the catastrophe of 6/22 - comparable in its mandate to the 9/11 commission here - its report might have read a little like this book... Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider's grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used - or not.' Niall Ferguson, New York Times Book Review"