Identity Theory of Truth

AvJulian Dodd

Inbunden, Engelska, 2000

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Beskrivning

This work argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting "modest identity theory", while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2000-06-20
Mått:140 x 216 x 16 mm
Vikt:422 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:200
Upplaga:2008
Förlag:Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN:9780333682265

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Mer om författaren

JULIAN DODD is at the Centre for Philosophy, Department of Government, University of Manchester. He has published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Analysis and Mind.

Recensioner i media

'Dodd's book presents a clear, thorough account of work on identity theories of truth...Dodd's clear, thorough exposition of the issues, and his engagement with minimalism, rewards close study.' - Michael Hay, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 'Exceptionally clearly argued...this is an excellent book...Dodd has thought-provoking things to say about the work of Ramsay, Tarski, Blackburn, Prior, Vendler, Rundle, and Salmon...The book is so well written that it could serve as a partisan introduction to truth for postgraduates and advanced undergraduates. Indeed, it could serve as a model of how to write good, clear philosophical prose. Overall, the book can profitably be read by anyone interested in the philosophy of truth.' - Alexander Miller, Mind

Innehållsförteckning

Preface Truthmakers, Facts and States of Affairs: A Critique of Correspondence Propositions, Indirect Speech and Truthbearers The Nature of Propositions: Thoughts versus States of Affairs Facts are True Thoughts From Correspondence to Identity A Variety of Deflationism Defended Aberrations of Rival Identity Theories Bibliography Index